Commentary
Volume Fifty-nine, Number Two, February 1975

The Defense Budget and Israel

Edward N. Luttwak

A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER?

Robert W. Tucker

The Democrats' Dilemma / Elliott Abrams

Christianity and the Jewish People / Frank Talmage

Visiting the Hirshhorn / Sonya Rudikoff

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Theater: The English Invasion / Jack Richardson

Books in Review: Edward Grossman/James R. Adams/
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
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Letters from Readers

Men and Marriage

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Without stopping to cavil at some of George Gilder's subsidiary points in his article, "In Defense of Monogamy" [November 1974] (it would be difficult, for example, to document an increase in impotence, rape, and homosexuality in recent times), one must accept his major point: marriage is by far the best status for men. The evidence on this is so impressive as to be all but irrefutable (see, for example, Jessie Bernard, *The Future of Marriage*, 1972; Walter R. Gove, *Social Forces*, 1972; and Lenore Radloff, NIMH, unpublished study of depression, 1974).

But Mr. Gilder is barking up the wrong tree when he addresses himself to the footloose bachelor, the male sexual revolutionary, or the *Playboy* aficionado. It is to women Mr. Gilder should address himself. For if one blade in his analytic scissors is sharp, the other is blunt.

Marriage is not as good for women as it is for men. Emile Durkheim, the master sociologist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in his classic . . . work, *Suicide*, noted that marriage reduced suicide among men but increased it among women. . . .

Since World War II a convincing body of research data has corroborated Durkheim's conclusion. Still, until now, whatever its drawbacks, marriage was the best option open for most women. So they sought marriage—much to the benefit of men, as Mr. Gilder reminds us—and convinced themselves that they were happy. But something seems to be happening, the significance of which is not yet altogether clear; clear enough, though, to cause Mr. Gilder alarm. He is quite right when he tells us that many single women "are not eager to get married." Young women seem to be rethinking their options, and marriage seems not to rank as high as it formerly did—they are not rushing precipitously into marriage. The proportion of young women twenty to twenty-four years of age who are unmarried has increased dramatically since 1960, from 28 per cent then to 39 per cent today. (The increase among men was minor, from 53 per cent to 57 per cent.) . . .

A variety of explanations has been invoked to explain the dysfunctional effects of marriage on the mental health of women: biological (discounted by most researchers because it does not fit never-married women); sociological, in terms of a generalized role factor (Gove) or of a structural factor—the way marriage is institutionalized for women in our society (Bernard); and clinical. The sociological explanations are based largely on statistical or epidemiological trends while the clinical explanations attempt to get at causative factors. Lenore Radloff, in her unpublished study of depression, has tried to tie the two together. She uses a "learned helplessness" model of depression proposed by Martin E. P. Seligman. A generalized scenario to explain much of the poor mental health of so many married women would read something like this: in order to prepare girls for marriage as it has been institutionalized in our society, we have in the past socialized them to be "feminine," which has been defined as dependent. Such "learned helplessness" renders them vulnerable to depression, conceived as the result of learning that one's responses are unrelated to outcomes.

The term "alienation" has been so overextended in trying to explain modern man's malaise that it has become almost useless. But in the sense of feelings of powerlessness it is a useful construct when applied to married women. . . .

Strong support for the powerlessness theory comes from Radloff's study of depression. In this study never-married women who were heads of households—which means presumably that they made decisions governing their own lives which they could implement—showed up remarkably well, even compared with married men. If in addition to being heads of households, they had household incomes of $12,000 or more, they were less depressed than married men with the same household income. But never-married women who were not heads of households were worse off than married women, and even worse than never-married men who were not heads of households. Nor did living in a household with an income of $12,000 or over help them either. No

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wonder young women, becoming accustomed to a modicum of control over the course of their lives, are delaying, if not wholly eschewing, marriage.

Though I agree with Mr. Gilder's general thesis about the benign effect of marriage on men, I find myself at a loss as to how to react to his sexism, not only as exhibited in his almost complete ignorance of the impact of marriage on the mental health of women, but also in his treatment of women as supine sex objects to be rationed among men for the sake of assuring a just distribution, to protect men from too severe competition for women. He writes man-to-man as though women were goods to be divided up. Look, guys, he says, without monogamy—one-woman-per-man—you may get left high and dry with no women at all. You may not be able to stand the competition from the rich and powerful who will win all the sexy girls. You'll end up with no wife at all. A fate as bad as death, if not worse. And here are the statistics to prove it. . . .

This line of argument may win over some men. But where does it leave women? Is this any way to win them over? Is this any way to make them want to marry those men?

JESSIE BERNARD
National Institute of Education
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

George Gilder makes a very strong case for the marriage of all adult males. He neglects, however, to mention the statistics which indicate that married women experience considerably greater incidence of mental illness and physical illness than single women do. When one looks at all the statistics, it seems that men are better off being married, while women are better off remaining single. This, to me, is the real problem which confronts society. It is a very serious problem, one much more serious and much more complex than the problem Mr. Gilder discusses with obvious bias. How is the problem to be solved? Do we create a Hobbesian jungle somewhere to which we can ship those single males who cause trouble? Is there some way to educate men or change them to achieve greater equality between the sexes? Does the missing portion of the male *Y* chromosome have anything to do with the inequality? Or do women remain subservient to the weaker male? Must women continue to sacrifice themselves . . . in order to keep civilization going? This is a challenging problem for social scientists to tackle, and one hopes they will do so before the Hobbesian jungle we are already living in gets any worse. Mr. Gilder offers a simplistic solution which will work for one half of the population but not for the other half. (Incidentally, I realize that my own bias is also very obvious here.)

DOLORES THOMPSON
Jamestown, New York

GEORGE GILDER writes:

Jessie Bernard and Dolores Thompson both believe, on the basis of a few questionable surveys, that marriage is bad for women. I can adduce a larger body of statistics which indicate that married women are happier and healthier than single women. For example, single women are ten times more likely than married women to be institutionalized for mental illness; single women are twice as likely to consult psychiatrists; and in a recent poll conducted by the Michigan Survey Research organization, only 44 per cent of single women professed themselves to be happy, compared with about 70 per cent of married women.

But such data are both boring and inconclusive. They are far less cogent, for example, than the data which universally indicate an "increase in impotence, rape, and homosexuality in recent years," although Miss Bernard thinks these phenomena "hard to document." She evidently likes some statistics better than others. So do I. But neither Miss Bernard nor I really bases an analysis of society on such data.

The premise concealed in the two letters is that children are optional or incidental in the lives of women. Both Miss Thompson and Miss Bernard think there are more important things in life than raising a family—that women should incur these responsibilities only after consulting a happiness calculus. I believe that children and family are the very substance of life itself and that to reject them willingly is to abort one's sexuality and abdicate one's deepest humanity. My article and the book, *Naked*


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Nomads, from which it was adapted, show that in modern society men may need marriage even more than women. But it is vitally important for both sexes and indispensable to society.

Women and Success

To the Editor of Commentary:

Sonya Rudikoff ["Women and Success," October 1974] takes issue with the work of Matina Horner because "it refers primarily to extremely limited and atypical groups of women . . . whose careers may not be illuminating about anything. . . ." In order to prove her point, she launches into a description of the lives of a small, select group of women which includes Marie Curie, Rose Kennedy, and Helene Deutsch.

As fascinating as these women were and are, it is precisely their atypical careers that are not illuminating with regard to the contemporary female experience. Dr. Horner's sample of college women would appear to be far more representative of the bright, educated modern woman who is caught between her desire to succeed professionally and the cultural stereotype that tells her that such success threatens her femininity.

Although Horner's data surely allow only tentative conclusions, they offer more valid insights about contemporary female behavior than do the lives of a highly select group of famous women.

Renee Rabinowitz
Psychology Department
Indiana University
South Bend, Indiana

To the Editor of Commentary:

I can only add my agreement to Sonya Rudikoff's perspective, particularly her comment: "Surely there could be further examination of all the easy assumptions about sex roles and sex stereotypes and the manner in which these are inculcated. Nowhere is there any place for the competence and evidently successful encounter with disintegrating forces that the lives of Margaret Mead or Jane Addams or others exhibit."

Too much of what has been accepted as women's-liberation writing amounts to confessions of incompetence (and revelation of it as well). Not only is the writing poor, the research weak, and the thinking deficient, but the author seeks our pity because she cannot cope with many aspects of life—from

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

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having a baby to becoming a success. Incompetent people have reason to fear success, since it is not likely that they will be able to handle success any more effectively than other aspects of their lives. As Jean Stafford wrote recently, speaking of the trees that had to be wasted to produce useless books, "Think of the forests that have gone into all those awful striptease acts on the psychoanalyst's couch—when the last garment is flung off, there is the same old set of bones, the same old skeleton that belongs in the closet." She was speaking of publishing trash in general, but I think the idea can be applied to the confessions of incompetence that pour forth in the name of women's liberation.

Many other women could be added to the list of competent people suggested by Miss Rudikoff. For example, Maria Montessori, who became a doctor in the face of great discrimination and went on to achieve distinction in the field of child development and education. . . .

While the psychology of success is a complex one, I think we will realize that there are many women who enjoy success when we give more attention to those who have earned it by work and disciplined talent. . . .

SHIRLEY DE LEON
Parents' Magazine
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Sonya Rudikoff's excellent analysis of factors in the lives of outstanding women reaffirms the mature experience that talent and determination will find a way around the obstacles of real or imaginary discrimination. With thirteen feminine Nobel Prize winners, a large number of Pulitzer Prize winners, and hundreds of women in nearly every activity listed in the reference books, the "fear of success" concept must yield to other interpretations.

Matina Horner's work in establishing the concept has been evaluated by a Harvard psychologist who concluded that though the research is an initial step in understanding an important aspect of sex-related behavior, the work is flawed by insufficient attention to scoring procedures, to the definitions of "motive" and "success," and to construct validation. An alternative explanation of the data might involve fear of sex-role inappropriateness.

Psychological counselors find more feminine fear of inadequacy in maternal, wifely, and social roles, which require subtle and complex skills, than in the application of a learned technique in a job or profession. These fears, not the need for "self-fulfillment," may underlie the drive to career, singleness, childlessness, and divorce. Of worldly "success" unrelated to the rearing of well-adjusted children and the achievement of a stable male-female relation, Henry James observed: "Success is like having a good dinner. All you can say is that you have had it."

Miss Rudikoff includes a discussion of psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch in her article. . . . Deutsch, still a consultant at the age of ninety, believes that new conditions have only put a new wrapping around the old psychology;

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further, that the objective world, exploration, cognition, and human cultural aspirations requiring a strictly objective approach are, with few exceptions, the domain of the masculine intellect. Earlier, Darwin postulated the eminence of the male intellect through natural selection. . . .

Both statements are challenging, and perhaps will be modified with time. In the 1920's, high IQ's were found on the high-school level in a ratio of eight boys to five girls. In recent years, the National Merit Scholarship Corporation's annual survey has produced roughly the same ratio of winners. The girls entering these contests are the cream of their class; they are apparently not afraid of success or of alienating males by their intellectual competition.

Women are verbally gifted, not as gifted in the quantitative-mathematical areas and other nonverbal tasks. This accounts for the smaller number of female contest finalists and may support Deutsch's theory of lesser objectivity and the loss of feminine promise during puberty when it is taxed by awakening femininity and intensification of the inner world.

Despite the forward feminine movement, girls still choose fewer years of higher education and aspire to careers traditionally acceptable for women, and, if they embark on "hard courses," they later move to easier ones.

In work and professions, women cling to certain basic orientations limiting their upward movement. . . . For many women, given the options, satisfaction may lie in reaching a goal rather than in the work itself. As a successful twenty-nine-year old woman stockbroker put it, "I've done what I wanted to do and proved what I wanted to prove. Now I just want to get married."

Rapid forward progress exacts a price. Among professional women, many are unmarried; among the married, the divorce rate is twice the national rate; many of the married have no children and the child-bearing rate is below the national average. . . . Among women psychologists, the suicide rate is three times the national female rate (for male psychologists, it is below the national rate . . .). Among women physicians, the suicide rate is four times the national rate (for male physicians, it is twice the national rate).

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

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

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In male-dominated societies, most men are not "successful" beyond rearing a family, and this through dull and unsatisfying work. Do they harbor grievances, yearn for self-fulfillment, and changed sex roles?

GRACE RUBIN-RABSON
Los Angeles, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Is it really as incredible as Sonya Rudikoff makes out that young women today should fear success? The trouble with most of the women she cites is that they have somehow concealed from us the price of their success or, what is worse, made it seem as if it would be improper for us to know.

As is often the case in human affairs, women's liberation is a widely-held belief that this social arrangement rather than that will bring individual satisfaction to people who were previously deprived of it. The move from people in general to individuals in particular is a walk into the unknown, and the young woman who proposes to embark on a career rather than on what is intended to become a full-time marriage is going to find out for herself whether the promised link between the two actually exists.

The manner in which this individual satisfaction has to come about is through a better relationship with a man than women have had before and a better sense of fulfillment in a career than in the work previously available to women. The point of demarcation between a young woman's commitment to a man and her own need to fulfill herself in her job is left up to her. She knows that the more she commits herself to her work, the more she will need a partner prepared to accommodate her. This requires assumptions about what men in general are going to be like and, in particular, what the man she will marry will be like. To make the proposition work, he will have to see things differently from the way most of the men she has so far met see them. If she makes a misjudgment on any of these things she has to reevaluate the others, and one ceases to wonder if she feels success might impair some other part of her nature.

In this she is no different from a man. Success at a career demands long hours of work, deep personal involvement in the work itself, and often periods away from home. . . . Everyone is perfectly aware of the risks to marriage that are involved. Hitherto it was mainly men who had to make the choice and run the risk, but we do not say they fear success, rather we say that they know the price and are either prepared to pay it or not.

Perhaps if the question were phrased differently, the explicit answer would be that the price of success is higher than many women think they would care to pay. This is the answer most men give, and I do not think it is always a coverup for failure. . . .

ALBERT B. PURBRICK
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Sonya Rudikoff's fine article contains an inaccuracy which, if left uncorrected, might possibly confuse the uninformed. She states that "millions of Hungarian Jews were not saved," a statement which implies that they perished during the Holocaust.

I lived in Hungary throughout this period, and time cannot blur my memories of it. It was, however, my personal good fortune to be able to extend a helping hand a good many times and secure the rarest of exemptions . . . for two Jewish families representing seven persons, all of whom survived and I trust are alive today.

I feel deeply that the loss of a single life is an unspeakable tragedy, and the cumulative tragedy of this epoch was apocalyptic in its effects. But I must also point out that in the years 1941-43 there were 465,000 persons in Hungary listed as being of Jewish descent. This figure which, though large, is only a fraction of the "millions" Miss Rudikoff mentions, included not only professing Jews but also those who had converted to Christianity and those of partially Jewish descent covered by the definitions of the Nuremberg Laws. Of these 465,000, a substantial proportion—I cannot give the exact figure—survived. Most of them still live in Hungary; a good many of them are in positions of distinction. That they are alive is due to a large extent to the efforts of many self-respecting and compassionate Hungarians who took the often fatal risk of providing shelter, documents, and safe-conduct to their endangered fellow citizens. It took some selflessness and a certain amount of fortitude to do this. Unfortunately, the common man is not typically a philanthropist, nor is he addicted to heroics; thus the fact that so many were willing to help is all the more noteworthy, and should be remembered. . . .

ALEXANDER F. KAROLYI
Santa Rosa, California

SONYA RUDIKOFF writes:

If Renee Rabinowitz will reexamine the quotation, she will find that I specifically charged "much of the modern ideology" about women, success, and achievement with referring to "limited and atypical groups of women, such as top executives in business, whose careers may not be illuminating about anything else."

That was the point of looking at the various lives as I did, to see what part this axiomatic "fear of success" played in their lives. It seemed not to play the part assigned to it. And Helene Deutsch, Jane Addams, Rose Kennedy, and the rest are in fact *extremely* typical—in the sense of being *types* of women with similar experiences: the type of the woman psychoanalyst with European background; the type of the social worker or early settlement-house organizer, etc. But of course I looked at their lives as illuminating examples, not as directives.

I thank Shirley de Leon, Grace Rubin-Rabson, and Albert Purbrick for writing.

Finally, I am happy to have the opportunity to correct the error Alexander Karolyi has pointed out. According to a 1941 census (cited in the *Encyclopedia Judaica*), the Jewish population of Hungary was 727,007 (this figure includes those Jews who lived in territories annexed by Hungary in the 1938-40 period). With the promulgation of additional discriminatory laws, this number increased to about 850,000. Of these, the *Encyclopedia Judaica* estimates, 565,000 died in the Holocaust and about 260,000 survived.

I was in error in referring to "millions of Hungarian Jews." I must have been thinking of the millions of European Jews who perished. Many Hungarian Jews were saved by decent, charitable people who did not support the monstrous acts of their own government or of the Nazi masters. Indeed, Hannah Senesh's mother was among the many Jews rescued by friends like Mr. Karolyi, who often risked their own lives to perform such acts of courage and charity.

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Jewish Studies

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert Alter's article ["What Jewish Studies Can Do," October 1974] appears to me to contain a few of those "treasured stereotypes" which, as he admits in the case of historical matters, need to be probed carefully and critically.

First, Mr. Alter speaks "from personal observation" of many students interested in Jewish-studies courses "wanting nothing more than a taste of 'the Jewish experience' that will make them feel good about their origins with little expenditure of academic effort." Is he talking about Berkeley? I would think that a Jewish history or literature course at Berkeley sets high standards. Why assume that a student enrolling in such a course and thereby committing himself to attend class and do the readings is lazier than a student in another discipline?

Second, Mr. Alter cautions against "unreal expectations by many in the Jewish community . . . involving a basic misconception of academic inquiry and of the American university." Such people, he suggests, view Jewish studies as the means for "the inculcation of group identity" and thus "attempt to influence [read: pervert] that academic process which . . . remains one of our society's most sustained efforts to seek the truth." . . . I suggest that Mr. Alter insults the intelligence of the majority of community well-wishers interested in the development of Jewish-studies programs on campus. Most of the community people that I have met have a deep appreciation of the university's function to seek the truth and wish in no way that it compromise its goal of rigorous intellectual inquiry.

Third, Mr. Alter belittles "job-aspirants who present themselves as Judaica experts on the basis of a command of Yiddish anecdotes, or an acquaintance with the novels of Bernard Malamud, or (what is not much better from a scholarly point of view) rabbinical ordination, or . . . past residence in Israel." The denigration of rabbis within the context of the sentence is annoying. . . . A rabbi has traditionally been a scholar; and both Mr. Alter and I have known many rabbis, admittedly with requisite professional training in addition to ordination, qualified to teach in the university. He could more profitably have expanded on the subject, outlining, without innuendo, the limitations of a religious functionary without such professional training.

Fourth, he states that "almost every course on modern Jewish thought seems to be restricted mainly to the writings of Martin Buber." . . . Perhaps Mr. Alter is being ironic here; I doubt, at any rate, that his generalization would be corroborated in a poll of academicians teaching this subject. . . .

I, of course, do not gainsay Mr. Alter's main emphasis that Jewish studies must be rigorous. . . . In sum, though, I would have preferred his heeding more the rabbinic maxim: "Judge all people on the scale of merit" (*Pirke Avot* 1:6).

EDWARD R. LEVENSON
Department of Hebrew and
Semitic Studies
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Although most of what Robert Alter says in his article on Jewish studies seems unexceptionable, several points invite comment.

Mr. Alter quite properly decries the dilettantish approach to Jewish studies to be found in many North American institutions. . . . But to be fair, it should be said that Jewish and "ethnic" studies are hardly unique in the effort to be or to appear trendy. One suspects that all too often they are simply trying to keep pace. . . .

There is also no question that Mr. Alter is right when he cites, as one of the main causes of such dilettantism in the Jewish field, the desire of many students to get just enough of a taste of Jewish studies to "make them feel good about their origins. . . ." But it is also important to recognize that there is a real difficulty built into Jewish studies. Although, as Mr. Alter points out, one needs more preparation for Jewish studies than for most other fields, undergraduates, and even graduates, often come to the university with considerably less preparation for Jewish studies than for other fields. The non-Jew has probably never studied Judaism at all. Unfortunately, one cannot assume that Jews have acquired the necessary "propadeutic skills." Neither a visit to Israel nor the synagogue school will have taught them. Alas, even the day school may not have done so!

Mr. Alter poses a more serious question . . . when he asserts that it cannot be the goal of Jewish-studies programs to reinforce or to create ethnic solidarity or religious commitment. But is he correct in implying that a heightened Jewish consciousness could well be brought about through propagandizing the naive and keeping the masses uninformed? It seems to me that if one is to understand the modern Jewish condition, or what came before, then one must confront the "unsettling chronicle of anguished alienation" that modern Hebrew writers present. If one is to appreciate Hebrew literature, or any other aspect of Jewish culture, then one needs to know the points of contact with other traditions. . . . Except for that minority of Jews seeking to live as if nothing had happened in the last four hundred years, it is hard to imagine being or becoming a committed, thinking Jew without such knowledge. . . .

Finally, if Mr. Alter is right about the necessity of the interdisciplinary approach to Jewish studies, then there can be no question that such studies must be undertaken at the university, and not because of the bankruptcy of the educational institutions of the Jewish community. If they do their job well, then they should be preparing their charges for Jewish studies at the university. . . . The Jewish community cannot control university programs, it is true. But if indeed the university "remains one of our society's most sustained efforts to seek the truth," and I think it does, then the danger should be minimal. In any case, the university campus is where almost all North American Jews between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two are to be found. . . . The university remains the great marketplace of ideas and perhaps even ideals in our society. . . .

In short, I feel that Jewish studies at the university deserve better than Mr. Alter gives. . . . In addition to the vital function of presenting an undeservedly neglected area of study to all comers, they can, at their best, serve for the Jewish student, at his best, as the proper climax to his intellectual growth and commitment. . . .

MICHAEL BROWN
York University
Toronto, Canada

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I read Robert Alter's article with great interest. Having taught Black studies, Chicano studies, and In-

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

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dian studies, I have now returned to the university to learn more of my own past—through Jewish studies.

It has been an exhilarating and disillusioning experience. I have found that many of the problems of Jewish education which turned so many off in the first place, still exist. . . .

Many Hebrew scholars are snobs. It is the rare teacher who opens up a meaningful dialogue with his or her students. Most remind me of a sentence from Milton Himmelfarb's "Gentlemen and Scholars" [COMMENTARY, October 1973]: "And on the whole, in the Occidental tradition, a scholar has been a gentleman, which is to say that real education has not been for the populace."

The literature provides a good example of this attitude. I have recently completed a critique of Jacob Katz's *Tradition and Crisis* for a Jewish-history course. The text was translated into English but there was not one footnote, and no real bibliography in the book. The English version has been in existence for thirteen years, yet this Hebrew scholar dismisses the problem with one sentence: "For the non-Hebraist, the footnotes would not have added to the text, as they are mostly interwoven with the interpretation of the sources." . . .

Certainly there is some work being done to translate Hebrew works into English. But is it too little, and/or too late? And will the primary source material remain in Hebrew? Is this in-depth material only for "gentlemen and scholars"?

Mr. Alter points out that "Jewish-studies courses clearly must be open to students of all backgrounds." Are we demanding that the non-Jewish student have a command of Hebrew before he can enter the hallowed halls of Judaica? And if so, are we not casting aside our perhaps most potent reason for having these courses on public campuses? . . .

Of course any student who majors in Jewish studies, or has a strong interest in this field, must learn Hebrew. Anything less would be frightening, a travesty. But the dabblers, the two- or three-course students, are a different group. Thus, I strongly recommend that if newly forming Jewish-studies departments are to be viable, a great effort must be made to translate important source materials into English. . . .

JUDITH VOGEL.
Silver Spring, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"What Jewish Studies Can Do" resonates sympathetically with my experience as a non-Jewish historian of religion. . . . Whether for reasons of wisdom, personal taste, or professional vested interest, I particularly applaud Mr. Alter's assertion that "Jewish studies integrated into the American university can no longer be a matter of confessional concern or ethnic loyalty. . . . Jewish-studies courses clearly must be open to students of all backgrounds."

But it is precisely at this point that I find Mr. Alter's article most disturbing. Perhaps I misread him, but it seems to me that despite his (to my mind) right position bravely taken, there is a persistent undercurrent of resignation to Jewish studies being principally, primarily, almost exclusively for Jewish students. If true, this is very sad news indeed for those of us who practice our scholarly interests in smaller institutions and/or in parts of the world where the proportion of Jewish students is low and their level of assimilation high. It means that Jewish studies is dead without a "critical mass" of Jewish students. . . .

But it has been my experience that Jewish-studies courses (with all readings in English—but including Eugene Borowitz and Emil Fackenheim, Richard Rubenstein and the Lubavitcher Rebbe, as well as Martin Buber) attract a lively cross-section of students. And the experience of colleagues in other institutions in the Midwest and South seems quite similar. Of course, when you don't have that critical mass of Jewish students, it helps to have a sympathetic and enlightened administration to get started. Nor would I want to overlook the labors of my friend, Rabbi Solomon Bernards, who has been a sort of Johnny Appleseed of Jewish studies in this generation.

CHRISTIAN E. HAUER, JR.
Westminster College
Fulton, Missouri

ROBERT ALTER writes:

Edward R. Levenson chooses to ignore with equal energy both the facts of the case and the terms in which I stated my argument. I did

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not say that a student enrolled in general Jewish-studies courses was "lazier than a student in another discipline," but it is very human to take the easy way out, something students in all fields repeatedly demonstrate, and there is evidence enough on my own campus and elsewhere that this frequently happens with students who register for general survey courses in Jewish studies. I did not say that representatives of the Jewish community were actually trying to influence academic process, only that it would be ill-advised for them to think in that direction, and I *did* say influence, not pervert. Mr. Levenson may have talked to different community people from the ones I have encountered, but I certainly have observed a good many perfectly well-meaning souls who nevertheless entertain somewhat misguided notions about the possible relationship between academic inquiry and the inculcation of identity. After all, the nature of academic inquiry is not so easy to understand in all its implications if you are not involved in it from within, and so my comments hardly implied an insult to anyone's intelligence.

I begin to wonder, though, whether Mr. Levenson himself fully understands the academic enterprise when he can so casually toss off shopworn phrases like "a rabbi has traditionally been a scholar" as evidence of academic credentials for members of the rabbinate. There is a world of difference between the preparation for ordination and the kind of historical, philological, multi-linguistic training needed to produce a serious academic specialist in rabbinic literature. Mr. Levenson must surely know that rabbinic amateurs "filling in" at universities have been the bane of Jewish studies in this country for decades. Finally, my comment on the preponderance of Buber in courses on modern Jewish thought was based on the nationwide course listings in the catalogue, *Jewish Studies in American Colleges and Universities,* duly footnoted in my article.

I am happy to know that Michael Brown agrees with so much of my article, though I am puzzled at his impression that I gave Jewish studies in the university short shrift. My reiterated point was precisely that the growth of Judaica was an enormously positive thing, to which, as Mr. Brown says, we should not attach extravagant expectations. His inference, by the way, that I envisage a heightening of Jewish consciousness through propagandizing the naive is quite fantastic.

Judith Vogel's plea for translations is surely warranted, and I hope she will be encouraged by the fact that right now there are some major translation projects under way of the sort she has in mind. I am also grateful to Christian E. Hauer for his comment about the smaller colleges of the Midwest and South. I must confess that when I wrote, I had chiefly in mind the larger universities of both coasts and those near major urban centers, where there tend to be concentrations of Jewish population. Clearly, other institutions, where Jewish students will be scarce, are a legitimate, indeed necessary, part of the whole Jewish-studies picture.

Lenny Bruce

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was shocked to see that COMMENTARY . . . would print a review of the caliber of Dorothy Rabinowitz's putdown of my biography of Lenny Bruce, *Ladies and Gentlemen—Lenny Bruce* [Books in Review, October 1974]. Miss Rabinowitz's character is perfectly reflected, I suspect, by her faceless and pointless prose; she is horrified, obviously, by the fact that there are Jews who do not share her sentimental pieties about the Jewish home, the Jewish mother, and all the other goody-goody platitudes of Jewish self-congratulation. All I can say to her is, "joy of the worm."

What really angers me is the incredible intellectual and moral irresponsibility implied in her statement—a flat factual statement based on pure supposition—that Lawrence Schiller "had, like Goldman, written a good deal on the subject of Bruce while he was alive." The remark shows not only that Miss Rabinowitz has no respect for facts and the processes by which one determines what is true and false, but it also shows that she is utterly ignorant of the world about which she is writing. Larry Schiller is a photo-journalist and book packager, not a writer. He has never written or published a word on the subject of Lenny Bruce during or after the comedian's life. Schiller never saw


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Bruce work or spoke to him or had any contact with the man whatsoever. He supplied me with some tape-recorded interviews with people who knew Bruce as well as a legal permission from the Bruce estate to do a biography. That is all: and all that is spelled out for those who can read in the "How This Was Written" section at the end of my book. How Miss Rabinowitz got any other idea is beyond me—but error of that degree should apprise COMMENTARY's readers of the degree and expertise exemplified by Miss Rabinowitz and by COMMENTARY.

ALBERT GOLDMAN
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

One of the typically loop-the-loop sentences in Dorothy Rabinowitz's review . . . reads: "In his representations of the hipster world which Bruce inhabited, Goldman uses italic type in passages wherever he wishes to signal his own skepticism about that world, its sympathies, and especially his own connections with all of these as a writer whose aim is to cloak himself with the insider's wisdom while retaining the distance and disinterestedness of the outsider." A questionable nugget for so turbulent a trip. *But it is not even a typographic truth* (emphasis mine). Goldman employs italics for the usual purposes: foreign words, titles, interior monologue, emphases, etc. The rest of the book is as Roman as Caesar.

Probably blinded by visions of italics, Miss Rabinowitz scolds Goldman for "acclaiming" the Yiddish knowledge of one Joe Ancis solely because "he can say *baitsim* for 'balls'." In truth, Mr. Ancis's Yiddish credentials, as detailed by Goldman, are somewhat more substantial: "From Joe, Lenny got the real flavor of the Jewish lower classes. Joe came from real old-country Yidden. His family spoke Yiddish at the dinner table. He spoke the kind of Yiddish the readers of the *Daily Forward* or *Der Tag* or the *Morgen Freiheit* recognized. . . ."

From Ancis, Bruce did indeed catch the flavor of Yiddish and that set him apart from the Catskill-*cum*-Carson comics. While they vulgarized the language and crudely caricatured those who spoke it, Bruce used it to add vintage seasoning to his irony and satire.

That is not to say that Bruce never took the low road. But to anyone who saw him perform, these infrequent excursions were easily recognizable as failures of his comic art rather than calculated cheap shots.

Miss Rabinowitz also informs us that this is a book "about illness, not about talent." That is what Miss Rabinowitz's review is about. The book, on the other hand, presents a convincing description of a brilliant, intuitive comedian, documenting his talent as well as his illness—on and off stage. It is not, however, written for lip readers of comedy—and for those much is probably lost without translation.

The book is also about Bruce's persecution and prosecution—a fact which Miss Rabinowitz chooses to ignore. I wonder how she manages to shrug off so lightly events which shaped the last three years of Bruce's life and no doubt contributed to his death at age forty-one. Apparently she considers insignificant the fact that he was hounded as a symbol of a counterculture; that the San Francisco police arrested him to dramatize their campaign against the beats; that he was busted in New York because DA Frank Hogan (read Cardinal Spellman) was not amused by a bit called *Religions, Inc.*, in which Billy Graham calls up Pope John XXIII and says: "Hey, Johnny, what's shakin' baby?" Miss Rabinowitz's lack of interest in this aspect of Bruce's life is in direct conflict with the sensibilities of scores of writers, attorneys, academicians, entertainers, and editors (including the editor of COMMENTARY) who spoke out against the harassment and testified in Bruce's behalf at the trials.

I hope that these examples of distortion (there are more) will serve to separate Miss Rabinowitz's dry, socio-monotone from a scat-singing, blues-shouting book. They have as much in common as peanut butter and *schmaltz*.

AMRAM DUCOVNY
New York City

DOROTHY RABINOWITZ writes:

In the explanation of how his book came to be written Albert Goldman explains that Lawrence Schiller had been "at work on a book with another writer"—but that had not worked out. "So we made an arrangement in which I retained control of the actual writing of the book, while giving him credit for the massive journalism he contributed." Let it suffice to say that all the attention that Mr. Goldman lavished on explaining, in minute detail, the size and the whiteness of Lenny Bruce's rear end, the size and the color of the abcess on Lenny Bruce's arm, and so forth, might better have been expended on explaining the authorship of the book in a fashion that would not have yielded sentences like those quoted above.

In his defense of a scat-singing, blues-shouting book, a characterization of Mr. Goldman's work which, I admit, did not occur to me upon reading it, Amram Ducovny puts me in direct conflict with the sensibilities of scores of writers, attorneys, academicians, entertainers, and editors, a place that is not nearly so hellish as Mr. Ducovny—a not untypical product of obedience to our most fashionable schools of piety—thinks it.

Clearly, too, Mr. Ducovny belongs to the why-didn't-you-mention-it school of believers: a school whose guiding premise is that if you fail to mention a sanctified issue you must be on the wrong side of it, a premise that is but one of the ranker aspects of that commissar mentality that has these many years afflicted our culture.

Torah and Talmud

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

My thanks to Jeffrey Marsh for his gracious and accurate review of my book, *Invitation to the Talmud* [Books in Review, September 1974]. . . . My answer to Mr. Marsh's quite legitimate question —must not study be intimately connected with the forms of observance?—is yes. Study of Torah without practice of the commandments is impoverished and partial. Yet one must begin somewhere. Many find it possible to effect *teshuvah* through practice of the commandments. I think others can begin through learning, which leads inexorably to doing, just as part of doing is learning. Yet the pleasures of learning, by themselves, cannot be ignored. For me to witness the brilliance of the great commentaries, not to mention the dazzling genius of the texts themselves, is an endless joy. Mr. Marsh's criticism is fair, and I hope I have answered his questions without evasion.

JACOB NEUSNER
Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island

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

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

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Karl Marx

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have not read David McClellan's *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought,* but judging from Carl Gershman's review [Books in Review, December 1974], I don't think I have to. Does McClellan claim that Franz Mehring's famous and classic biography of Marx was "hagiographic"? According to my dictionary, hagiography refers to writing about the lives of saints. If Mr. Gershman had taken the trouble to buy the paperback edition of Mehring's book, he would have seen that it most certainly does not treat Marx as a saint. Among other things, Mehring charges that Marx dealt unfairly with Weitling (and Weitling, the founder of German socialism, was indeed a saint); that he vilified Lassalle; that he intrigued against Bakunin while the latter was translating *Das Kapital* into Russian. Mehring does defend Marx against silly calumnies, and he makes no bones about his admiration for Marx the thinker, but he was not in any event writing about Marx the man—his book was meant to be political.

What Mr. Gershman further reports about McClellan's views on Marx's work raises the question of whether either of them has in fact read Marx. The *Grundrisse* (the title is not Marx's but the editors', and the manuscript is a first draft . . . of *Das Kapital*) is far from being "Marx's most important work," as Mr. Gershman characterizes it. At least Marx himself did not think it was, or he would have had it published. . . . The *Grundrisse* consists of rather disjointed notes and excerpts which Marx used later on in what really was his most important work. Nor is it true that the manuscript constitutes a "link between the early humanist Marx and the fully matured author of *Capital.*" There is nothing in the *Grundrisse* which is not in *Capital,* and long before the *Grundrisse* was published in 1939, intelligent readers of *Capital* had found the link with humanism as well as the theory of alienation in the famous "On the Fetishism of Commodities" (Volume I, Section 4, Chapter 1). Not directly related to either work, but now appearing at the beginning of the current edition of the *Grundrisse,* is a "General Introduction" which is the source for the assertion, most often made by non-scholars, that with the publication of the *Grundrisse,* a new dimension of Marxism was revealed. Neither Mr. Gershman nor Mr. McClellan seems to know that this introduction appeared in Karl Kautsky's edition of *Toward a Critique of Political Economy,* which was published by the SPD in Berlin as early as 1902. It was, next to the *Communist Manifesto,* the most popular textbook in party schools until 1933. I mention this fact because in recent literature it has often been charged that the Social Democrats were insensitive to the humanist content of Marx's theories. . . .

Finally, I feel that I should warn those readers who might buy the *Grundrisse* on Mr. Gershman's word that it is a work in which "the problem of alienation is central." I fear they are in for a surprise, for they are not likely to find alienation discussed in it, except in the very precise Marxian sense of how the worker is becoming alienated from his work. All the other meanings which recent American usage has attached to the word alienation did not interest Marx. . . .

HENRY PACHTER
The City College of CUNY
New York City

CARL GERSHMAN writes:

Henry Pachter's defense of Mehring would be warranted if Mehring had been attacked, but he wasn't. The reader can go to the original volume to decide for himself whether or not Mehring's biography is "slightly hagiographical." I think that is a fair characterization of a work which, to cite just one example, concludes with Engels's famous panegyric at the graveside of Marx. I also referred to the Mehring biography as a classic, which it is. (It's true I don't have the paperback edition, though for what it's worth, I do have the third impression of the first English edition.) But Mehring wrote more than fifty years ago, and some of his contentions—for example, that Marx was unfair to LaSalle and Bakunin—now appear inaccurate in light of subsequent evidence. If Mr. Pachter can get over his pique and read the McClellan book, I think he will find that it is an important scholarly achievement and a useful supplement to the Mehring biography.

The rest of his letter seems at first sight to be an exercise in pedantry, designed to prove that Mr. Pachter, unlike McClellan or myself, has read Marx. But I think he is making one important point that is based upon a misreading of a few sentences of my review. Mr. Pachter is concerned that "recent American usage has attached to the word alienation" meanings Marx did not intend. I assume he is referring to the tendency to find "existential" meaning in Marx, as exemplified by Erich Fromm's discovery of a close relationship between Marxism and Zen Buddhism. I, too, disapprove of this tendency, and there is nothing in my review that could lead Mr. Pachter to conclude otherwise.

I observed in the review that "Marx was above all a humanist," and his discussion of alienation must be viewed in that context. As I understand Marx's use of the term, alienation is a condition in which man finds "the absolute elaboration of his creative dispositions" blocked. Mr. Pachter is being too narrow (perhaps in reaction against the "Marxian" metaphysicians) in defining alienation "in the very precise Marxian sense of how the worker is becoming alienated from his work," except if he includes in this definition all kinds of work, intellectual as well as physical.

In Marx's view alienation would not be overcome automatically by a revolution which brought about a classless society. The responsibility to achieve a creative existence would still rest with each individual. Socialism would merely eliminate the societal barriers to creative existence, making self-fulfillment a function of man's own powers and limitations. It is important to emphasize this ethical dimension in Marx's work, not to conform to "current usage," but to correct the misrepresentation of his ideas by those who would use them either to justify Communist oppression or to discredit a democratic socialist alternative.

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

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

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The Defense Budget and Israel

Edward N. Luttwak

THERE is a huge and increasingly notorious contradiction at the very core of mainstream American Jewish political attitudes. The vast majority of American Jews passionately support Israel's struggle for survival and are permanently concerned for its security. At the same time, most American Jews are liberals, and *qua* liberals, they are prominent in calling for the "reordering of national priorities"—a slogan which in practice translates into the attempt to make further cuts in the defense budget and further to reduce America's general activism overseas. The great artillery battles of 1915 sufficed to persuade even the most dashing and bird-brained of cavalry officers that modern war was not just a matter of guts and good breeding for man and horse: seeing a goodly share of the national product flying overhead in the shells of each artillery barrage, scarcely anyone could miss the essential connection between industrial capacity and military capability. By contrast, even in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War—the display of American deterrence in action and the airlift—many liberals—Jews and non-Jews alike—who are loud in their verbal support for Israel still act in the political arena as if there were no connection between Israel's security and the level of American military preparedness. Quite recently, in New York State, a good many liberals, among them many Jews, did their level best to send a man to the Senate whose platform placed equal stress on strong support for Israel *and* a 25 per-cent cut in the defense budget. Oddly enough, Ramsey Clark found himself in considerable difficulties with Jews of all stripes because of some insufficiently ambiguous language on the Palestinians and their claims. But while a wide variety of views on the Palestinians—including *all* the different positions imputed to Ramsey Clark—are perfectly compatible with firm support for Israel's security, such support is not at all consistent with any drastic cut in the defense budget, let alone Mr. Clark's 25 per cent.

It is obvious that not every valet in navy service, and not every air-force band, is essential to insure an adequate American contribution to Israel's security. But it should be equally obvious that it is entirely illegitimate to press for drastic cuts in the scale of the American military effort on the one hand, and then to try and squeeze what Israel needs out of what remains. For one thing, the spectrum of Israeli logistic needs does not exactly correspond with that of the United States. Hence the supply of arms and ammunition to Israel does not merely diminish *pro rata* the level of U.S. stocks but also threatens to distort the structure of defense acquisition, with American priorities displaced by "Israeli" ones: hardware rather than men, tactical weapons and not strategic, and equipment for today, rather than research for tomorrow.

Confronted by the demands of liberal Senators and Jewish leaders for prompt and generous aid to Israel in the crisis of October 1973, defense professionals in and out of uniform could take some quiet satisfaction in witnessing this abrupt reversal of attitudes toward all things military. There was particular satisfaction in air-force circles, since one of the primary instruments of resupply, the ultra-heavy C-5 Galaxy transport, had long featured as exhibit "A" of "Pentagon waste and inefficiency" in countless speeches on the floor of the Senate, including a good many by those prominent in asking for the airlift. But the military were bitterly disappointed by the final outcome. It seems that by appropriations time the war and the airlift had been thoroughly forgotten. As the military men see it, while the Pentagon delivered, the liberal supporters of Israel, and the Jewish liberals in particular, have not: instead of showing greater understanding of the importance of adequate defenses, they are still pressing for cuts in the military budget. Yet the truth is

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that such cuts could seriously damage America's capacity to deter Russian activism in the world at large, including the Middle East; they could even undermine America's ability to supply Israel with the weapons, ammunition, and high technology it needs for its survival.

AT THE height of the Indochina war, in fiscal year 1968, the total outlays of the Defense Department amounted to $78 billion. In 1974, the last full fiscal year, outlays amounted to $79.5 billion. In other words, as the Pentagon's critics never tire of pointing out, the end of the Indochina war with all its very heavy additional costs has seemingly failed to bring about a reduction in U.S. defense outlays. But in this comparison no account is taken of inflation. When account *is* taken of inflation a very different picture emerges.

Thus in an assessment by Barry M. Blechman *et al.* of the Brookings Institution*—not by any stretch of the imagination allies of the Pentagon—the planned outlays for fiscal year 1975 are estimated at $86.2 billion, while those of 1968 are estimated to have been $127.6 billion in 1975 dollars. Defense outlays for fiscal year 1964, the last "pre-Vietnam year," are estimated at $95.7 billion, also in 1975 dollars. In short, 1975 defense outlays as planned would show a *decrease* of $41.4 billion between 1968 and 1975 in current dollars, and a decrease of $9.5 billion even as compared to 1964.

Still more revealing are comparisons of defense expenditure with other current money flows. For example, defense outlays for fiscal year 1974 amounted to 5.9 per cent of the Gross National Product, 27.9 per cent of all federal outlays, and 17.8 per cent of net public outlays, federal, state, and local. In fiscal year 1968, these percentages were very much higher: defense outlays amounted to 9.4 per cent of the GNP, 42.5 per cent of federal outlays, and 29.2 per cent of all net public outlays. Nor is the above comparison distorted by the fact that fiscal 1968 was the peak year of the Indochina war expenditures; in fiscal year 1964, the last truly pre-war year, defense outlays amounted to 8.3 per cent of the GNP (vs. 5.9 per cent in 1974); 41.8 per cent of all federal outlays (vs. 27.9 per cent), and 28.1 per cent of total public outlays (vs. 17.8 per cent).

As may be seen, American military expenditures have in fact declined quite drastically over the last decade except in terms of paper money. It is a curious reflection on the supposedly pervasive and skillful propaganda of the Pentagon that the vast majority of the public continue to believe that military expenditures have been steadily increasing, relative to everything. In particular, the myth that the defense budget accounts for three-quarters of the total federal budget and thus preempts all sorts of welfare programs shows an astonishing persistence.

Unlike liberals of all kinds, fiscal conservatives may object that the sharp decline in the *proportion* of defense expenditure to public outlays in general between 1964 and 1974 proves absolutely nothing, since, in their view, the last decade has seen an uncontrolled and ruinous growth in federal, state, and local expenditures which have cut deeply into the personal income left to the citizen. But if inflationary effects are eliminated, by measuring everything in constant 1958 prices, the per-capita figures show that defense expenditure has declined quite sharply from $245 in fiscal year 1961 to $202 planned for fiscal 1975; by contrast, during this period total *private* outlays per capita increased from $1,896 to $3,005. And fiscal year 1961 was of course both a pre-war year *and* the last year of the Eisenhower administration—i.e., before the supposedly ruinous increase in taxation and redistribution of the 1960's.

As a matter of fact, even these figures understate the real decline in the scale of the American military effort. The abolition of the draft has also imposed a sharp cut in the real resources devoted to defense. The compulsory service of hundreds of thousands of young men in the military represented a hidden tax of major proportions, and one which was strongly regressive, since the (able-bodied) poor were much more likely to be drafted than middle-class youth. The poor and their families were in effect forced to subsidize the defense budget by surrendering the prospect of higher earnings in the civilian economy for the nominal pay of compulsory military service. In the absence of the draft, the armed services have been forced to attract men who would previously have been compelled to serve, and the financial incentives to voluntary service have become a heavy burden on the defense budget: pay, allowances, and related costs have increased from 43.3 per cent of the total defense budget in fiscal year 1964 to 55.2 per cent in 1974. And of course this means that the real resources available to the defense establishment have declined proportionately by 11.9 per cent.

Many thoughtful observers are opposed to the very idea of an all-volunteer force. Some fear that

* *Setting National Priorities, The 1975 Budget*, by Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, The Brookings Institution, 269 pp., $2.95 (paper). The defense budget can be looked at in three different ways, with the total obligational authority divided either by the type of input—i.e., military personnel, retired personnel, operation and maintenance procurement, and so on; by the type of activity—i.e., strategic, general-purpose, intelligence and communications, and so on; or by department, i.e., army, navy, air force, defense agencies, defense-wide, civil defense, and military assistance. The Brookings Institution study allocates the entire budget to the ultimate deployed forces, with a three-way split of all outlays among general purpose, strategic-nuclear, and strategic mobility (i.e., airlift) forces.

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it will make the military even more of a closed society, a body apart, increasingly remote from the values and ideas current in civil society, and perhaps even vulnerable to political exploitation. Others see the danger of a military coup in the United States as totally fanciful, but remain disturbed by the wider social implications of the all-volunteer force, for its enactment by Congress reflects the belief of the legislators that young Americans, unlike young Russians, or for that matter young Israelis, are no longer willing to serve their country, and if need be, fight for its ideals—or interests. But whether or not one favors an all-volunteer military establishment, one must recognize that its adoption has not entailed any increase in the cost of military manpower to society as a whole. The only difference is that the cost is fully borne by the taxpayer instead of being divided—most unfairly—between the taxpayer and those young men who happened to be drafted, and their families. For all practical purposes, the increase in manpower costs represents another net reduction in the defense budget.

Among those who are still pressing for further reductions in defense expenditure—a group which includes the heirs of McGovern in the Democratic party—there are two schools of thought. The first, more extreme but also more honest, advocates drastic reductions in the scale of American military power, eliminating the navy except for a force of small patrol boats to serve as an adjunct to the coast guard, reducing the army to two divisions with a corresponding tactical air force, and eliminating all strategic-nuclear forces except for a "minimum deterrent" of ten or so Polaris submarines. As a result, the defense budget would be reduced to a tenth or so of the present level, or even less. Those who support this policy are frank in recognizing its implications: they acknowledge that the United States would no longer be capable of guaranteeing or even contributing to the security of Europe or Japan, let alone Israel. If pressed, its advocates also admit that such a policy would in effect abandon the world to a Russian hegemony, if not actual conquest.

The second school of thought is altogether less honest. Its members call for drastic reductions in defense expenditure, typically of the order of 25-30 per cent, but they deny that this would entail any real reduction in military capability. Instead, the money is to be saved by eliminating "waste and inefficiency" in the Pentagon as well as "unnecessary" weapons and "useless" forces, especially strategic weapons and strategic forces.

No myth is seemingly more ineradicable than that of the strategic arms race. Hearing Henry Kissinger talk of his exploits in "capping the arms race" and "saving billions of dollars" on strategic-nuclear weapons, one would imagine that there *has* been such a "race," and that it has caused "spiraling expenditures." In fact, on the American side at any rate, the reverse has been true. According to the Pentagon's computations, the planned budget for all strategic forces (long-range B-52 bombers, Polaris/Poseidon submarines, land-based ICBM's, and six squadrons of air-defense fighters) would amount to $7.6 billion in fiscal year 1975; the figure for fiscal year 1964 was $8.5 billion, in much more valuable 1964 dollars. In other words, the strategic budget has declined very sharply in terms of real resources.

Much more revealing is the authoritative comparison by Blechman and his Brookings colleagues, which includes a variety of support and research costs in estimating the strategic slice of the budget: the figure for 1975 will reach $18.3 billion, as opposed to $29.7 billion for fiscal year 1964 computed at 1975 prices. For all the talk of spiraling defense costs, it can be seen that even in current dollars the reduction in expenditure has been substantial, while discounted for inflation it has been downright phenomenal—no less than $11.4 billion in 1975 dollars.

Indeed, there are some who argue that the decline in the strategic budget has been too great, and that it has allowed the Soviet Union to overtake the United States in the number of land-based strategic missiles (ICBM's), and lately in the number of submarine-borne missiles (SLBM's) also. In 1964, the United States had net numerical superiorities in both classes of weapons, with 834 ICBM's vs. 200 Russian, and 416 SLBM's vs. 120 Russian. As against this, while American ICBM and SLBM forces have remained static at their planned levels of 1,054 and 656 units (already reached in 1967) the Soviet Union now has more than 1,590 ICBM's and 750 SLBM's. Moreover, the Russian missiles are much larger, so that while the overall payload of U.S. strategic missiles amounts to roughly three million pounds, that of the Russian missile forces is 300 per cent greater at nine million pounds—this being the "throw-weight imbalance" of which so much has been said of late in conjunction with the SALT negotiations. (Senator Jackson, for example, has called for substantial reduction in the strategic forces of both sides, but a reduction which would equalize overall missile payloads.)

Many analysts, including the present writer, are disturbed by the medium-term implications of the growth in Russian strategic capabilities, which neither the SALT-1 accords nor the Vladivostock agreements have done anything to arrest. Detailed projections* which avoid any sort of "worst-case estimate" show that within five years or so the Soviet Union is not only likely to widen the throw-weight gap still further, to reach *four* times

* See, for example, the present writer's *The U.S.–USSR Nuclear Weapons Balance*, Sage, 1974.

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the level of the American, but will also undoubtedly utilize its missile payloads much more effectively, through the introduction of multiple warheads. Together with a modest increase in accuracies, this would create a real gap in strategic capabilities. Even the Brookings estimates show the Russian missile forces as three times more powerful than the American in actual destructive capacity, while other estimates are a good deal more pessimistic.

NEVERTHELESS, no serious analyst argues that the Russians have *already* achieved any kind of meaningful strategic superiority. For one thing, the Soviet Union has no real counterpart to the American strategic bomber force which, though much reduced (from 696 heavy B-52 bombers in 1964 to 396 planned for 1975), is still far superior to the Russian (140 much inferior aircraft). While U.S. heavy bombers are of a very old design—the first B-52's were operational in 1955—they have been repeatedly modernized, and are thought to be several times as effective as their Russian counterparts. Moreover, the American strategic missile force, though it has only one-third the overall payload of the Russian, remains much more effective at present, since almost two-thirds of U.S. missiles are equipped with very efficient multiple warheads, and they are also substantially more accurate.

What all this means is that the United States has remained ahead while actually decreasing its expenditure on strategic forces. This hardly suggests that there has been all that much "waste and inefficiency" in the strategic budget: in fact, since 1964 there has been a sharp increase in effective capabilities together with a decline in cost.

None of this will impress those who argue that *all* strategic forces other than the few weapons needed for simple deterrence are *ipso facto* useless and wasteful. If driven into a corner, they may concede that the Pentagon has managed to increase strategic capabilities while continuing to cut costs, but they will argue that strategic superiority is a meaningless concept, and that once the ability to strike back at an enemy with *some* nuclear warheads is assured, all additional forces are quite useless. Recently these voices found a powerful ally in no less a person than the Secretary of State, who was quoted as asking, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What do you do with it?"

According to this school of thought, the outcome of confrontations such as the Cuban missile crisis was solely due to the balance of naval power in the waters around Cuba, and had nothing to do with the strategic balance, which favored the United States by a very wide margin in those days. It was the military balance *in place* which made the difference, and not the fact that while the United States could have destroyed most of the Russian strategic force, the Soviet Union could not have destroyed the American. The argument seems plausible, but those who explain the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis and all other confrontations in terms of local military power alone have so far failed to explain why the Russians did not then prevail in the repeated crises over Berlin, where Russian superiority on the ground was at least as great as American naval superiority around Cuba.

In support of the contrary view, there is moreover the impressive testimony of Russian actions: following the Cuban missile crisis, an accelerating increase in Russian strategic deployments could be observed, an increase that did not level off until the "meaningless" superiority of American missile forces had been cancelled out. The Russian investment in strategic forces since 1964 has been enormous, certainly several times as great as that of the United States, and in the Soviet Union there is presumably no capitalist arms industry to foist "useless" weapons upon the military.

To be sure, one can construct all sorts of theories to explain why bureaucratic pressures in the Soviet Union should have led to exactly the same results as "military-industrial" pressures in the United States. But the wholesale denial of the utility of strategic power beyond that needed for simple deterrence is not convincing. The advocates of "minimum deterrence" claim that ten invulnerable missiles would suffice to deter a nuclear attack upon the United States, and this may even be so. But then no sane Russian (or, for that matter, Chinese) leader is likely to launch such an irrational attack anyway. The real utility of strategic power must be found in its *political value*, in guaranteeing the ultimate security of NATO Europe and other allies, formal or informal, against nuclear coercion, and in deterring a much wider range of hostile acts than a purposeless nuclear attack on American cities. And the latter is the *only* threat—and a remote and fanciful one to boot—that a minimum deterrent could possibly deter. To do more, one needs greater and more flexible forces so as to have a much wider range of options than a single fire button. One also needs men on the ground, ships at sea, and tactical aircraft, all known as "general-purpose" forces in Pentagonese.

IN THE official breakdown of the defense budget planned for fiscal year 1975 (since reduced by Congressional action), general-purpose forces accounted for $29.2 billion of the $92.6 billion total obligational authority, as opposed to only $7.6 billion for the strategic forces. This is to pay for all full-time ("active") fighting forces that are not both nuclear and long-range—specifically air force, navy, and marine fighter, light-bomber, and reconnaissance "wings," army and marine divisions, and navy carrier task-forces,

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escort ships, attack submarines, and amphibious assault ships—together with all their direct logistic support, headquarters, and so on.

Once again, a straight comparison which takes no account of inflation shows a startling trend: in spite of the end of direct American participation in the fighting in Indochina, general-purpose expenditures have hardly decreased at all since the peak year 1968. In that year, the general-purpose budget amounted to $30.4 billion, as opposed to the planned level of $29.2 billion in 1975. But once again, the deflated figures reveal a quite different picture. In the Brookings estimate, the 1975 budget for the general-purpose forces is $63.4 billion, while that for fiscal year 1968 was $92.3 billion in 1975 dollars, *including* the costs of the war in Indochina. This time, however, a net increase in expenditure *has* taken place, for without the incremental costs of the Indochina war, the general-purpose budget in 1975 dollars is estimated at $61.1 billion for 1968, with $58.1 billion for 1964 as compared to $63.4 billion in 1975.

The explanation is simple. Strategic weapons, for all their faults, are either unmanned or controlled by small crews; even maintenance is largely computer-controlled and heavily automated. But it still takes a complete human body to fire a rifle or even to clean one, four men to operate a tank, and three or four thousand to man an aircraft carrier. It is thus the general-purpose slice of the budget that has borne the major part of the increase in manpower costs.

In 1968, at the height of the Vietnam war, the army had 1,570,000 men on active duty; before the war, in 1964, it had 972,000; but the planned level for 1975 is only 785,000. As a standard of comparison, the Soviet Union has 1,800,000 men in its ground forces (excluding air-defense troops). Even more striking at first sight is the apparent difference in actual combat capability: while the Soviet Union has no fewer than 167 divisions, the United States has only 13⅓ army divisions, and three separate brigades.

Over the years, critics have talked of bloated headquarter staffs, luxurious logistic echelons, and a swollen army bureaucracy, in contrast to the supposedly spartan Russian army, which can seemingly field almost twelve times as many divisions as the U.S. army with not much more than twice its manpower. A less superficial comparison reveals a rather different picture. First, it turns out that of the 167 divisions in the Russian army, only 50-60 are manned in full strength, the rest being either half-strength or "paper" units, with one-third or less of their theoretical manpower on board. Second, even on paper, Russian divisions are much smaller, with an establishment of 12,000 for the mechanized divisions, 9,500 men for the tank divisions, and 7,000 men for the airborne divisions, as opposed to 16,300, 16,500, and 13,000 men respectively in their American counterparts. Moreover, while only 213,000 of the men of the U.S. army serve in divisions, this does not mean that the remaining 572,000 are all cooks, valets, typists, PX speculators, or officers relaxing in air-conditioned headquarters. Above the level of the division, there are "corps" and "army" echelons, with fighting and logistic troops assigned to each. In fact, the division slice amounts to roughly 40,000 men.

For practical purposes, the army share of the budget, planned at $23.6 billion out of a defense-wide total of $92.6 billion for fiscal year 1975, pays for 158 "maneuver" battalions of mechanized, airborne, tank, armored cavalry, and finally helicopter-mounted air-cavalry troops, supported by artillery forces, missile troops equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, anti-aircraft units, 10,000 helicopters, and 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft, as well as a variety of logistic units.

There is no doubt that many more men are used for supply and maintenance in the U.S. army than in the Russian. But this is not entirely due to the well-known proclivity of the U.S. army for hot food and iced beer in the field, as well as sauna baths and air-conditioned barracks. Part of the difference is due to the fact that while the Russian army is entirely deployed within the Soviet Union or in lands directly adjacent, the U.S. army must supply 190,000 men in Germany, another 4,400 men in a separate Berlin brigade, a small force in Italy, and 26,000 men half a world away, in South Korea, as well as two brigades in Hawaii. In spite of this, twelve additional battalions have recently been formed by thinning out logistic and support units.

Moreover, American equipment is more complex than the Russian, and therefore requires more men for its maintenance. Some of the added complexity is due to the national passion for advanced technology (a passion which, however, now shows distinct signs of waning even in the military), but the larger part is simply due to the fact that American equipment, being more advanced and more effective, is thus more difficult to maintain. The Russian army does not, for example, have anywhere near the 10,000 helicopters of the American, and except for the very latest stuff, much of its equipment remains rather crude. During the October war, the Russians supplied the Arabs with some of their best weaponry, and the Israelis captured a great deal of it, including more than 500 modern battle tanks (more than they lost and twice as many as the U.S. supplied during and just after the war). As always before, the Israelis found that Russian equipment was of "simple and rugged" design, cheap to build and easy to maintain. But they also found that it was often far too "rugged" for real effectiveness. Israeli tank crews who fought

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for days at a stretch in American M-60 tanks or British Centurions, discovered that the clumsy controls and cramped crew spaces of even the best Russian armor were utterly exhausting after a few hours, and that much essential equipment was simply absent. In fact, Russian vehicles seemed to have been designed for very muscular dwarfs who could somehow shoot accurately without proper range-finders.

None of this is to say that there is no waste and inefficiency in the army budget. Far from it. The army, more than the other services perhaps, has historically been subject to political pressures which among other things have forced it to maintain facilities at too many scattered locations, especially in the South and Southwest. A glance at a map of army posts would suggest, indeed, that it is still deployed to fight the Indians, rather than Russians *et al.* But every time attempts are made to close down obsolete arsenals or unnecessary bases dating from the Indian or Mexican wars, a coalition of local interests is instantly formed, and instantly represented in Congress; these coalitions have defeated the army reformers with great regularity, for their political clout always counts for much more than the feeble Congressional instinct for managerial efficiency.

An altogether greater cause of structural inefficiency is the existence of a separate marine corps, which has 196,000 men in three divisions as compared to the 785,000 men of the army. Marine-corps divisions have their own headquarters, uniforms, doctrine, training camps, equipment, and so on, and they come under the ultimate supervision of the navy, at least in theory. But though they do have special training, and some special equipment, for amphibious landings in the grand manner, the three marine divisions are essentially ground forces. In fact, the marine corps is a not-so-miniature independent military force with its own artillery, logistics, and even its own air force (comprising 550 combat aircraft). The men and the money going to the marines could certainly be used more efficiently, if they were distributed between the army and the air force respectively, adding substantially to both, and eliminating massive duplication built into the system. There is an excellent argument for preserving the special *esprit de corps* of the marines, and also their special skills in amphibious warfare, but both of these things could be done with a much smaller all-amphibious force: at present the marine corps alone has more men than the entire British army, and more aircraft than the entire British air force.

Bored defense analysts may amuse themselves in drawing up plans to "rationalize" the ground forces by abolishing the marines, but for the time being any such reform remains a political impossibility. It would also be illegal. Acts of Congress now force the Secretary of Defense to preserve an independent marine corps, and moreover specify that it is to have three active divisions. Always fearful of being absorbed into the army, the marines, strongly supported by their retired veterans, have built over the years a formidable political base in Congress, and also a legal wall around the corps, which guarantees its independent survival—and which restricts very severely the freedom of action of its nominal civilian masters, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy.

How much real military power is there in the 16⅓ ground-force divisions? Of this total, 1⅓ infantry, two marine, one armored cavalry, one airborne, and one air-mobile divisions are held in the U.S. as a central reserve for worldwide use at short notice.* The third marine division, in the Pacific, would also be available for ready intervention, but most of the remaining ground forces are either deployed in Europe or Korea, places where they are likely to be needed anyway in the event of major trouble, or else are kept in the U.S. but committed for reinforcement to Europe.

The ground forces of the strategic reserve would be amply sufficient to carry out an operation such as the Persian Gulf intervention of which there has been so much talk recently: two marine and the two air-deliverable divisions would suffice to seize and hold securely every asset of value in the western side of the Persian Gulf. But in order to guarantee the area against an Iraqi (or a Russo-Iraqi) counterattack, armor would be needed, at least one armored division, and possibly more. This would exhaust the strategic reserve for all practical purposes, and any additional troops would then have to be taken away from the forces earmarked to reinforce Germany: the thin margin thus creates a built-in incentive to the Soviet Union to start applying pressure in Europe in the event of any American deployment in the Middle East, whether in defense of Israel, or in the Persian Gulf. *A fortiori*, this same argument applies to any more serious commitment of forces.

Chronic reports of drunkenness, drug addiction, insubordination, and racial violence among U.S. army and marine troops have raised serious doubts as to their morale and battle-readiness. There is no doubt that all these problems exist, as they do in civil society, but experience, even in Vietnam, suggests that once the bullets start flying, American troops are invariably willing to fight. With their superior equipment in virtually all classes of weapons, with their highly developed mechanical aptitudes, and essentially sound training, the GI's need only good leadership and some knowledge that their efforts are not entirely futile to fight hard and well. The problem is not qual-

* Given time, 8 divisions and 24 separate brigades or regiments could be manned by 620,000 combat echelon reservists.

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ity but quantity. The U.S. army is small and ought to be larger. It should not under any circumstances be reduced further, for otherwise even its qualitative edge will not suffice to equalize the balance.

SINCE 1968 the share of the navy in the total defense budget has increased steadily: in fiscal year 1974 it amounted to $27.6 billion, as opposed to $22.1 billion for the army, and $25.5 billion for the air force. Of late there has been a great deal of contradictory talk about the strength of the navy or the lack of it. Upon his retirement, the last Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, proclaimed that the U.S. navy had become inferior to the Russian; his successor, Admiral Holloway, promptly went on record with an opposite view. Actually it all depends on the time period one has in mind.

The U.S. navy emerged from World War II with a huge fleet and one that was very modern: in 1946 the average age of navy vessels was only five years. Aircraft have life-spans of ten years or so (though the B-52 bombers are approaching twenty), but ships are a good deal more durable and less vulnerable to obsolescence, for naval technology develops slowly. Thus, throughout the 50's and 60's, the navy remained with its wartime fleet, supplemented by some new aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and a few other modern ships.

By the late 1960's, the average age of U.S. warships had increased to eighteen years, and the navy was facing block obsolesence, as the vessels built in between Pearl Harbor and VE-Day became too old to be usefully modernized yet again. At the same time, the Russian navy, built around anti-ship missiles instead of the American combination of aircraft carriers and guns, was presenting an increasingly serious threat. And while old warships were decreasingly effective, their maintenance costs were rising steadily.

In an uncharacteristically bold move, the decision was therefore made to scrap a great many ships, accept a drastic decline in the size of the fleet, and use the money thus saved to build as many new ships as possible so as to modernize the fleet in one forward leap. The result of this policy was that between 1968 and the end of fiscal year 1975, the number of navy ships will have decreased abruptly, from 976 to 508. The latter, however, will mostly be modern ships. In the meantime, the Russian navy has been growing in size as well as quality and now includes 221 "major" warships as opposed to 177 for the United States, though the tonnage and overall quality of American vessels are much higher.

The Russian navy is now in the process of deploying two new classes of missile warships, the Kara cruiser and the Krivak destroyer. Modern analytical methods have not made much progress in the naval field, and these warships, very fast, of sleek design, and "bristling with weapons," have received extravagant praise, not least from Admiral Zumwalt who described the Krivak as "ton per ton the most effective warship afloat." But in reality it seems that Russian navy planners have made an error of catastrophic proportions, and given the ten-year lag between design and construction, this is an error that will continue to perpetuate itself for another decade at least. Not that the Russians have been incompetent or backward. It is merely that the unpredictable evolution of military technology has played a cruel trick on the Russians, the pioneers in the design of missile warships.

What happened is that the Russian warships reflect in their design the advanced technology of the anti-ship missile, but not the still more advanced and indeed revolutionary electronic warfare technology for missile defense. In essence, this technology, together with good training, allows ships which are attacked by surface missiles to dodge or intercept quite a few of them; a well-equipped ship with a well-trained crew can still be destroyed, but its electronic defenses and anti-missile weapons must first be saturated by multiple missile firings. During the October war, the Israelis sank thirteen Russian-built missile boats in Syrian and Egyptian hands without suffering a single loss of their own. The small Arab boats fired at least 50 Styx missiles at Israeli missile boats; in November 1967 a pair of Styx missiles had sufficed to sink the *Elath*, one of the two largest warships in the Israeli navy. But in the 1973 sea battles, owing to good training, skillful maneuver, and various jamming devices, the Israelis did not suffer a single hit. And when the Arab boats had fired all their missiles, the Israelis went over to the attack, sinking them with impunity with both guns and missiles. Now the missiles on board modern Russian warships are far superior to the old Styx missiles given to the Arabs, but the Kara, Krivak, and Kresta missile ships all have one thing in common with the small missile boats of the Arabs: they carry only a small number of missiles, five or ten per warship, and have absolutely no room for reloads.

By contrast, the new Spruance-class destroyers of the U.S. navy, of which thirty are to be built, can carry more than eighty missiles of all types, including any proportion of the new U.S.-made Harpoon anti-ship missile. What this means is that in the event of combat with the American navy, the Russians are apt to repeat the unhappy experience of the Arabs at the hands of the Israelis: for once the Russian warships fire off their five or ten missiles apiece, not enough to saturate the electronic, missile, and gun defenses of a comparable number of modern U.S. warships, they would still be confronted with Spruance destroyers each capable of firing dozens of missiles at the

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rate of four every three or four seconds. No prudent Russian navy planner can envisage the future naval balance with any optimism, at least as far as surface warfare is concerned.

Aside from the surface fleet, whose size is now reaching its low point, but whose quality will improve sharply in the near future—*if there is reasonable funding* (and the cuts made to the 1975 shipbuilding budget were quite drastic)—the navy maintains two types of forces which are so different in outlook and doctrine that they virtually constitute separate services.

First, there is the large and still growing force of nuclear-powered attack submarines, 61 of them at present and building toward 90. The Soviet Union has 70 such submarines and it is likely to maintain or increase its numerical edge in the future also. Moreover, the Russians, unlike the Americans, have not lost faith in diesel submarines and continue to build them: some 175 are in service, including 25 armed with anti-ship missiles.

Quite aside from the dictatorship of Admiral Hyman Rickover and his total opposition to anything afloat that is not nuclear-powered, there is logic in the different composition of the two submarine fleets. The Russian submarine fleet is designed to be used against both warships *and* merchant ships, since in the (unlikely) event of a prolonged struggle in Europe, the North Atlantic shipping lanes would be as essential in the future as they were in two world wars. As against this, the Soviet Union would remain unaffected by attacks on its merchant shipping, and so the only targets that matter for the U.S. submarine fleet are enemy *warships*, and especially Russian submarines. And while diesel boats could still be very usefully employed in sinking merchant ships and especially oil tankers, their margin of survival in attacks against warships would be far too narrow.

At present, it is planned to build five new attack submarines, all nuclear, every two years; soon the oldest types built in the 1950's will begin to approach retirement age, and this is just about the minimum level of construction that can be tolerated if the strength of the submarine fleet is to be maintained. It is possible, however, that a rather smaller and cheaper type of submarine could be built than the present Los Angeles class, which are very large (6,900 tons) and very fast, but which also cost more than $150 million each.

The centerpiece of the U.S. navy remains the carrier force; reduced from 24 ships in 1964 to 15 at present, the force will decline further, to 12 units by 1980, even if Congress funds *all* present programs. The carriers are all very large, and very expensive: the nuclear-powered *Nimitz*, which is to join the fleet in 1975, will have cost $1 billion. With 80-90 aircraft on board each, the pair of aircraft carriers on station in the Mediterranean provide the powerful and long-reaching arm of the Sixth Fleet. In the event of a major emergency, it is the aircraft of the Sixth Fleet, roughly equivalent to one-third of the Israeli air force, which would provide the most capable force of ready intervention. Three more carriers of the Seventh Fleet are available in the western Pacific at any one time, with the remaining ten carriers in maintenance, modernization, or training. Of these, however, at least five would normally be available at very short notice to reinforce the Sixth or Seventh Fleets.

Once the carrier force declines to 12 units, however, normal deployments are liable to go down to two carriers in each forward fleet, with another four normally available at short notice. (Homeporting in Greece and Japan was intended to increase the ratio of forward-deployed carriers by cutting out the cruise periods.)

The great problem of the aircraft carrier is vulnerability. Powerful though a live carrier may be—a single carrier could destroy every enemy warship within a range of hundreds of miles in a matter of hours—there is no doubt that in the event of a *nuclear* war, where carriers could be attacked by nuclear missiles and torpedoes, they would have slim chances of survival. It is true that the whole purpose of the carrier task forces is to deter—and, if need be, fight—limited wars such as those that might be entailed by an intervention in the Middle East to break the oil cartel, or to bail out Israel. But serious analysts are beginning to question whether carriers could survive even non-nuclear attack by the Russian navy.

In essence, the danger derives from the very effectiveness of the carriers. Knowing that none of their warships could survive for more than an hour or two within range of the carriers, Russian fleet commanders are likely to commit every available submarine, bomber, and missile ship to attacking them. Moreover, they are likely to do everything in their power to obtain permission to launch a surprise attack, for given any warning at all, the strike aircraft of the carriers are liable to destroy the opposition first.

It is primarily to meet the threat of missile attack that the very advanced and very expensive F-14 fighters are being procured by the navy. On present plans, 16 squadrons are to be equipped with the F-14 for a total cost of $8 billion; even this will not be enough to replace all the F-4 Phantom navy fighters now in service: 24 squadrons of F-14's for fleet defense (two per carrier in 1980) would cost roughly $12 billion at 1975 prices, including stocks of the extraordinarily effective and expensive Phoenix missile.

The total air-force budget, which, like that of the navy, includes strategic weapons (heavy bombers and ICBM's) as well as

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tactical ones, has declined sharply in real terms since fiscal year 1968, the peak Indochina war year. In 1974, the budget stood at $25.5 billion as opposed to $22.1 billion for the army and $27.6 billion for the navy. For this money, the air force bought the services of 645,000 men, to operate roughly 5,000 combat aircraft (excluding some 1,100 strategic bombers and tankers as well as the home air-defense fighters). These men and these aircraft are more widely distributed than any other U.S. military force, with fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons in Britain, Spain, West Germany, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Philippines, and Taiwan, as well as Alaska and Iceland, all backed up by the Tactical Air Command in the continental United States which serves as the training base and general reserve.

Owing to the undoubted futility of much bombing and strafing in Indochina, the value of tactical air power has been questioned by many. Apart from those whose position is simply uninformed or purely emotional, there are a good many cold-blooded analysts who point to the limitations of tactical air power in World War II, Korea, and lately in the Middle East, where the densest anti-aircraft networks in the world undoubtedly undermined the combat value of the Israeli air force.

In particular, it is frequently argued that deep-penetration "interdiction" missions (for which the larger and more expensive fighter-bombers are built) have proved rather ineffectual in the past, unlike "close-support" missions, where fighter-bombers are called down by troops on the ground to attack the enemy directly in front of them. In fact, by 1969 this view had become the common wisdom. It was obviously a waste of time to try to "choke off" supply routes into South Vietnam by bombing jungle trails, and by extension it has been argued that it would be equally futile to try to interdict a Russian attack on Europe by attacking the supply system, the railway network in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR. Railway lines are surprisingly hard to destroy and destroyed tracks can be quickly repaired, or evaded by re-routing.

But then a series of unrelated technological breakthroughs upset the theories of these analysts. The introduction of laser-homing and television-guided bombs and missiles suddenly increased the accuracy of delivery by a spectacular 1000 per cent or more. As the last bout of post-election and pre-Christmas Vietnam bombing showed in 1972, "interdiction" strikes against bridges, power-stations, storage dumps, and indeed any target that was at all worth hitting had radically changed in nature. Instead of scattering bombs all over the place, missing the target much more often than not, and having to return many times to hit it again, exposing the aircraft to ground fire each time, fighter-bombers were suddenly performing as they had always done in the movies: one mission flown, one or two bombs dropped, and the target destroyed with pinpoint accuracy.

In October 1973 the Israelis did not initially have "smart bombs." In essence, the first stages of the war featured a pre-Vietnam Israeli air force fighting it out against post-Vietnam Russian air defenses. Israeli losses to ground fire were *not* heavy (99 aircraft for 7,272 sorties), but the results were poor: pilots dodging a hail of shells and missiles could not fly slow and easy as they did in 1967 to make precision attacks. The situation changed dramatically when the smart bombs were finally released to the Israelis. Pilots with virtually no prior training and with improvised support gear scored phenomenal 95 per-cent kills with the Walleye TV bomb, 85 per-cent with the Maverick missile, and 75 per-cent with laser-guided bombs. In fact, the Maverick emerged as an absolutely lethal tank killer; some Israelis complained that it was too effective: Arab tanks hit by these missiles could no longer be repaired for Israeli use.

Not even the professionals, let alone the public or Congressional would-be experts, have yet come to terms with the revolutionary change that these precision-guided weapons have introduced. It is already quite clear, however, that there has been a neat reversal in the value of the two kinds of tactical strike missions: "interdiction," where aircraft are sent to bomb targets of value and can therefore use smart bombs (which are not cheap) has suddenly become a much more promising mission than close support, where scattered troops on the ground do not offer scope for pinpoint attacks.

Incidentally, it is quite certain that the introduction of smart bombs has shifted the entire military balance in favor of Israel, for while Arab air defenses may improve further, it will take many years for Russian weapon designers and Arab anti-aircraft troops to catch up to the sudden leap in the effectiveness of strike aircraft. In Europe, where the USAF deploys some 400 F-4's and 72 swing-wing F-111's, it is not yet clear what the effect of this technological change on the military balance might be. For unlike the Middle East—where Arab aircraft cannot survive in air combat long enough to use any type of bomb, whether smart or not—in Europe *both* sides will have precision weapons sooner or later, and the new technology need not favor the defense.

The air force is also responsible for the so-called mobility forces, with 79 C-5 and 275 C-141 long-range aircraft (which featured in the 1973 airlift to Israel) and 325 C-130E shorter-range transports. Once the political hesitations were overcome, the U.S. airlift, masterminded by air-force commander-in-chief General Brown, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and repentant

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amateur sociologist, was outstandingly efficient: 22,395 short tons of equipment were flown to Israel in 566 missions; as against this, the Russians flew 930 missions in their airlift but carried only 15,000 tons, even though the average distance they had to fly was not much more than one-fourth of that flown by U.S. aircraft. The C-5's made much of the difference: they flew more than 10,000 short tons in only 145 sorties; the 79 aircraft in the force could have flown many more flights, had they been needed.

During the October airlift, U.S. transports landed at the Azores airfield, leased from the Portuguese. But that was in the bad old days of the dictatorship, and now there is a much more progressive regime in Lisbon but one which is also more easily purchaseable by Arab oil money. In order to reduce the dependence on the goodwill of the Portuguese, and indeed of anybody else—for it seems that all can be bought or intimidated nowadays—the Defense Department plans to spend $450 million (if Congress will allow it) to provide the C-141's with in-flight refuelling gear, which the C-5's already have.

IN THE "functional breakdown" of the defense budget (as opposed to the service-by-service breakdown), research and development accounted for just over $7 billion in fiscal year 1974 out of the total obligational authority figure of $87.1 billion for the defense budget as a whole. As we have seen, it is the technological edge, the product of the research and development of past years, that in so many different areas compensates for U.S. numerical inferiorities, and also for those of the Israelis (and other U.S.-supplied allies). And yet it is precisely against these $7 billion ($8.4 billion was requested for 1975) that much of the permanent offensive of the liberal budget-cutters is directed.

Their particular targets are the large, expensive, and highly visible weapons programs such as the ABM and C-5 in the past, and now the B-1 bomber, Trident missile submarine, F-14 navy fighter, and F-15 USAF fighter. In fact, these are the programs that everyone seems to want to cut in the various "alternative budgets" that feature in the "position papers" of the anti-defense lobby. A great deal can be said for and against these large-weapon programs, and this writer for one has seen very persuasive cases being made by thoughtful analysts against the B-1 bomber and Trident submarine, both to be leading strategic weapons in the 1980's and beyond. Yet the alternatives, though cheaper, are not that much cheaper (perhaps 20 per cent).

As for the F-14 and F-15, described as usual as "useless multi-billion-dollar programs," these are supposed to take over the missions now being carried out by the Phantom, an excellent aircraft but one which was designed in the 1950's and is beginning to show it. During the October war Israeli pilots shot down at least 50 Arab aircraft for every loss of their own in air combat. Pilot quality had much to do with this result, but it also reflected the mechanical superiority of U.S. Phantoms (and Israeli-converted Mirages). Now that the Arabs are acquiring a new generation of Russian aircraft, including the MiG-23 which is faster than the Phantom, and no less maneuverable, the Israelis, like the USAF, need new and better aircraft to retain a qualitative edge. Both the F-14 and F-15 aircraft are very expensive indeed—partly because of small production runs—but one has yet to see realistic alternatives being presented. Instead the critics glibly assert that the Phantom can be made to serve into the 1980's. Lighter and cheaper fighters, as well as older Phantoms, may usefully supplement a core of modern and sophisticated aircraft, but they cannot do the job alone.

OBSERVERS of the guerrilla warfare that goes on in and around Congress at appropriations time are familiar with the contradictory stances that the process imposes on both sides, a contradiction particularly acute when debate centers on the research-and-development slice of the budget. The armchair strategists who press for budget cuts insist before one committee that the U.S. need not worry about Russian (and Chinese and . . .) numerical superiorities since American forces retain a sharp qualitative edge. At the same time, the Pentagon's spokesmen stress the numerical differences and discount the qualitative edge in asking for money to maintain the strength of the baseline army, navy, and air force. Both then turn around and appear before the subcommittees on research and development, the budget-cutters to deny the need for more expenditure to retain the very qualitative edge that they cited to even the balance, and the Pentagon's spokesmen to argue the opposite case.

The blatant dishonesty of both sides has long since made cynics of all participants, but there is no doubt who is ahead in the "balance of dishonesty" and there is no doubt who has been winning: in spite of the vast increase in Russian strategic-nuclear forces and military budgets, and in spite of the 1973 Middle East war, U.S. defense outlays are now roughly 20 per cent below the figure of 1964, taking into account the hidden manpower deduction. And U.S. military manpower has declined by a fifth—from 2,685,000 men in 1964 to 2,152,000 planned for in 1975. It may be argued that all this simply reflects the détente and so on, but it should be noted that over the same period, according to *the most conservative calculations*,* Russian defense expenditure has

* *Military Balance 1973-74*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 80. Other estimates are as much as 80 per cent higher.

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increased by almost 40 per cent, while Russian military manpower has not been reduced, but rather increased by 125,000 men.

If these trends continue much further, the ability of the United States to deter Russian activism overseas, to preserve the global political balance, and thus incidentally give Israel a fighting chance, will undoubtedly come into question. The many worthy liberal intellectuals whose names decorate the personality and staff lists of the Council for a Livable World, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, the Coalition for New Priorities, the Arms Control Association, the Center of Defense Information, the Federation of American Scientists, and other anti-defense lobbies are all entitled to their views. It is perfectly legitimate for Jews and non-Jews alike to advocate further reductions in American military power, and the general activism of the United States overseas, or indeed to call for an elimination of both. Others are perfectly entitled to hold the opposite view. But all must accept that any drastic reduction in the American defense budget will weaken deterrence and will also make it increasingly difficult for the United States to supply Israel with the tools it needs for its own defense.

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A New International Order?

Robert W. Tucker

I

IT IS A MATTER of general agreement that traditional patterns of inequality in international society are widely challenged today. Differences may and do persist over the lengths to which this challenge can be expected to go in the years ahead and the consequences it will have if permitted to run its logical course. These differences do not affect the view that for the present, at any rate, we are in a period when inequalities once accepted as part of the natural order of things are no longer so accepted. Nor do they affect the judgment that many of the inequalities endemic to international society in the past are no longer sustainable.

The contemporary challenge to inequality has been almost as sudden as it has been pervasive. It is of course the case that we may find harbingers of the opposition to inequality we experience today not only in the interwar period but in the years preceding World War I. The egalitarianism of nation-states that is a commonplace today was not unknown at the turn of the century. Nor was the logic of this new egalitarianism obscured to its adherents. The 20th-century equation of the nation and the state not only invested the state with a legitimacy it has not previously possessed; that equation also gave to the claim of state equality an appeal and force it had never before enjoyed. For the equality of nation-states evoked, if nothing else, a far more persuasive analogy with the ideal of individual equality than had the analogy earlier drawn between states and men. The ideal of the nation carried with it a quality of "naturalness," hence a quality of individuality, that could be attributed only with considerable difficulty to the state alone. Once the implications of this ideal were accepted, it followed that nation-states need be no more identical than men to claim that they had an equal value by virtue of their individuality. And as in the case of individuals, so in the case of nations, it was argued that equality was violated when individuality was suppressed, through denial of political independence, or when it was robbed of self-respect by the disabilities—political, legal, and economic—which effectively deprive a collective from full participation in international society.

But if the new egalitarianism of nations was eventually to serve both as a prime factor in the creation of new states and as a powerful rallying cry for the removal of inequalities held to deprive peoples of self-respect, these were consequences that largely materialized only in the years following World War II. They are indeed the consequences that form part of the basis for the present challenge to inequality. Prior to World War II, however, they appeared as little more than the first winds that herald the possibility of a coming storm. On balance, the interwar period conformed to traditional patterns of inequality. Although the legitimacy of the more extreme manifestations of self-help—above all, armed force—was no longer accepted with the equanimity characteristic of an earlier era, the historic functions of military power remained largely unchanged. The current view taken of the "disutility" of military power was clearly not the view taken in the interwar period.

Nor was it only with respect to the use made and expected of military power that the world of the 1930's was still very much a traditional world. It is instructive to remind ourselves that demands for equality in the interwar years were, in the main, the demands of states now, as indeed then, comprising the powerful and wealthy of international society. What was then popularly termed the struggle between the "haves" and the "have-nots" was in reality a struggle among the haves. In this respect as well, the interwar period clearly followed a traditional pattern. A majority of the have-nots of today had yet to achieve independence. With rare exception, they were not in a position to press for equalities that, for better or worse, are achievable only through the institution of the state. Of the have-nots of today that did enjoy independence then, the claims to equality, when heard at all by the haves, seem quite modest by comparison with the claims of the developing states today. What is increasingly taken as a commonplace today, that the division between

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the rich and the poor nations poses a grave danger to peace and stability, was then no more than the musing of a few seers. The contemporary persuasion that this division is morally repugnant was the possession of perhaps an even more select group. The conviction that justice requires the rich nations to help all peoples obtain a "minimum subsistence" could scarcely be seriously entertained by nations that had yet to recognize the precept of minimum subsistence in their domestic lives.

It is no more plausible to find the promise of a new egalitarianism in the wartime declarations of the United Nations or in the institutions established to order the postwar world. Certainly, one may find repeated reaffirmation of the principle of the "sovereign equality" of all states. But the homage paid to this principle broke no new ground. What is significant in the wartime declarations is the extent to which they reflect, rather than break from, the experience of the interwar period.

Similarly, the structure of the institutions to govern the postwar world can scarcely be interpreted as a departure from traditional patterns of inequality. The Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) closely reflect, in their voting arrangements as well as in other ways, the economic inequality of the participant states (an inequality that separated the United States from all other participants). In the structure of the United Nations Charter the reality of inequality is no less, despite the affirmation of the "equal rights . . . of nations large and small," the pledge to respect "the sovereign equality of all the members of the United Nations," and the voting provisions for the General Assembly. In the charter's original design of order the feature of fundamental importance is the practically exclusive power and almost unlimited discretion conferred upon the Security Council—that is, upon the great powers—in providing for international peace and security.

The charter afforded no assurance that the powers accorded the Security Council would be so employed as to give equal protection to all interests of all member states. The charter's design of order was made dependent on the condition that the great powers retain a basic identity of interests (a design which in itself clearly did not preclude acknowledgment of great-power spheres of influence). So long as this basic identity of interests was maintained, if the price of order was deemed by the great powers to necessitate the sacrifice of what otherwise would be regarded as the legitimate interests of states, there was little in the charter to prevent this sacrifice. Given the role and powers of the Security Council, the chief difference between the traditional balance-of-power system and the system of the charter is that the latter sought to make explicit and to legitimize what the former left rather obscure and never quite dared to legitimize.

II

If we are to find in the United Nations the principal institutional expression today of the demand for greater equality, we must do so in terms of what the organization has become and not in terms of what it was initially intended to be. The change from an instrument of the great powers to a forum for the new states to press their claims begins in the 1950's and coincides with events that suddenly gave the weak of the world unexpected significance. In part, this significance may be traced simply to the impact of the rapid decolonization that marked the years from the late 1940's through the early 1960's and to the very novelty of an international system that had achieved universality. Even in the absence of the cold war, this sudden appearance of a large number of new states would have aroused exaggerated expectations of their effect on world politics and, particularly, great-power relations. In part, however, what gave special significance to the emergence of these states was a bipolar power structure and a concomitant hemegonial conflict that soon became coextensive with what was for the first time a universal international system. The pervasiveness of the cold war was matched by its intensity. A characteristic feature of the conflict was the tendency to make almost any discrete issue into a symbol of the whole and to relate almost any conflict of interest to the underlying and ultimate conflict of interest.

In these circumstances, the states of the Third World took on an importance for the superpowers they would not otherwise have enjoyed. Although almost any feasible shift in the political allegiance of Third World states could not have decisively altered the respective power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was nonetheless assumed that the global balance of power might well depend upon the ultimate disposition of the underdeveloped nations. In fact, once the cold war moved from Europe to Asia and to the Third World generally, conventional balance-of-power calculations became increasingly irrelevant to the major protagonists. What moved the latter was not so much a fear for their conventional security interests—though this fear was never absent—as a fear that they might become irrelevant to the majority of humanity comprising the Third World. It was this prospect of a diminishing influence that led to the vision (or nightmare), which persisted for more than a decade, of an America beleaguered in a hostile world that had chosen the example of Communism.

Although the cold war gave many of the states of the Third World a salience and leverage they would never otherwise have enjoyed, it also limited considerably their independence and freedom

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of action. Conversely, while the decline in intensity of the cold war after the mid-1960's increased the level of independence of these states, it did so largely because the great cold-war protagonists attached a decreasing significance to an interest they had earlier deemed crucial. In part, they did so simply for the reason that in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, and the dangers that crisis illuminated, they had partially and almost imperceptibly turned away from a view of their rivalry which previously had given it an almost completely hegemonic cast. In part, perhaps, they did so out of a sense of fatigue as well as out of a growing realization that the contest could not have a decisive outcome, particularly in the area that the cold war had increasingly centered on. The struggle over the status of the Third World had been primarily a struggle for political allegiance and influence, not territorial control or conquest. But the reliability of political allegiance and influence in the absence of more traditional means of control was increasingly placed in question. Thus what had once appeared as a vital and manageable stake in the cold war took on an elusive and questionable character.

It is not without irony that the decrease in the significance to the two great powers of the Third World states coincided with the rise in the demands of the latter for a greater measure of equality. Although by the middle to late 1960's the restraints imposed upon the states of the Third World by the cold war had clearly begun to recede, the burdens an increased measure of independence imposed upon political leaders of these states had just as clearly not receded. However persistent many Third World governments had been in their criticism of the cold war, the attention they had received as a result of that conflict had assuaged deep anxieties over their very viability as states. If the cold war restricted their freedom of action, it also gave them a much needed sense of importance and worth. This latter sense was probably of greater moment to governing elites than fears—real or simply professed—that the cold war threatened their independence, for despite the restraints it imposed, the cold war provided a psychic confirmation of independence.

III

In retrospect, then, the cold war may be seen as having afforded not only the occasion for an otherwise unexpectedly rapid decolonization but as having provided a marked stimulus to demands for greater equality on the part of the new and developing states. Nevertheless, the common view at the close of the 1960's was that the Third World formed, for the most part, an area of marginal significance in world politics. Even those who objected to this view, and to what they saw as its manifestations in the Nixon foreign policy, did so more out of hope that the developed and capitalist states might be induced to acknowledge a responsibility to improve the lot of the developing nations than out of conviction that the latter might somehow compel the former to do so. No doubt, this view was an exaggerated reaction to what appeared as an excessive preoccupation in the 1960's with the Third World, a preoccupation that was held largely responsible for the disastrous intervention in Vietnam. We had failed to see that the world—developed and underdeveloped alike—had become pluralistic. Although a pluralistic world might be far more complicated than the world of the classic cold war, it was nevertheless held to be a much safer world. Interpreted in essence as the triumph of nationalism, pluralism in the prevailing view meant that Communist expansion no longer carried the threat to America it once carried. Pluralism also meant that the prospect of Communist expansion had dramatically declined. With that decline, the importance of the Third World declined as well. Contrary to the radical explanation that we were in Vietnam because the greater stake in the conflict was access to indispensable raw materials on Western terms, the prevailing view was that we were in Vietnam because we had misunderstood the changes that had taken place in the world. Indeed, the argument went, we had never really understood the Third World at all. John Kenneth Galbraith summarized the new understanding of Third World states in these terms:

> They are poor and rural. . . . For the appreciable future they will so remain. Even by the crudest power calculus, military or economic, such nations have no vital relation to the economic or strategic position of the developed countries. They do supply raw materials. But even here the typical observation concerns not their power as sources of such supply, but rather their weakness as competitive hewers of wood in the markets of the industrially advanced countries.*

With the advantage of hindsight, we can see what Galbraith passed over, that the supply of raw materials might not always be in excess of demand, that at least some of the "hewers of wood" might choose to combine rather than to compete, and—above all—that the heretofore weak might achieve a "vital relation" to the strong should the latter, for whatever reasons, prove unable or disinclined to make use of their strength. Moreover, this estimate of the relations between the developed and underdeveloped states not only underestimated the progress in development that marked the efforts of a number of Third World states; more importantly, it neglected the rising demands throughout the underdeveloped world for a greater measure of equality. During the

* John Kenneth Galbraith, "Plain Lessons of a Bad Decade," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1970-71), p. 37.

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trauma of Vietnam these demands had been, perhaps understandably, overlooked. In fact, the challenge to inequality had slowly but steadily gathered momentum throughout the 1960's. It had done so in international forums where the increasing acceptance of the "one state, one vote" rule gave the small and weak an influence they had never possessed in the traditional system dominated as it was by customary practices that reflected a consensus of the strong. On a number of significant issues requiring international agreement, novel constraints were thereby introduced by virtue of the need of the powerful to obtain legitimation of their interests through the consent of majorities often made up of Third World states. An emergent political equality has been attended by the demand for a greater measure of protection for the economic interests of the underdeveloped states and by the insistence that the historically disadvantaged be given preferential treatment. Nor have these claims fallen on deaf ears in the developed and capitalist states. Among Western elites, at any rate, many are responding, if not over-responding, to what they suddenly see as an urgent need to reduce international inequality, if for no other reason than that of vital self-interest rooted in an ever-growing interdependence.

IV

WHAT are the characteristics of the new egalitarianism that are expected to determine the future international system? In part, it is clear that the new egalitarianism resembles nothing so much as the old equality. If international society is on the threshold of a new era, it is not apparent in the commitment of the new states to an interdependence that precludes a freedom of action states have habitually claimed in the name of their sovereign equality. Westerners increasingly find a contradiction between the new egalitarianism, which is held to result largely from a growing interdependence, and the state's insistence upon its undiminished freedom of action, but the elites of the new states do not share this outlook. On the contrary, for the latter it is precisely the complete independence and sovereignty of the state that forms the most important—certainly the most emphasized—part of the new egalitarianism. It is the new states which with unwearying insistence have reiterated that the international order, based on the sovereign equality of states, must accord to every state the unrestricted right to determine its own course of political, economic, and social development. Thus the "full permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and all economic activities," to use the words of the UN General Assembly's 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, is an "inalienable right," the exercise of which is not to be subject to any external "economic, political, or other types of coercion." More generally, the principle of sovereign equality is interpreted to give every state the right to define its legitimate interests and, subject to limitations which remain uncertain, to take such measures as may be necessary for their defense. Save perhaps for the self-consciousness with which these claims to equality are made by the new states, there is little that is novel about them.

Nor is there any novelty in the insistent claim that the subjects of the new egalitarianism are states and states alone. There is no warrant for seeing in the new egalitarianism the precursor of a growing equality *within* states. The growth of equality among states may prove quite compatible with a continuing, even a deepening, inequality among individuals within states. Whatever the meaning we may give to the equality of states, the assumption that the consequences of state equality need not be clearly distinguished from their consequences for individual equality can only lead to confusion and worse. The almost wholly abortive attempts since World War II to secure the effective internationalization of basic human rights afford a clear illustration of the point at issue. To the extent that the human-rights movement has made any progress—and such progress has been minuscule—it is not unfair to say that it has been made despite the insistent assertion by states of their rights—among which the right of equality has been paramount. The central thrust of the claim to equality in international politics and law not only remains a claim to the equality of states, it is a claim that serves today—as in the past—to reaffirm the view of the state as the exclusive guardian of the interests of, and sole dispenser of justice to, the human beings who comprise it. This claim shows few signs of receding today. Certainly, the new egalitarianism in no way challenges it. If anything, the new egalitarianism has given this claim renewed strength.

In some respects, therefore, the new egalitarianism is little more than a refurbished version of the old equality which was quite compatible with almost any and all forms of inequality. In other respects, though, the new egalitarianism is indeed new. The powerful are not to employ their power, certainly not their military power, against the weak on behalf of interests whose defense would have evoked the threat or use of force only a short time ago. Intended primarily to deny the legitimacy of armed intervention in response to action a government may take within its territorial jurisdiction, the prohibition has also been extended to cover so-called issues of "global management" (e.g., conflicting claims over the use and exploitation of the oceans and space). At the same time, the developed states are to acknowledge a duty to assist the underdeveloped states in

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the great task of reducing the material disparities among them. The prevention of nuclear war apart, this task forms the most important purpose of the new international order. Here again, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order may be cited as representative of the new egalitarianism. The principal purpose of the new order, the Declaration reads, is to alter a system wherein the developing countries "which constitute 70 per cent of the world population, account for only 30 per cent of the world's income." A substantial reduction of inequality in the global distribution of income forms the collective responsibility of the developed states. The framework within which this duty is to be implemented, however, must be one designed by the "whole international community," the collective decisions of the community reflecting the principle of political equality.

The logic of the new egalitarianism therefore requires discrimination on behalf of the materially disadvantaged. This logic has been given expression in the preferential standard by which the developing countries, through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), have sought to replace the most-favored-nation standard. There is no question that the UNCTAD scheme is discriminatory. In place of equality of treatment between the rich and poor, UNCTAD substitutes a standard of equity. Its well-known rationale is that among developed nations equality of treatment (in the form of the most-favored-nation principle) is equitable, whereas among developed and underdeveloped nations equality of treatment is inequitable and, along with other consequences, promotes further inequalities of wealth. Among unequals, the undeveloped nations have argued, equality of treatment leads to discrimination in favor of the stronger. Hence the conclusion that the discrimination shown in favor of the weaker, by virtue of the preferential standard, is equitable because it serves to reduce inequality.

ARE the claims of the new egalitarianism, as articulated by Third World spokesmen, to be taken seriously? I see no reason why they should not. It is easy to show that they often combine two different standards: one for the developed states of the North, another for a largely undifferentiated South (comprising the very poor states, the emerging class, and the nouveaux riches). Thus the insistence that *every* state has exclusive control over its own resources cannot logically be reconciled with the insistence that *some* states have a duty to share their resources with others. Whereas the former claim risks nullifying the basis for an "international welfare order," the latter claim attempts to save such basis by proclaiming it the special duty of the favored few. It is for this reason that a detached, though not unsympathetic, Western observer of the new states' position can voice concern over the possibility that these states have "constructed needless barriers to some of their central needs for the future—namely the acceptance by more affluent states of some level of duty to transfer resources to other states to meet the direst material needs of great sections of mankind."* But logical consistency here could be maintained, and supposedly "needless barriers" removed, only by the concession in principle of a claim that responds to anxieties which are the result of a long history of domination and formal inequality. Rather than make such a concession, the new states find little difficulty in advancing logically inconsistent positions, or, more to the point, in insisting upon a double standard of conduct. Besides, this double standard can always be justified by invoking a past in which material disparities presumably arose because of what is seen as a double standard imposed on developing peoples.

If the claims of the new egalitarianism are not to be dismissed because they proclaim a double standard, they are also not to be dismissed because they gloss over divisions separating the countries of the South. The juxtaposition of Southern rhetoric with Southern realities has been undertaken many times. But what does the exercise prove apart from what we already know: that there are many conflicts of interest among the countries of the South and that, given normal expectations of state behavior, a number of these conflicts will persist and even deepen if for no other reason than as a result of markedly different rates of development? We did not need the oil crisis to demonstrate this, though it clearly has provided a very vivid demonstration. The devastating effects of current oil prices on many developing countries have been met with relative indifference by the major OPEC countries, thereby putting to rest the romantic notion that the new states would lead the way to humanity's moral regeneration. The most telling comment on this notion has come from a Senegalese official who is reported as having said about the world's response to the West African drought that while the United States "gives enough to allow itself an easy conscience," the infinitesimal assistance given by rich fellow Muslims in the Arab countries indicates the latter "have not reached the state of conscience."†

The oil crisis affords apparent vindication of the view that "the South" does not exist in the sense that it was widely seen to exist only a decade ago. At the same time, if the major OPEC countries have not set the kind of example that many vainly expected of them, the all-important point remains that to date thay have set an example that others will attempt to emulate, even

* Julius Stone, *Of Law and Nations*, p. 361.
† New York *Times*, November 10, 1974, p. 34.

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though on a considerably more modest scale. Communal solidarity is not a prerequisite to common grievances that express themselves in claims to greater equality. Nor, for that matter, is the presence of conflicting interests a bar to the pursuit of interests that are still perceived as shared by most governments of the South. The rather disconcerting truth is that the reactions of Southern victims of present oil prices have been almost as astonishing in their way as the reactions of Northern victims. A large literature on what sociologists term "relative deprivation" would have led us to expect the Southern countries to show intense resentment toward the sudden riches and new status of the major OPEC states, and particularly in view of the lack of concern the latter have shown over the effects their actions have had on the world's poor. It may be a mixture of fear and hope that prevents this resentment from becoming manifest. Then again, however, it may be the persistence of grievances and interests that are still held in common despite feelings of resentment. To the extent that it is the persistence of commonly held grievances and interests, the response of the developed states to OPEC actions has clearly not served to discourage the claims of the new egalitarianism. If anything, this response has given such claims new impetus.

V

WHAT is extraordinary about the contemporary challenge to international inequality is not so much the challenge itself, however, as the response it has elicited and the expectations it has generated among liberal elites in the developed and capitalist states. It is quite true that in theory at least liberalism has always been far more egalitarian than is commonly recognized, and that this egalitarianism did not stop at the boundaries of the state. Nor did liberalism rest with the promise of legal and political equality for those peoples that met the standards of civilization and, accordingly, were deemed capable of directing their own destiny. The liberal credo not only held out the promise of legal and political equality but the further promise that free trade, besides being proportionately beneficial to all, would promote a gradual equalization in international income distribution.

Even so, until very recently it would have seemed incongruous to hear from liberal lips that material inequality in international no less than in domestic life must be justified and that, at the least, such justification must fail if it does not encompass the provision of a minimum level of subsistence to all peoples. That a just society must insure a minimum subsistence for all is a principle accepted within most Western societies only in this century, and within the United States only in the past generation. Even now, the controversy over what constitutes minimum subsistence continues to evoke widespread and deep disagreement. That what has been accepted as a precept of justice only so recently within historic national societies may—indeed, must—also be regarded today as a precept of justice in international society deserves, one would think, to be treated with some skepticism.

The point remains that this response is increasingly taken for granted by Western elites. It is apparent in the view that finds a "logical inconsistency" in the disparity of effort made to alleviate poverty at home and abroad. It is equally apparent in the persuasion that not only the same moral case may be made for the redistribution of wealth among states as for such redistribution within states, but substantially the same peacekeeping case as well. The appeal of and need for greater global equality, it is held, must grow with the growing awareness of the vast gulf between conditions of domestic life (in developed societies) and those of international life. Thus the growth of equality within the state forms the precursor of the movement toward the growth of equality among states. In this view, the dynamic of equality cannot and will not be contained at the boundaries of the state. Reflecting the development of the more influential domestic societies, the world community will become a welfare community in roughly the manner that Western states have become welfare states.

Still, the question persists: what will induce the powerful in international society to yield what has only so recently and often so reluctantly been yielded in domestic society? Clearly, if the inequalities that have traditionally marked state relations are to decline, the institution that has afforded the primary means for maintaining inequality must also decline. The effective challenge to inequality requires, at the outset, that the more extreme forms of self-help—especially military force—no longer perform their time-honored functions. Provided that physical coercion of the weak by the strong has largely lost its former utility, as many now believe, nothing would appear to be of comparable moment in altering the hierarchical structure of international society. It is in the assumption that the rising material and moral costs of employing force now effectively inhibit—or very nearly so—the strong from resorting to force against the weak that we must find one of the root sources, if not *the* root source, of the challenge to inequality.

Nor is it reasonable to expect that a growing disutility of military power will have no effect on the economic power wielded by the strong. Although disparities in economic power remain in a world where military power is presumed to be increasingly at a discount, the effects of these disparities must surely be altered as well and in the same direction. Power may not be indivisible, but few would care to argue that though the

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utility of military power has markedly declined, there need be no devaluation in the efficacy of economic power. Recent experience has shown that even against a very small state, and one with a vulnerable economy, the effectiveness of economic coercion alone may prove surprisingly limited. In part, this is so for the evident reason that economic coercion permits the weak alternatives that physical coercion does not. Then, too, the limited effectiveness of economic coercion may in some measure be attributed to the same sources that limit the effectiveness of physical coercion. While the legitimacy of the former has not been subject to the same standards as has the latter, economic coercion has been called increasingly into question even when employed by the wealthy country to protect interests that are the result of undertakings the weaker (underdeveloped) state consented to.* This argument draws added force once it is recognized that economic coercion can only have its full effects to the extent it leaves open the option of physical coercion. In this respect, it is quite understandable that many who reject serious economic confrontation in the oil crisis do so in part on the ground that this may lead eventually to military confrontation. Finally, as in the case of physical coercion, so in the case of economic coercion, the same argument will be, and has been, employed: the costs may well outweigh the gains, whether economic or political, in a world where the poor and weak have displayed increasing sensitivity to any form of coercion.

The erosion of military and, in some measure at least, economic power as instruments of the strong must clearly have, if continued, a profound impact on the hierarchical nature of international society. Even so, this erosion cannot of itself confer the kind of leverage needed to effect a significant redistribution of the world's wealth. The reduction of material disparities among states is affected by the new constraints on force largely to the extent that these constraints permit the weak to take measures within their territories that in an earlier day would have invited armed intervention. In this sense, a restricted scope afforded to forcible measures of self-help may diminish, and for one select group of countries spectacularly so, disparities in wealth. Yet it is only in this sense that the new constraints may do so. In consequence, their effects—again, the case of oil apart—would appear to be rather peripheral in reducing material disparities.

In a broader perspective, however, the leverage Third World states are expected to enjoy by virtue of their possession of natural resources indispensable to the industrialized states is only one feature of a more general vision in which the vulnerabilities of the strong will become increasingly apparent. The dependence of the rich on the raw materials held by the poor is only the most recent and dramatic manifestation of this vision. The vision would persist in the absence of concern over continued supply of raw materials at less than exorbitant prices. It is to be found in the repeated admonition that we cannot begin to solve the many environmental problems we face without the cooperation of the Third World states. It is also to be found in a host of economic issues other than natural resources—investments, markets, monetary reform, trade liberalization—in which the Third World is considered to have the power to "hold us up."†

STILL, it is not these and related issues that form the crux of the conviction that the present inequalities of nations—above all, material inequalities—must somehow be reduced. Instead, the essence of the challenge to inequality is the presumed danger that these inequalities hold out to international peace and stability. The power of the weak that is most to be feared, on this view, is the power to transmit misery in the form of chaos and war. Whether this transmission takes an active or a passive form is held to be less important than the vulnerability of the rich to whatever form it takes. We have become familiar with the metaphors that are intended to convey this sense of the vulnerability of the world's favored peoples to conditions that may one day prompt the less fortunate and their governments to desperate behavior. The United States, Samuel Huntington writes, "is a tenant occupying the largest, most elegant, most luxuriously furnished penthouse suite in a global apartment house." As such we have "a clear interest in insuring that the structure as a whole is sound and that minimum conditions for decent human existence prevail in the building."** Robert L. Heilbroner puts the matter more generally, as well as more ominously, in these terms: "Even the most corrupt governments of the underdeveloped world are aware of the ghastly resemblance of the world's present economic conditions to an immense train, in which a few passengers, mainly in the advanced capitalist world, ride in first-class coaches, in conditions of comfort unimaginable to the enormously greater numbers crammed into the cattle cars that make up the

* It serves no useful purpose here to enter into extended discussion of what constitutes "consent" as between parties greatly unequal in power. If the fact of inequality *per se* is held to invalidate the consensual nature of an undertaking, then almost any bilateral agreement between developed and underdeveloped countries may be regarded as devoid of validity. An apparently more plausible attack on the validity of agreements entered into between the rich and the poor holds that the test must turn on exploitation rather than inequality *per se*. In fact, the alternative turns out to reveal almost as many difficulties as the test it replaces.

† Cf. C. Fred Bergsten, "The Threat Is Real," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1974), pp. 84 ff.

** Samuel P. Huntington, "Foreign Aid: For What and For Whom," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1971), pp. 130-31.

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bulk of the train's carriages."* Eventually, in the absence of a greater equality, the world's apartment house or train will be subject to dangers that may threaten all of the inhabitants or passengers. But it is the rich among them who are presumably the more vulnerable, if only for the reason that they have a great deal to lose.

Thus in what almost appears as a reversal of the "natural" order of things, it is the weak of the world who are considered to hold out grave peril to the strong. Moral obligation apart, it is the world's interdependence—indeed, its indivisibility—that compels us out of self-interest to reduce present material disparities between the world's rich and poor. The appeal to self-interest resulting from an inescapable interdependence need not and should not be understood only in the narrow sense of avoiding material injury. Even if the poor could be safely left to their suffering, the prospect of living in a prosperous enclave that is surrounded by a despairing world would prove unwelcome. More than that, it is argued, this prospect must eventually prove morally debilitating, especially given our awareness today of conditions from which it was once possible and rather easy to divert our attention.

It is in this manner that a view initially based upon calculations of self-interest moves almost imperceptibly to one based upon moral obligation. The sentiment of sympathy or pity may not appear in unalloyed form, but it is clearly there even though combined with anxiety over the actions to which the poor may finally be driven in the attempt to alter their condition. Since the same combination is a commonplace in arguments for greater equality today within Western societies, there is no cause for surprise that it should form the basis for appeals to reduce inequalities in international society. What is surprising is the rather casual manner with which a collective moral responsibility that encompasses humanity is increasingly viewed almost as self-evident.

VI

The oil crisis enables us to see with a clarity we could not have before some of the consequences of the new egalitarianism. One consequence is that if permitted to run its logical course the new egalitarianism will lead, as it is leading today, to a growing disjunction between power and order, that is, to an international society in which the principal holders of power—at least among the developed and capitalist states—may no longer be the principal creators and guarantors of order. And since nature abhors a vacuum, the new equality is also likely to lead to an international system in which the relative power position of the Soviet Union will be considerably enhanced, for the Russians are neither dependent in any significant way on the new states nor disposed to view their claims in the manner of Western elites. The disjunction between power and order will accordingly be largely one-sided in its effects. Whether this prospective outcome is to be welcomed or decried is not at issue here. What is at issue is the problems it must raise to the degree it is realized.

There are many who will take exception even to this manner of formulating the consequences of the movement toward greater equality in international society, let alone to what they sense to be the implications of the formulation. Why speak of a growing disjunction between order and power, it will be asked, rather than of a changing power? Moreover, why speak of the principal possessors of power that are no longer the principal creators and guarantors of order, if it is admitted that order implies power? True, convention sanctions the loose usage whereby one speaks of power that is no longer usable or effective. This manner of speaking is misleading, however, since power that is no longer usable or effective is no longer power in any meaningful sense.

Thus, it is argued, no useful purpose is served by pointing to the markedly declining utility of traditional forms of power as creating a separation between power and order. What is happening instead is that a new and more egalitarian order is emerging, in part because a form of power that was once decisive and pervasive is no longer so, or, at any rate, no longer nearly so decisive and pervasive. On this view, then, to point to a growing disjunction between power and order betrays a retrogressive outlook and a yearning to return to the traditionally hierarchical system ordered primarily on the basis of relative military capability.

There is some merit to these considerations, if for no other reason than what may appear as order to one observer may yet appear as disorder to another. So it has always been, and we have no persuasive reason for believing contemporary judgments are somehow free of this perennial bias. Unless the concept of order is reduced to the mere effectiveness with which power—whatever its ingredients and application—secures such behavior as its holders ordain, there is an unavoidable element of preference implicit in all judgments on what constitutes order. If this is true with respect to civil society, it is for obvious reasons all the more true with respect to international society.

It is not these qualifications, however, that form the principal objection to the position which holds that there is a growing disjunction between power and order in state relations. Instead, objection centers on the alleged failure to recognize what Pierre Renouvin has termed the "underlying forces" at work in contemporary world poli-

* Robert L. Heilbroner, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect*, p. 39.

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itics. For it is these forces which are presumably constantly eroding the old order and the forms of power that maintained it. There is neither space nor need here to review once again what by now a large, and still burgeoning, literature has elaborated. Suffice it to say that an increasingly interdependent world is found to result from weapons that can no longer protect, let alone aggrandize, the state; from a technology that no longer permits the "separate" state; from transnational economic and social actors that have come to function largely independently of the state; and from a process of industrial growth which creates problems that cannot be resolved in isolation by the state. In almost all its variations, then, the theme of interdependence points to the state's growing loss of autonomy.

But what is of relevance in this context is not so much the state's loss of autonomy as the egalitarian implications this loss conveys. Marked inequality—certainly radical inequality—is seen to threaten an interdependent society for the reason that interdependence is considered but a synonym for vulnerability. A society made up of increasingly interdependent units is a society made up of increasingly vulnerable units. If the great moral imperative of the age is equality, as we are constantly told, an interdependent world that does not respond to this imperative is evidently a world with a very bleak future.

Interestingly, however, the by now pervasive theme of interdependence is only seldom applied to the Soviet Union (or, for that matter, China), and with good reason. By this very omission we may conclude that interdependence is largely irrelevant to the state that will assuredly continue to play a major, and increasing, role in world politics. For the purpose of conventional political analysis, this qualification alone may well be regarded as critical. Still, one need not press this point. The qualifications to interdependence are considerable even when kept to the rather abstract level its advocates appear to prefer. If in one sense modern weapons make all states vulnerable as never before, in another sense these weapons confer a security on their possessors that states seldom enjoyed in the past. If in one sense technology—particularly communications—no longer permits the "separate state," in another sense technology gives the state making full use of it powers it previously rarely possessed. Moreover, the same technology that confers these powers also makes possible—at any rate, for the favored few—a policy akin to autarchy. It is of course the case that whether states pursue a policy of independence or interdependence, they must eventually face the problems attendant upon growth. But there is no compelling reason for believing these problems can only be resolved through the methods of interdependence and, indeed, there are a number of reasons for believing quite the contrary.

EVEN if one accepts the view of an ever-rising interdependence occurring at the expense of the state, the prospect of a growing disjunction between power and order is not thereby excluded. It is excluded only if one assumes that interdependence itself is largely constitutive of order and that this order is self-maintaining, at least in the sense that its maintenance does not depend upon the threat or use of physical coercion. In fact, however, such interdependence as we have in international society today, while creating the need for a greater measure of order, provides no assurance this need will be met, whether by a supposedly declining state or by some alternative institution (s). Indeed, if the state is being slowly but surely drained of its autonomy, as the believers in interdependence would have it, then in the absence of effective alternative political institutions, what order international society has heretofore enjoyed must be jeopardized. Surely the order of the past generation must be jeopardized, since the state that has presided over it is presumably no longer capable of doing so.

If the interdependence advocates do not see matters in this light, it is because they do assume that interdependence itself is largely constitutive of order, that an interdependent world must establish its own set of rules and constraints, and that this order does not include force, the *ultima ratio* that characterized and defined the traditional system. Obviously, the new system will still be one largely dominated by self-help. What else could it be in the absence of supranational institutions? But the self-help of interdependence will show a far more benign face than the self-help of the traditional system, and it will do so because the threat or use of force is destructive of interdependence. Is this apparent circularity of the argument a fundamental flaw? No, provided a sufficiently high value is attached by *all* participants to those consequences held to follow from interdependence.

To be sure, the more cautious prophets of the new order of interdependence readily concede that the emergence of this order is both complicated and threatened by the persistence of "obsolete" forms of power (and, of course, by the persistence of equally obsolete attitudes that have yet to adjust to the requirements of an interdependent world). But this admitted tension between the old and the new is seen as unavoidable in a period of transition. It can, and in all likelihood will, be overcome as the forces of interdependence continue to erode the already weakened position of the state.

What is the basis for believing that this tension between the old and the new will be resolved in favor of the new? It will not do to respond by pointing once again to "underlying forces" the significance of which are, as noted, quite ambiguous. At best, these forces leave one on uncertain grounds and, if anything, suggest that the ten-

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sion, rather than being resolved in favor of the new, may only become more pronounced. If this is so, it serves to strengthen the view of a growing disjunction between power and order with all that this disjunction must portend. Even in the new order of interdependence, it seems only reasonable to assume that conflicts of interest will arise and that, as the oil crisis has demonstrated, a growing interdependence will itself be productive of many very serious conflicts of interest. How will such conflicts be resolved if the traditional means for resolving them are to be neither employed nor meaningfully threatened? To respond that the means of conflict resolution will increasingly approximate the means of resolving conflicts within the state assumes a degree of consensus international society has not known in the past and clearly does not know at present. But this in turn assumes a formative agent of consensus—and, indeed, of conscience—that heretofore at least has invariably been the state (and not, as a still regnant liberal outlook insists, an elusive "society").

VII

If we are plainly not already in a consensual world, is there plausible reason to believe that we are moving toward one? Interdependence cannot of itself provide such reason, since it is as much a source of conflict as of consensus, if not more. Can development provide what interdependence cannot provide? Many apparently think so and find in the very universality of commitment to the cause of development the consensus that may serve as the foundation of a new order. But the issues that interdependence raises are also in large measure the issues development must raise, however widespread the approval development elicits in principle. This is so if only for the reason that the commitment to development, if taken at all seriously, is evidently a commitment to a greater measure of equality. Although development may and does mean many things, one thing it surely means to its legions of supporters is a world in which material disparities will be less marked than they are at present. No doubt, those who go so far as to equate development with equality exaggerate. The exaggeration is a pardonable one, however, in view of the importance equality occupies in the development imperative.

Unless we assume that the greater measure of global equality expected to attend development will result from the indigenous efforts of the developing countries themselves, the development of the latter evidently entails a steady and very substantial transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor countries. Is it reasonable to expect such transfer to occur voluntarily as a consequence of some transcendent consensus on the desirability of development? It would not seem so. Certainly, it would not seem so if we take as our point of reference the only experience we have. Within major Western democratic states, the efforts that have been made to achieve a greater measure of socioeconomic equality have met with considerable resistance, and this despite their relative modesty in both intention and result. Yet these efforts have been undertaken within nation-states that have a long history and enjoy some measure of cohesiveness and solidarity.

The paradox, and the difficulty, attending all movements toward achieving greater equality are that in large measure they must presuppose the very conditions they seek to achieve. The great end ultimately sought through equality is fraternity, in Tawney's expression, the society of fellowship. Yet the achievement of this end remains unattainable without that preexistent measure of cohesiveness and solidarity which safeguards against the conflicts that demands for greater equality raise, conflicts that may well prove destructive of fellowship. No major Western state has yet managed to resolve this paradox satisfactorily, and for the reason that none has enjoyed the moral resources, the degree of consensus and sympathy, requisite for its resolution. Instead, the quest for equality has been met by the promise of equal opportunity, by the expectation that everyone's material condition may be constantly improved through growth, and by the recognition that everyone must at least be insured a minimal level of subsistence. Whether one regards this record as commendable or deplorable, a substantial realization of equality or a betrayal of it, is not at issue here. Of relevance is the point that this, in rough approximation, is the historic response Western democratic states have made to demands for greater equality. In part, this response—the provision of a minimal standard of subsistence—was made only after a relatively high level of development had been achieved. Even so, its recognition has come slowly and, to many, quite inadequately.

If this experience has any relevance for the problem of global inequality, we can only expect that the development imperative, whatever the degree of consensus it elicits in principle, will in reality provide an acute and continuing source of conflict. Given the notorious lack of cohesiveness and solidarity of international society, the demand to reduce present disparities of income and wealth would prove productive of conflict even in quite favorable circumstances. For even in quite favorable circumstances, international economic relationships would still be relationships of equity with their clearly redistributive overtones. Moreover, the prime movers in the demand for equality will be states. Is there reason to expect that the claims of underdeveloped states to greater equality will be moderated with a steady improvement in their standards of living? Here again, if the experience of domestic society is at all rel-

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evant, the answer cannot prove comforting in its implications for international conflict.

It is a well-known theme of conservatives that the issue of equality grows more acrimonious and demands for greater equality more insistent as the poor begin to improve their living standards and to see the possibilities heretofore hidden from them. But the theme also happens to be borne out by experience, and candid egalitarians have always acknowledged, while defending, the growth of resentment against inequality that attends the growth of equality. It is one of the great egalitarians of the century who wrote that the determination to end disabilities deemed needless and advantages deemed preferential "has its source, not in material misery, but in sentiments which the conquest of the grosser forms of poverty has given room to grow."* Recently, a champion of greater global equality has warned in unequivocal terms against the belief that a modest rise in living standards among the underdeveloped nations will moderate their claims and thereby promote a world with less conflict.† Nor is the reason for the sharpened intolerance of inequality that attends the growth of equality to be found simply in the sentiments that rising expectations bring, sentiments which readily make remaining inequalities appear intolerable. In part, this rising determination to end inequality is to be explained by the conviction that the position of the privileged is no longer secure once concessions have been wrested from them by whatever means. The significance of this conviction will of course vary according to circumstances. In international society it is bound to prove quite significant, given the circumstances normally marking the concession of interests by states—let alone the concession of vital interests. It was entirely to be expected that the major OPEC states should view the manner in which concessions were wrung from the developed and capitalist states as indicative of a power position no longer secure. And it is to be expected that if the latter states continue to behave as they have behaved to date, the former, acting on this view, will press for a still greater measure of "equality."

These considerations suggest that the development process—as interdependence—holds out the promise of far more conflict than consensus, and this even accepting the assumption of relatively open-ended growth. It is this assumption that provided the foundation for Western-inspired postwar development programs, just as it is this assumption that accounted for the optimism placed in these programs. Given a moderate amount of competence and will on the part of governments of developing countries, a convergence of per-capita growth rates was expected to result in the not-too-distant future from modest aid infusions and technology transfers. Convergent per-capita growth rates, in turn, would eventually lead to per-capita income levels that, if not equalized globally, would still exceed the levels of income prevailing at the time in the developed states.

This view persists in some quarters even today, but it is clearly a rapidly declining faith. Population growth alone has dealt it a very severe blow. The goal of converging per-capita growth rates has been moved from the not-too-distant to the indefinite future and levels of per-capita income once entertained have simply been abandoned. In the meantime, disillusionment within Western countries over the results of development efforts in many Southern states has been met by rising resentment of the poor over what is seen as a commitment by the rich that is at once no more than of token significance and yet increasingly unbearable for the interventionist pressures it is often felt to bring.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the favored solution for international inequality was a variation of the favored solution for domestic inequality. Even if the rather elusive, though ubiquitous, "gap" was not substantially closed, it would not matter terribly, it was believed, if the standard of living of all rose dramatically. This proposition is far from self-evident, again as domestic experience has shown. What Charles Frankel has observed in the domestic context ("a man does not have to be poor to be disadvantaged; he merely needs to be poorer than somebody else") may prove no less relevant in the international context.

At any rate, the favored solution of an open-ended growth process has been called into question and, in consequence, the faith that found in development the promise of a new order has been shaken. For the appearance of constraints on growth changes the entire setting in which development and the reduction of global inequalities were to have taken place. What once appeared as not only a plausible but a painless goal no longer does so. Nor is it enough to respond that present constraints on growth will not prove to be lasting, that what we are confronted with is a short-to-medium term problem likely to be resolved, depending upon the particular constraint, over the next ten to thirty years. The long term may produce catastrophe. On the other hand, the long term may find solutions to problems that appear next to insoluble today. We cannot know. But it is not the long term that concerns us. It is the near term, for that is the only term statecraft responds to, if indeed it responds to that.

VIII

GIVEN the circumstances likely to prevail in the near term, the need for order will not prove less but greater than in the

* R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, p. 225. Of course, what constitutes "needless disabilities" and "preferential advantages" varies with the growth of equality itself.

† Gunnar Myrdal, "The World Poverty Problem," *Britannica Book of the Year 1972*, p. 34.

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continues to find a great deal of difficulty and that democratic governments will continue to prove responsive to the distinction the public draws between its collective welfare and the welfare of those outside the state.

There are even reasons for believing that this distinction may be drawn more sharply in the future than in the recent past. One reason, paradoxically enough, is the growing demand for greater equality within many of the developed states. That in America this demand may be expected to mount in intensity is forecast alike by champions and critics of equality.* Yet a more egalitarian America need not mean a greater willingness to reduce global inequalities of wealth, and this all the more so to the extent that egalitarianism takes place within the cultural and value setting of "traditional" America.† In these circumstances, a case may be made for an America that shows no more, and perhaps even less, disposition than today to concern itself with poverty abroad. We may expect that those experiencing improved material well-being will, despite their improvement, insist upon defining "needs" in terms of "wants." This being so, the demands for further material improvement are, if anything, likely to increase. These considerations, moreover, are only underlined by the prospect that industrial growth within the developed countries may decline in the years ahead, however modestly. For even a modest slowdown in industrial growth will intensify the problem of equality for domestic societies whose social stability is so centrally dependent upon economic expansion.

In retrospect, the present concern over reducing disparities of wealth among the developed and underdeveloped nations may yet appear not as the beginning of a new era but as a brief interlude that is followed by a restoration of attitudes not essentially dissimilar from those which preceded it. This is not to say that traditional patterns of inequality will be or should be restored. It is to say that the claims of the new egalitarianism will either be moderated or we will have a period which by comparison will make the postwar period seem almost benign.

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* For the former, see Herbert J. Gans, *More Equality*. For the latter, Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. Gans writes (p. xii) that "more equality must come because Americans favor it and because America cannot function in the long run without more equality." Bell finds (p. 425) the redefinition of equality—from equality of opportunity to equality of result—"the central value problem of post-industrial society."

† As Herbert J. Gans is so persuaded. He writes that egalitarianism in the future America "will not be based on altruism," that "it will be individualistic," and that "it does not presuppose that people are ready to stop competing for material or nonmaterial gain." *More Equality*, pp. xvi, 25.

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past. It will prove greater because interdependence creates relationships and development gives rise to claims which, if not somehow resolved, may easily lead to chaos. The oil crisis strikingly illustrates this need without affording any assurance it will be met. If anything, the course of the crisis to date indicates that it may well not be met. If it is not, the reason will be that the strong among the developed and capitalist states are no longer willing to enforce the order of the past, while the weak who have challenged this order are incapable of creating a new order. Even so, the failure to enforce the order of the past will still mean, on balance, the relinquishment of interest by the strong.

Is it plausible to expect this anomalous situation to persist? If not quite plausible, it is still possible, if only for the reason that this situation will remain critically dependent upon political and moral perceptions which may yet transform today's possibility into tomorrow's reality. To be sure, these perceptions are not of equal moment. Nor are they directly relevant to each and every conflict of interest between the developed and capitalist states of the North and the states of the South. Moreover, they are identified much more with elite groups in the North than with the publics at large. Still, their general significance today for the response the new egalitarianism has evoked cannot be in serious doubt. Implicit throughout the preceding discussion, they are: a rising disinclination to use or to threaten force, whether from the belief that force is no longer expedient or from the conviction that force is no longer a legitimate instrument or, more likely, from a combination of the two; an exaggerated view of the sources of strength of the Third World which is, in large measure, a function of the view that the developed states are in many respects highly vulnerable; a persuasion that growing interdependence is threatened by inequalities which, if allowed to persist, will result in generalized chaos or war; a commitment generally to reducing international inequalities, though without a clear idea of—or, for that matter, interest in—the effects a redistribution of wealth would have on the redistribution of world power; and, finally, a sense of guilt over a past for which we are now thought to be paying the inevitable price.

It is against this outlook that the response to OPEC actions may largely be understood. This response could scarcely condemn the ends presumably sought by the oil-producing states, for these are the very ends (interdependence, equality, development) to which Western liberals have long been committed. It may of course be argued that however unexceptionable the professed ends sought by OPEC states, the means employed to these ends are to be condemned. But such condemnation is less than persuasive if it is made simply on the ground that the present oil price is an administered price of a cartel. Quite apart from the consideration that pre-OPEC oil prices were also the administered prices of a cartel, the prices of a number of industrial goods developing states must import are, in effect, administered prices. If the OPEC oil price today were one-third its actual price, it is doubtful that much weight would be given to the fact that the price is administered by an oil-producer cartel. It is very late in the day for Western liberals to object to price-fixing simply because it is undertaken by states. Equally, it is very late to object to international transfers of wealth which result from state action when the need for a positive role for the state in the form of aid-giving has long been taken for granted.

It is another matter to condemn the means to otherwise laudable—or, at the very least, unobjectionable—ends because of the effects these means have on others. Although OPEC actions affect both the rich and the poor, it remains the case that the effects are very different. The rich, *if* they are lucky, may only be made marginally poorer. The outlook for the poor is of a different order. Suppose, however, that the major OPEC states were to show an unexpected degree of wisdom and self-restraint and to offer the poor states a concessional price for oil. Suppose, further, that the Arab oil producers decided to share a very substantial portion of their huge revenues with their Arab brothers and to grant large loans on soft terms to predominantly Muslim countries. In these circumstances, what petrodollars might remain for recycling in the West would be modest and of manageable proportion. Indeed, the price of oil levied on the developed-country importers might be markedly raised. What would the objection be, then, to the actions of the oil exporters? Clearly, objection would have to be taken simply to the sheer magnitude of the transfer of resources involved. Yet this would prove no easy case for Western liberals to make. Though perhaps still objecting to the means, their objection would seem almost trivial when set alongside the approved ends.

Since these circumstances do not obtain, those committed to the new egalitarianism are saved from having to face the consequences of their commitment. The point remains that the oil crisis is the clearest indication we have to date of the way the new egalitarianism may be expected to work if given free rein. It is not easy, however, to see it being given free rein in the future. A political-moral outlook that once proved not only relatively costless but congenial to our interests is bound to be challenged once it is apparent that if acted upon the result will mean a world over which we will have decreasing control at increasing cost. For if a large portion of Western liberal elites finds no more difficulty in distinguishing between the United States and Bangladesh than it does between California and Mississippi, it is safe to say that the general public

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The Democrats' Dilemma

Elliott Abrams

IN MOST elections, it is said, people do not so much choose which candidates they are for as eliminate those they are against. On the face of it this notion seems adequately to explain both the 1972 Presidential election, when a healthy plurality decided to vote against George McGovern, and the mid-term election of November 1974, when large majorities voted against Richard Nixon even though his name did not appear on the ballot.

The reasons behind the voters' repudiation of Nixon are too obvious to need elaboration, and theoretically, at least, they do not appear to implicate Nixon's political party. Watergate has been seen as Nixon's problem, or America's, but not as a peculiarly "Republican" phenomenon for which the party should be held responsible. *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse*—an adage which may well insure that most books by Republican authors on this episode will be penned by convicted Watergate felons. The voters' rejection of George McGovern, on the other hand, is obviously a matter of passionate concern to Democrats, not least because it is essential for them to understand the 1972 debacle if another Democratic defeat is to be avoided in 1976. The choice of a theory to explain 1972 will have much to do with the choice of a candidate for 1976, and the debate among political intellectuals on this matter is directly tied to the intra-party power struggles now under way, as was made dramatically clear at the mini-convention in Kansas City last December.

A conventional wisdom has by now emerged on the McGovern defeat of 1972, providing both an "organizational" and a "substantive" interpretation for the magnitude of his loss. McGovern is considered to have been an unattractive candidate whose campaign was so badly run he himself came to appear incompetent and untrustworthy; on substantive issues McGovern is thought to have appeared too far to the Left of the great majority of voters—even traditionally Democratic voters. Indeed, so the theory goes, it was the desertion of the increasingly conservative white working-class voters, the "white ethnics," from the Democratic party that turned Nixon's victory margin into a landslide. The lesson for 1976, then, is clear: the Democratic nominee must be attractive, his campaign must be carefully run, and in addition he must keep strictly to the political center lest he offend working-class whites and once again drive away a key element of traditional Democratic support.

This conventional analysis is appealing, and not entirely incorrect. McGovern's $1,000-a-person welfare plan, and the precipitous withdrawal of his firmly announced "1,000 per-cent" support of his running mate, Senator Thomas Eagleton, are shining examples of campaign errors, and there is no doubt that McGovern's views, or apparent views, on many issues (national security policy, for one) were unpopular. The 1974 Congressional elections would appear to add additional weight to this interpretation of what happened in 1972: Gary Hart, formerly a McGovern campaign manager, won his Colorado Senate campaign by running as what one might call an "extreme moderate." Ramsey Clark, on the other hand, lost to Jacob Javits in New York (despite Hugh Carey's overwhelming victory in the gubernatorial race), apparently because he was unable to shake the left-wing label he had acquired through such acts as his visit to Hanoi in 1972.

Still, the conventional analysis leaves much to be desired as a sufficient explanation of the McGovern debacle. For one thing, it credits McGovern and his aides with a shrewd and brilliantly managed drive for the nomination and then blames his defeat in the general election on the gross incompetence of the very same people—an unresolved contradiction. And on the question of substantive policy issues, the conventional analysis posits an electorate too conservative to accept a Democratic nominee when the fact is that Democratic majorities have been elected to Congress every term since 1954—including in 1972, in the face of McGovern's own landslide defeat. These and other logical deficiencies in the conventional view have prompted a number of authors to reconsider the 1972 election and what

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it signifies for the future of Democratic party politics.

The most comprehensive of the revised looks at 1972 is by Lanny J. Davis in *The Emerging Democratic Majority*.* This book opens with a history of the "New Politics" forces, starting with the civil-rights and anti-Vietnam war movements in the 1960's, and continuing on, through the 1968 campaign of Eugene McCarthy, to the 1972 election. Davis then enters into an extremely detailed examination of Edmund Muskie's campaign for the Democratic Presidential nomination, and concludes with a series of chapters analyzing the lessons Davis believes may be learned from the story he has told. Although the book seems, at occasional points, to be an apologia for Muskie, in whose campaign the author participated, Davis writes with considerable intelligence and his views are consistently well-argued.

Its title notwithstanding, Davis's book is not really a response to Kevin Phillips's 1969 work, *The Emerging Republican Majority*—Richard M. Scammon and Ben Wattenberg delivered such a response in 1970 in *The Real Majority*—but is rather an attempt to answer two questions which perplexed Davis about the 1972 campaign. First, Edmund Muskie appeared to everyone to be a winning candidate, and everyone knew McGovern would be a terrible candidate; why, then, did McGovern win the nomination? And, second, if McGovern was smart enough to win the nomination, why wasn't he smart enough to avoid defeat in the election? (The second question is another way of challenging the view that McGovern lost badly simply because he campaigned poorly.)

Davis has an answer to both questions, one that should catch the attention of Democrats contemplating the 1976 primaries. "The fact is," he argues, "most of the major problems of communication which McGovern faced during the campaign were the result of his doing what was necessary to win the purest elements of the New Politics constituency and to keep them satisfied during his campaign." Davis notes that the personal approach of the Muskie campaign—"Trust Muskie"—"while well suited for a general-election campaign against Nixon, totally overlooked the political realities of winning the nomination in a multi-candidate primary." Since primaries draw low turnouts, a small but devoted band of workers can often drum up enough voters to gain their candidate a plurality. Conversely, the kind of candidate who is acceptable to the great mass of voters but, precisely because of his centrist views, passionately supported by none, will lose primaries despite the fact that he would be the strongest man in a national election.

The phenomenon is of increasing importance in both parties. The Ripon Society's fine study of the 1972 election and Watergate, *Jaws of Victory*† (one of the few Republican comments on 1972 and its aftermath), holds that recent changes have served "to open the [electoral] process up dramatically by placing the primary voter and the caucus attender at the center of the system. In many ways this is commendable, but what has happened is almost revolutionary. The managers have simply created a situation of great instability where it is almost impossible for anyone to exercise a predictable amount of influence over the nominating process."

This is not entirely accurate so far as the Democrats are concerned, since, predictably, under the present party processes the influence of one group—the New Politics forces—is being maximized. It is no accident that the first great moves for Democratic party reforms came from a body known as the McGovern Commission; the authors of *Jaws of Victory* write of these reforms as "long-range attempts to manipulate the rules to the advantage of certain elements of the party." What to do about the problem is another matter. Davis, however, does not shrink from the logic of his analysis; he calls for a "brokered" national convention. In 1972, he writes, "Such a result would have been in the interests not just of the Democratic party, which under the circumstances would probably have nominated someone who had the widest support among all segments of the party, but of the nation as well."

WHATEVER one thinks of Davis's prescriptions, his diagnosis is cogently argued and his warnings well taken. At the moment, an exact repetition of 1972 in the Democratic party seems unlikely, but there is more to watch for than the nomination of an unpopular New Politics candidate. The activities of the McGovernites in 1972 not only culminated in the nomination of their candidate but also saw the victory of their views as to which national issues were worthy of emphasis by the Democratic party, and what positions Democrats should take on these issues. Furthermore, their activities, with the help of the media, were the source of the very special image of the "new" Democratic party which was then conveyed to voters. Even if the McGovern wing of the party cannot choose the nominee in 1976, it may well be powerful enough to control party policy.

Control over party policy is vital because voters are attentive not only to the programs a candidate advocates but also to the people or groups upon whom he seems to rely for advice or support. McGovern's own position on abortion, to take one simple example, was probably less important to the electorate than the vociferous support he received from pro-abortion women's groups at the Democratic convention. This brings

* Stein & Day, 288 pp., $8.95.

† The Ripon Society and Clifford W. Brown, Jr., Little, Brown, 394 pp., $10.95.

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us back to the question of whether McGovern appeared too left-wing for the white working-class voters who are essential to a Democratic victory. Davis takes issue with this notion, and he is seconded in his conclusions by John G. Stewart, a former McGovern campaign aide, in *One Last Chance** as well as by Andrew Levison in *The Working Class Majority.*† Both these authors suggest that in the course of the 1960's and early 70's, working-class whites have become more rather than less liberal on many key issues.

In *One Last Chance,* Stewart, a communications consultant on the McGovern staff, cites a series of polls showing that large majorities of Americans, and especially of McGovern and Wallace supporters, believe that "the big special interests in this country have too much power" and indicating that public officials are seen as distant figures who lack understanding of the problems of the average man. However, the same polls show equally large majorities opposed to "permissiveness" and believing that "minorities . . . are making unreasonable demands." Stewart writes:

> At first glance it might be assumed that a "cynicism of the Right" could be differentiated from a "cynicism of the Left." That is, one segment of the electorate could be singled out that felt the system is stacked against the common man; another segment could be characterized by "hard-hat" toughness on the matters of race and permissiveness. . . . Many observers seem to have glossed over the fact that these seemingly inconsistent sentiments were perfectly compatible in the minds of the vast majority of the voters.

Stewart does not go very much farther than this in his analysis, which is "political" in the narrow sense. He concludes that the lesson to be learned is a tactical one, and he suggests various policies and approaches that might appeal to "leftist cynicism" without alienating "rightist cynicism" (such as a policy stressing employment security for all workers rather than one stressing special treatment for minorities). He does not attempt to fit these ideas into any larger framework.

Lanny Davis, more alive to the implications of the polls Stewart uses, writes of a 1972 poll in which "by a margin of 69 to 22 per cent, the public expressed its opposition to spending more money on welfare. But the same cross-section of people, by a margin of 62 to 31 per cent, supported increased spending to 'help the poor.'" For Davis, the conclusion is obvious: "What this means is that while most people will not support a generalized philosophy of government spending, those same people *will* support liberal social programs aimed at solving *specific* problems." In other words, "Liberal Democrats can follow their instincts and support programs which they perceive as dealing with problems of poverty and social inequities without necessarily risking public disfavor." In any event, this was not why McGovern lost: "Those 'cultural' issues on which McGovern was especially vulnerable, such as amnesty or abortion, were (and are) essentially peripheral to the major domestic and foreign policy issues that have traditionally divided liberals and conservatives." McGovern, Davis states, did not lose because he was "too liberal," but because he "seemed to represent an elitist, moralistic constituency" whose "arrogant snobbery" was responsible for alienating white working-class and middle-class voters. The vote against McGovern, then, was based not so much on ideological, as on class, divisions.

DAVIS and Stewart, both of whom are interested essentially in election results, take at face value the polls showing working-class whites to be conservative on "cultural" issues but liberal on economic and social ones. Andrew Levison's approach in *The Working Class Majority* is different: while politics is a central concern, his subject is the condition of the American working class, and election results are useful to him largely for what they reveal about that condition.

"In 1972 blue-collar voters defected to Nixon," Levison writes in his preface. "What will they do in 1976? That is the central issue in American politics." Levison begins by noting the widely held view that the American working class has become conservative, and can be won over only if liberal ideals are compromised. He then states his theme: "The central thesis of this book is that this view is basically and profoundly wrong." To prove his point, Levison uses a combination of hard data and purely impressionistic evidence like personal anecdotes and random interviews, apparently meant to convey the "feel" of working-class life. While the goal is laudable, and Levison's stories often quite interesting, such evidence is of course unreliable; fortunately, the hard facts he presents are quite persuasive, and do not need anecdotal support to be believed.

Levison begins, appropriately, with definitions: most Americans—60 per cent—are *still* working class (service or white-collar workers like waiters and sales clerks, Levison reminds us, are no more middle-class than factory workers, and are often more poorly paid); today's working class is *not* sufficiently affluent to be considered a *de facto* middle class (according to Levison, the average workingman earned $9,500 in 1970, which was below the $10,760 the Bureau of Labor Statistics then held was necessary to maintain an "intermediate" budget); the working-class suburb does not have much in common wih Shaker Heights

* Praeger, 208 pp., $8.00.
† Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 319 pp., $8.95.

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or Scarsdale. Levison discusses factory working conditions, including safety problems, time pressures, and the sheer physical toll taken by working-class jobs. There is no need to belabor any of these points, or to catalogue the evidence Levison adduces to support each one. The picture emerges, largely convincing if overdrawn, of a working class which is far from affluent, far from the style of the middle class, and far indeed from the business-oriented conservatism of the Republican party.

"It becomes clear," Levison says, "that, throughout the 60's, there was a rising discontent and militancy centered on the conditions of work and life in blue-collar America." Yet this discontent has not resulted in racism or reaction on the part of workers. Poll after poll has demonstrated that *working-class whites do not differ substantially* from middle-class whites in their views on race. Racist responses appear dramatically only when working-class whites are pitted directly against blacks, and especially when, as with busing, working-class whites are asked to make sacrifices to help blacks while more affluent whites sit on the sidelines.

How, then, does Levison explain why, "throughout the 60's, it was George Wallace and other conservatives who benefited from blue-collar discontent, rather than liberal Democrats"? Like Stewart and Davis, he blames the liberal Democrats, who, he claims, deserted the working class by concentrating on issues like busing, amnesty, or abortion while ignoring the needs of the average American. Levison concludes:

> The sources of the "drift to the Right" among blue-collar workers are not some mysterious social-psychological processes that cannot be reversed. If workers were "traditionally Democratic" it was because liberal Democrats "traditionally" stuck up for them. The rising militancy and a growing dissatisfaction that arose among workers was in large part over legitimate grievances. Yet they found liberals and progressives were not even aware that they had any discontent at all. In fact, the steady erosion of Democratic margins among workers since the mid-60's exactly parallels the indifference of middle-class liberals toward blue-collar workers in those years.

LEVISON'S analysis, then, leads, to precisely the same explanation of McGovern's 1972 defeat, and to the same advice for 1976, as those offered by Stewart and Davis. Yet interestingly enough, his picture of growing working-class discontent is contradicted at every turn by Ben Wattenberg's new book, *The Real America*.* Where Levison, and indeed Davis and Stewart, make use of statistics to support their views, Wattenberg overwhelms the reader with page after page of graphs, tables, and percentages. But his book is more than a collection of statistics; it is a serious, and on the whole successful, attempt to marshal the available evidence for an optimistic and enthusiastic view of America not often considered intellectually respectable in recent years. In view of the importance of Wattenberg's effort, it is particularly unfortunate that the book is not better written. Wattenberg's overly colloquial style, probably meant to lighten or enliven the effect of all those statistics, is eventually grating; and since the style is close to that of a campaign speech, it imparts a polemical and partisan tone to the book which may cause some readers to ignore the arguments.

To Wattenberg, the 60's were a time of tremendous progress:

> After examining the data, the conclusion here is that the human condition in America—as measured by the data—has in fact improved rapidly in recent years. Indeed, it may well be that conditions have improved more rapidly than at any time in recent American history, in fact, improving to such a degree as to create a new human situation, a society whose massive majority is "middle-class."

Since Levison and Wattenberg are referring to the same years and the same country, one is forced to wonder whether the data can support two such directly contrasting views. For the most part, they can.

First, Wattenberg makes plain he is talking of measurable improvement in living standards, and Levison presents no figures disputing Wattenberg's on this score. Notwithstanding our recent economic problems, it is a simple fact that great advances have been made since 1960 in areas such as average income levels, housing conditions, educational levels, the eradication of poverty, and the elimination of race and sex discrimination. Wattenberg emphasizes this progress, while Levison stresses how much remains to be done; accordingly, Levison's definition of middle-class status is a narrow one, while Wattenberg's middle class at times seems to embrace everyone not presently on welfare.

Wattenberg knows this is not the Land of Oz: America has been successful in that "we've been coping successfully with the problems that we face, even if we're still glum about those problems. Remember that those two concepts, progress and glumness, are not necessarily contradictory." To take a simple example, the worker who moves from a rented apartment to a newly-purchased home will be in a tremendous financial bind, stretching himself to meet his newly-risen expenses, and, in Levison's terms, he may be greatly discontented with his income level, with his job, and with the tax structure. Nonetheless, he and his family are better off than they were, and everyone can be justly proud of an economy that enables more and more workers to own their own homes.

* Doubleday, 367 pp., $10.00.

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Second, Wattenberg presents a fascinating set of statistics showing that people do recognize that their own lives are better now than they used to be, although they do not think that the country's affairs in general are going better. He reports that "the notion that something is wrong with the country is perhaps just as strong as the view that things are going well personally." To reach for a concrete example once again, the worker in his new house may recognize the improvement in his family's life, but express a negative view of national affairs because he is unhappy about school busing or income taxes or, for that matter, Watergate.

Wattenberg offers another explanation of why people are not as happy as they should be about recent progress: the "Failure and Guilt Complex," a state of mind which considers America a terrible place, getting worse all the time. He tenders several pages of marvelous quotations which he has probably been collecting for years with malicious glee. Tom Wicker in 1971 talks of "the breakdown of American life," and Norman Cousins in 1970 of "a comprehensive breakdown" of human society as a whole. John Gardner in 1969 writes that "the nation disintegrates. I use the phrase soberly: the nation disintegrates." Senator Mondale in 1971, speaking of the race situation, observes that "this country is rapidly coming to resemble South Africa," and Gary Hart in 1972 speaks of a "society teetering somewhere near the brink of moral bankruptcy and collapse." It goes on and on. Cruelly, in the middle of these pages of quotations, Wattenberg places a remark by George Orwell: "You have to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool."

As indicated by the professions of the men just quoted, the belief that no progress is being made is propagated in part by liberal politicians, and in part by the media. Wattenberg concludes that "A case can be made that a good part of our domestic malaise can be laid precisely at the feet of a media system that underreports progress. . . . Americans say their own lives are fine. And they say America is in trouble. There is another way of putting that: What people know of firsthand, they think well of. What people know of secondhand, information gathered through the transmission belt of our system of communications, they think ill of!" Wattenberg complains of the apparent rule that "Good news is no news," and asks that "Americans be told of their successes with the same vigor and flair that they are told about their failures."

The Real America is not just a celebration of the virtues of American life, though at times it sounds like one. Wattenberg is concerned with electoral politics, and his catalogue of social and economic advances has a political aim: today, he tells us:

> Liberalism itself is under attack, and it cannot successfully be defended without reference to American success. The liberals have been in the saddle for two generations. If America has failed, or is failing—as liberals have been saying for half a decade and more—then it is liberalism that has failed. And if America is succeeding—then liberalism can claim a share of the credit and ask for an extension of its writ.

The purveyors of gloom, Wattenberg believes, have a political goal themselves: whether Nixonian conservatives or New Politics radicals, they must rout liberalism if they are to stand in its place. The attacks from the Right, on one party by the other, are easily recognized as partisan, but as Wattenberg makes clear, the attacks from the Left are no less partisan, no more disinterested or objective.

Obviously, criticisms of liberalism will vary according to the political position of the critic; perhaps more important for the future of the Democratic party, criticisms will also vary according to the critic's social and economic position. This is a simple enough point, but its implications are enormous: If the "McGovern wing" of the party actually represents (as is often claimed) an upper-middle-class constituency, its differences with the traditional, labor-oriented sectors of the party may not be transitory but may instead be fundamental and lasting.

Wattenberg and Levison both approach this question, but neither grapples with it directly. Wattenberg attacks the view that the 60's were "the last gasp of traditional liberalism" and that we need a new agenda:

> A new agenda indeed! Tell it to the blacks—who for all the progress, are still low men on the economic totem pole. Tell it to the poor in America, still in slums and hollows and shacks. Tell it to the aged. Tell it to the sick. . . . Tell it to the factory worker in an unsafe factory. Tell them the old agenda is complete. . . .

Levison for his part notes disapprovingly that discussions of the political role of workers often "will end with a caution that liberals ought not to expect too much," since workers are concerned with matters like wages, rather than more "progressive" issues like ecology. "The dismissal of working-class grievances and discontents as somehow less thoughtful or profound than those of other groups, in fact, smacks of condescension," he writes.

Neither Wattenberg nor Levison goes further than this. Yet on reflection it seems clear that for upper-middle or upper-class New Politics types—those who believe we need a new agenda, or that workers have no grasp of the "real" issues—the old agenda *is* complete, and the old bread-and-butter issues are no longer of interest. For

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the wealthy suburbanite of 1968 with McCarthy daisies on his sports car, or the college student of 1972 sacrificing his vacation in Europe to work for McGovern, issues like unemployment, wages, health insurance, pensions, and job safety are simply not vital. Indeed, on some issues a direct clash of interest has arisen between constituencies within the Democratic party; ecology offers a good example, where the workers' need for an expanding economy is often directly at odds with the environmentalists' desire to check pollution.

The gap between the white working-class voter and the upper-middle-class and upper-class "new liberals" is hardly unbridgeable, as Democratic candidates proved all around the country in the 1974 elections. However, the Presidential elections of 1968 and 1972 should make one point clear: without support from the New Politics forces, Democrats will find victory more difficult; without support from working-class whites, they will find victory impossible. This proposition is likely to gain, not lose, in cogency as the national economy continues to worsen.

YET there is already substantial evidence that the Democrats have not learned the lesson. The most remarkable thing about the mini-convention held in December is not that, in the end, compromises were reached on such issues as quotas. What is truly remarkable is that, only two years after their candidate and their view of party politics were overwhelmingly rejected by the voters, the McGovernites retain control over so much of the party machinery that it is necessary to change party policy to satisfy them. McGovern himself has apparently learned nothing: in his one major speech to the convention he attacked party moderates as "the voice of timidity" and warned the party that "we will be in the center but a dead center."

Why anyone should pay heed to such counsels is unclear, since the New Politics forces evidently have very little appeal to the electorate. Indeed, what seems to be forgotten during the Democrats' internecine struggles is that if they are to win elections, they must satisfy the voters. If it is already clear from the 1974 election results that the emerging Republican majority never quite emerged, Davis's idea of an emerging Democratic majority now seems equally dubious. Each party has certain bases of support, and seeks to enlarge upon them by attracting independents and voters from the other party. As the Ripon Society's analysis goes in *Jaws of Victory*, "Voters are becoming more fluid, but not realigned. Their party loyalties remain largely unchanged, but they are less important." If each party can hold on to its own base, the 1976 election will be close—like 1960 or 1968, for example. If either loses a substantial fraction of its base (which is easier to do now that party loyalties are of reduced importance), there will be a landslide—as in 1964 or 1972. The notion of a permanent majority for one party over the other in Presidential elections is unrealistic, unless one is willing to assume uncommon stupidity on the part of leaders of either party.

George McGovern and his supporters committed what, in a two-party system, are capital crimes: they did not compromise, they took hard ideological positions, they alienated a large portion of their party's traditional supporters, and they lost—very, very badly. Whether the Democrats can correct all this in time remains to be seen; it now seems increasingly possible, however, that the dynamics of the multi-candidate primary and the power of the New Politics forces within the party (largely due to the "reforms" they themselves instituted) will lead in 1976 to another dismally unsuccessful Democratic campaign.

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Christianity and the Jewish People

Frank Talmage

ROME. The 13th century. In his disputational work, *The Testimony of the Lord Is Faithful,* Solomon ben Moses cautions his readers:

> I have advised my friends . . . not to argue or debate with Christians. They should avoid disputing with them on matters of religion. . . . If the Jew be victorious he will provoke wrath upon himself for belittling and refuting their faith. But if he is defeated and shamed and if on his account and through ignorance truth is silenced, his punishment is twofold. Yet if the Jew be forced to debate, let him not do so with ignoramuses for that is forbidden by the authorities. . . . Neither should he dispute with his enemies and those who are of ill will toward him, for they will inform on him and on us. . . .

Master Solomon was clearly not an advocate of dialogue. Nor were most medieval Jews. Joseph Kimhi, the 12th-century author of the first European Hebrew polemical work, tells us he is writing to refute "the children of the impudent of our people," apostates from Judaism. His son, David, whose polemics became famous and widely quoted, seems also to have been more concerned with renegades than with born Christians. It was also a common phenomenon for apostates to write polemical works against their former co-religionists, trying to convince them to join the new faith. Thus, Petrus Alphonsi in the 11th century writes a dialogue in which he persuades his old self, Moyses, of the justice of his conversion.

For most medieval Jews, however, no matter what crises they may have had to endure, the identity crisis was not one of them. Religio-cultural, linguistic, and social bonds allowed them to find their place within the texture of Jewish history. Confrontations with representatives of other faiths were *ad hoc* or *ad hominem*. And being secure in their own faith, Jews had no compelling need to denigrate others. Most major medieval thinkers appraise Christianity in a rather positive light—to the extent that they give it attention at all. Not surprisingly, this remained true throughout later centuries in the case of those Jews who stayed rooted in the Jewish sources (while not necessarily cut off from Western thought). The views of Christianity of Jacob Emden (1698-1776), Nahman Krochmal (1784-1840), and Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) are couched in the same sympathetic spirit as those of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) and Menahem ha-Meiri of Perpignan in the 13th century.

The point is made in a strangely charming way, not by any of these exalted figures but by the acerbic Russian bibliophile and bibliographer, Ephraim Deinard, who settled in the United States before the turn of the century. Deinard reprinted in 1904 the *Refutation of the Principles of the Christians* by the 14th-century philosopher, Hasdai Crescas. In his introduction, Deinard observes:

> I know very well that even if we print thousands of books like this, we will not convert the Christians. Rather, I have another aim. My principal object in the publication of such books is my own brethren and people: to give the sons of Judah the weapons with which to defend their faith against their Hebrew assailants, the rabbis who preach Reform who harm us more than the Christians. If only the pious Christians would abolish the missionaries and place Reform rabbis in their place, they could expect the speedy demise of the Jewish religion.

But our concern today is not with people such as these, who—whether they lived in Denmark, Galicia, Jerusalem, or New Orleans—read, wrote, and lived in Hebrew, those whom the late Simon Rawidowicz called Jews-in-the-original. Our concern nowadays is, rather, with Jews-in-translation.

The gradual admission of Jews into European society at the beginning of the 19th century brought with it the disorientation that accompanies a change of address. The newly emancipated Europeanized Jew had less and less access to the primary sources of his tradition. He had been sprinkled with a knowledge of European culture but was not quite ready for total immersion. He thus began to look at his Christian neighbor with new interest. By determining who the latter was, at least, he could know who he was not. Thus,

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with these Jews-in-translation, we find, from Moses Mendelssohn on, a continuing dialectic between Judaism and Christianity in which the one is defined in terms of the other. The format is usually that of a theological chess game. As is common in a chess game, one side is black and the other white. Generally, the white knight is Judaism, the religion of reason, and paganism, the religion of nature, the black. Christianity is the gray area, a syncretism of the two, becoming more and more alienated from its Jewish origins and inclining toward paganism.

A look at several representative Jewish thinkers of the period shows the prevalence of this typological approach. Saul Ascher (1767-1822), Samuel Hirsch (1815-1899), and Solomon Formstecher (1808-1889) see Judaism as the religion which teaches man's freedom and his consequent ability to liberate himself from sin. The Frenchmen, Joseph Salvador (1796-1873) and Elie Benamosegh (1823-1900), oppose the otherworldliness of Christianity with the faith of Israel that unites both this world and the next. Abraham Geiger (1810-1874), a leader of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* movement and an exponent of German Reform, sees in the Jewish-Christian relationship a reenactment of the Pharisee-Sadducee conflict.

The failure of most of these analyses is that in them Judaism is stripped of any specific content. For Salvador it is identical with the Social Contract or the ideals of the French Revolution; for some of the Germans, the principles of German idealism were revealed at Sinai. Specific Jewish practice is shunted to the side. Saul Ascher, for example, finds the content of Jewish tradition a defense against Egyptian paganism, while Samuel Hirsch wishes Jewish practice preserved for historical but not theological reasons. Formstecher, as a representative of Reform, sees in Jewish ritual observances impediments to the ultimate unification of mankind, while even Mendelssohn, the defender of Jewish religious law, or *halakhah*, expects a new revelation which will lower the barriers between the two faiths.

THIS trend of thought continues into the 20th century, with the types becoming more sophisticated but the methodology the same. Thus Leo Baeck, the Reform distiller of the essence of Judaism, defines the religion of Israel as classical, seeking the future and in a constant ferment. Christianity, on the other hand, is romantic: passive, with sights set toward the past. It was thinking such as this that made Franz Rosenzweig quip that in Baeck, author of *The Essence of Judaism*, he found more essence than Judaism.

This was more than a quip—Rosenzweig himself had been through one of the best known disputations of the 20th century with his Christian kinsman, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. The debate is based on a correspondence conducted in the foxholes of the German lines in 1916. In the eyes of Rosenzweig, this was not dialogue but "a bombardment between two learned cannons with a lyrical urge." Indeed, the correspondence can only be fully appreciated by one born in Germany at the turn of the century and possessed of a classical education. Yet through the rich and polished repartee, we find, on Rosenstock-Huessy's part, an interesting meld of classical and modern anti-Jewish motifs. He, too, speaks in typological terms. In talking of Judaism as the "law," he finds a religion archaic, self-righteous, and passive—a characterization not entirely removed from Baeck's view of Christianity. To such a Judaism, Christianity is contrasted, spiritual, dynamic, liberating the individual from his national limitations. Rosenstock-Huessy throws the paradox of German Jewish life in Rosenzweig's face. What is the point, he asks, of being a Jew who "plays the organ and thinks in a non-Jewish way," who has no Temple and no Law, who does not marry at the age of eighteen, and, when he does, takes a non-Jewish girl and converts her?

Reflecting on Israel's pride, Rosenstock-Huessy asserts:

> I know that Judea will outlive all the "Nations," but you have no capacity for theology, for inquiry after truth or for beauty. Thou shalt not make any image. At this price the Eternal Jew may live because he hangs on tenaciously to the life granted to him. But he is cursed to live by the sweat of his brow, taking loans everywhere, and making loans everywhere. The Jew dies for no fatherland and for no mission. He lives because his life does not approach the margin of life. He lives in a chimerical reflection of a real life that cannot be envisaged without the sacrifice of death and the nearness of the abyss. . . . You do not know that the world is movement and change; the Christian says there is day and there is night, but you are so moonstruck that you think that the night view is the only view that exists and you consider as the ideal conception the minimum of light, the night. You consider that this encompasses day and night.

Rosenzweig answers that the way of life of Eastern Europe is not the only legitimate approach to Jewish living. Judaism can adapt itself to many environments. "However much these phenomena may hold of the alien," he observes, "Judaism cannot but help assimilate them to itself." But more to the point, Rosenzweig asserts:

> The serious acceptance in reality in which the theological principle about Jewish stubbornness is being worked out is Jew-hatred. You know as well as I that all the realistic explanations of this hatred are only so many fashionable dressings to hide the only true metaphysical reason, which is, metaphysically formulated, that we refuse to take part in the fiction of the Christian dogma that has gained world acceptance because (although reality) it is fiction (and *fiat veritas, pereat realitas,* for "Thou God art

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truth"), and, formulated in the manner of enlightenment (by Goethe in *Wilhelm Meister*): that we deny the basis of present culture (and "*fiat regnum Dei, pereat mundus*," for "a kingdom of priests shall ye be unto me, and a holy people"); to formulate it in an unenlightened way: that we have crucified Christ and, believe me, we shall do it again any time, we alone in all the world (and *fiat nomen Dei Unius, pereat homo*, for "whom shall you make equal to me that I will be equal").

Rosenzweig thus finds himself participating in a classical Jewish-Christian disputation. Rosenstock-Huessy reveals his structure of dogma, which rests on the all-important foundation of Jewish obduracy; Rosenzweig, probably without knowing it, answers in practically the same way as had 12th-century Franco-German polemicists. But this is not the 12th century; and Rosenzweig's vexation is clear. He is ready to put the chess board away. He may not have been an Eastern European Jew but he could still immerse himself in the Hebrew sources of his religion. Like his medieval forebears, he knew who he was and had no need to fall back upon a negative anthropology. Like them, he wished to leave, and be left, alone.

Rosenzweig, then, attempted to turn his back on the old typological approach. In his *magnum opus*, the *Star of Redemption*, which appeared in 1921, Rosenzweig proposes the thesis that both religions, Judaism and Christianity, be held to possess equal validity and to be mutually complementary. Neither is the arbiter of the truth, which will only be fully known at the end of days. Judaism is the Life—the faith that was with the Father at the beginning—while Christianity is the way toward the Father of those who are not yet with Him. Judaism is the fire; Christianity the rays. Judaism is the Star of Redemption turned in upon itself; Christianity the Cross with its arms branched outward.

Yet despite this attempt, Rosenzweig could not completely rid himself of the old dichotomies. For one, his interpretation of Christianity as the rays emanating from the center did not preclude the possibility of those rays turning back upon the center. To ward off such a reflection, Rosenzweig was forced to have recourse to defensive apologetics. He writes in his famous letter to Pastor Ehrenburg: "Christianity acknowledged the God of Judaism, not, however, as God, but as the 'Father of Jesus Christ.' Christianity cleaves to Jesus because it knows that the Father can be reached only through him. Precisely the good Christian forgets God Himself in the face of the Lord Jesus." If neither is the true religion, Christianity is less true than Judaism; the new thesis of equal validity is destroyed, and with it the new desire for dialogue on equal terms.

On January 14, 1933, on the eve of catastrophe, the failure of dialogue could be seen again in a debate between Martin Buber and Karl Ludwig Schmidt. In the bizarre setting of Nazi Germany, Jews were invited at a public meeting to brotherhood with Christians, German style, with the understanding that the Church is the spiritual Israel. Schmidt invokes the ancient arguments: ". . . The Christian message says in this context: God has willed all this; Jesus, the Messiah rejected by his people, prophesied the destruction of Jerusalem. Jerusalem has been destroyed, so that it will never again come under Jewish rule. Until the present day the Jewish diaspora has no center."

Buber, however, refuses to be alarmed. Calmly and confidently, he responds to Schmidt's ancient argument as David Kimhi had refuted it centuries before. Israel's condition is not a proof of Christianity. Rather, it is a proof that despite all, the covenant still exists. In a moving statement which reflects the depths of his own experience, Buber asserts his counter-claim:

> I live not far from the city of Worms, to which I am bound by the tradition of my forefathers; and, from time to time, I go there. When I go, I first go to the cathedral. It is a visible harmony of members, a totality in which no part deviates from perfection. I walk about the cathedral with consummate joy, gazing at it. Then I go over to the Jewish cemetery consisting of crooked, cracked, shapeless, random stones. I station myself there, gaze upward from the jumble of a cemetery to that glorious harmony, and seem to be looking up from Israel to the Church. Below, there is no jot of form; there are only the stones and the dust lying beneath the stones. The dust is there, no matter how thinly scattered. There lies the corporeality of man, which has turned to this. There it is. There it is for me. There it is for me, not as corporeality within the space of this planet, but as corporeality within my own memory, far into the depths of history, as far back as Sinai.
>
> I have stood there, have been united with the dust, and through it with the Patriarchs. That is a memory of the transaction with God which is given to all Jews. From this the perfection of the Christian house of God cannot separate me, nothing can separate me from the sacred history of Israel.
>
> I have stood there and have experienced everything myself; with all this death has confronted me, all the dust, all the ruin, all the wordless misery is mine; but the covenant has not been withdrawn from me. I lie on the ground, fallen like these stones. But it has not been withdrawn from me.
>
> The cathedral is as it is. The cemetery is as it is. But nothing has been withdrawn from us.

Nothing has been withdrawn from us. In the formulation of Professor H. H. Ben-Sasson, "To the harsh and uncompromising postulate that the Jews can live in Europe only on acceptance of Christian conditions and conceptions, Buber presents his thesis of open dialogue between Israel as a nation and religion, and Christianity as a religion for other nations."

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What happened to Buber's readiness for dialogue at this point is well known. And so back to Rome. In the year of infamy, 1942, a German Jesuit was expressing his views concerning the place of the Jews in the divine economy. Peter Browe ends his work, *The Papacy and the Medieval Mission to the Jews,* with a section explaining the slender success of the medieval Christian mission to the Jews. The book concludes:

> The entire fate of the Jewish people, its life and wandering throughout the centuries, the preservation of its race and its peoplehood in the midst of countless conflicts and persecutions cannot be satisfactorily explained on the basis of purely political and sociological considerations; the rejection and ultimate reelection of the Jewish people completely elude these. Only through faith can we somethow understand the resolution when we with St. Paul must recognize that God's election is mysterious and unfathomable, "that His judgments are unsearchable and His ways past finding out" (Romans 11:33).

In the same year in Protestant Switzerland, no less a theologian than Karl Barth makes the following observations:

> . . . Israel's unbelief cannot in any way alter the fact that objectively, and effectively, even in this senseless attitude beside and out-with the Church, it is the people of its arrived and crucified Messiah, and therefore the people of the secret (concealed from it as yet) Lord of the Church. . . . Over against the witness of the Church it can set forth only the sheer, stark judgment of God, only the obduracy and consequent misery of man, only the sentence and punishment that God in His mercy has chosen to undergo Himself to prevent them from falling on us. . . . This is how Israel punishes itself for its sectarian self-assertion. But it cannot alter the fact that even in this way it discharges exactly the service for which it is elected. Even in this way it really gives to the world the very witness that is required of it . . . even in the spectral form of the Synagogue. The existence of the Jews, as is generally recognized, is an adequate proof of the existence of God. It is an adequate demonstration of the depths of human guilt and need and therefore of the inconceivable greatness of God's love in the event in which God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. The Jews of the ghetto give this demonstration involuntarily, joylessly, and ingloriously, but they do give it. They have nothing to attest to the world but the shadow of the cross of Jesus Christ that falls upon them. But they, too, do actually and necessarily attest Jesus Christ Himself.

Rosenstock-Huessy. Schmidt. Browe. Barth. Twentieth century or 2nd? Do these statements differ in essence from what Tertullian had preached to the Jews eighteen-hundred years before?

> Since, therefore, the Jews were predicted as destined to suffer these calamities *on Christ's account,* and we find that they *have* suffered them, and see them sent into dispersion and abiding in it, manifest it is that on Christ's account these things *have* befallen the Jews, the sense of the Scriptures harmonizing with the issue of the events and of the order of the times. Or else, if Christ is not yet come, on whose account they were predicted as destined thus to suffer, when He *shall have come* it follows that they *will* thus suffer. And where will then be a daughter of Sion to be derelict, who *now* has no existence? Where the cities to be burnt which are already burnt and in heaps? Where the dispersion of a race which is now in exile? Restore to Judea the condition which Christ is to find, and [then, if you will,] contend that some other [Christ] is coming.

In terms of content, the 20th century formed a micro-aeon which encapsulated with little essential change the rhetoric and invective of nineteen-hundred years. Yet as in all periods of radical upheaval in Jewish history—the destruction of the Temple, the Crusades, the expulsion from Spain—the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust altered the syntax of the polemical idiom, if not the morphology. Considerations of doctrine and dogma, Scripture and social critique, changed the nature of disputation from a sporting event and theological chess game to a confrontation in which the disputants found their national identity and indeed their very lives at stake. Statements that in earlier times were merely vexing to the Jew, in 1942 were blasphemy.

Yet Jews were learning to "blaspheme" as well. Shortly after the war they fulfilled Tertullian's condition, restoring to Judea the condition which Christ was to find. In 1948, in a moment of weakness, Jewish "arrogance" was given free reign and the State of Israel was allowed to happen. The birth of the Jewish state was greeted in Christian circles with mixed reactions. Millar Burrows, representative of a whole class of theologian-Orientalists, responded in the *Christian Century*:

> The central issue between Judaism and Christianity lies in their answer to the question: What do you think of Christ? . . . There are some points, however, on which all Christians are united. While orthodox Judaism believes that the Messiah is to come and liberal Judaism holds that there is no Messiah except the Jewish people itself, all Christians believe that the messianic prophecies of the Old Testament have their true and only fulfillment in Jesus. The present resurgence of Jewish nationalism is a repetition of the same fatal error that caused Israel's rejection of Jesus. It is the focal point at which Christian opinion, in all brotherly love, should make clear and emphatic its disagreement with the dominant trend in contemporary Judaism. For the enthusiastic, dominating, just now apparently all-conquering devotees of political Zionism we would feel the sorrow that Jesus felt when he wept over Jerusalem. We must not relinquish or forget our conviction that the Messiah is Jesus, and that the fulfill-

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ment of the promises of the Old Testament is to be found in the universal Kingdom of God which He came to establish. The Christians' final attitude must be that of Paul: "Brethren, my heart's desire for Israel is that they may be saved."

So it was that where the Jews were a proof of Christianity, the Jewish state was a stumbling block. And so it was that for the next two decades Zionist apologists attempted to convince the Christian world of the compatibility of the Jewish state with Christian ideals, and of the justice of Christian recognition of the right of the Jews to political independence in their historic homeland. Scribes and Pharisees, these apologists compassed the sea and land to earn one proselyte, but the proselytes—distinguished as they may have been —were few indeed. Nevertheless, in Jewish ranks, only an occasional voice of dissent was heard. One such dissident, Eliezer Berkovits, called his co-religionists to task for fighting a futile battle. In an article entitled "Judaism in the Post-Christian Era," published in 1966, Berkovits turned the table on its head: Christianity is on the way out. The Jewish people, the old Israel, are the New Israel as well. To the former New Israel—the Christians—there is nothing to say.

Such "bigotry" was unpalatable to most Jews. Jacob Neusner, in a letter to the editor of *Judaism,* where the essay had appeared, decried its narrowness of mind: we must keep the doors open. Then came June 1967. Americans fear a second Vietnam; Jews dread a second Auschwitz. As A. Roy Eckardt put it: "Again Silence in the Churches." Jacob Neusner writes a second letter to *Judaism:* he was wrdong. Berkovits was right. Overnight the Jewish people turned into a nation of Berkovitses. Writing in a *Christian Century* series, "How My Mind Has Changed," Emil L. Fackenheim gave eloquent testimony to this development in 1970:

> Thirty years ago I had become convinced that what had once divided Jews and Christians was now dwarfed by the demonic forces threatening both. In the years that followed I became involved in Jewish-Christian dialogues on that basis and formed lasting personal and theological friendships. Today I am confronted by another, less comforting aspect of Jewish-Christian relations. In regard to it I find myself misunderstood or even abandoned by most, though not all, Christian theologians. Nazi anti-Semitism, anti-Christian, would have been impossible without centuries of Christian anti-Semitism. Why drag up this dead past? Because, alas, I can view it as past no longer, and because I owe the victims of Auschwitz (and . . . Christianity itself) a relentless truthfulness.
>
> Once I held the mild view that Christian anti-Semitism was vanishing in the wake of Jewish-Christian dialogues which confined attention to what the two faiths have in common. I have now been forced into a more radical view: anti-Semitism exists wherever it is held (or implied) that "the Jewish people" is an anachronism which may survive, if at all, only on sufferance. Anti-Semitism of this kind survives in such post-Christian phenomena as a liberalism which maintains that of all peoples Jews alone are obliged to be men-in-general, and in a Communism which affirms that of all nationalisms Jewish nationalism alone is "petty-bourgeois." Its ultimate root, however, lies in the Christian view—perpetuated through the centuries, lingering on even where Christianity itself is undermined by atheism or agnosticism—that the birth of the new Israel entails the death of the old.

THUS the impasse at which Jewish-Christian dialogue finds itself. Is this then to be the last word? Perhaps we should look elsewhere and go beyond the sphere of learned theological debates. Perhaps we should examine the situation as it is on an "everyday" plane. One runs the risk in doing so, of course, of slipping over the unguarded border between scholarship and journalism—the one consists of relating anecdotes about others, the other of relating anecdotes about oneself—but perhaps the risk is minimal after all.

On October 19, 1973, a letter favoring support for the State of Israel and signed by a group of distinguished Christian theologians and laymen was published in the Toronto *Globe and Mail.* Since "Jewish nationalism is the stepchild of Christian prejudice," the letter claimed, "Christians must affirm Israel as the visible and tangible manifestation of both Jewish survival and Jewish security." A Jewish friend of mine at the University of Toronto, where I teach, while finding the letter well-intentioned, objected that it sounded as if it were advocating the establishment of a game-preserve for an endangered species. Could not even our friends take the Jewish right to a state at face value?

The real answer, however, appeared in the *Globe and Mail* of October 23, in a letter submitted by, among others, some members of my own department. This letter took serious issue with the first and found it "rife with prejudice, and an often subtle, but nonetheless virulent anti-Semitic prejudice against the Arabs (for they too are Semites and cousins of the Jews)." Several days later, I was confronted by a signatory of this letter. As Burrows would have put it, in all brotherly love, he made clear and emphatic his disagreement with the dominant trend in contemporary Judaism. Still under the unspeakable strain of those days, I listened—as had my forefathers on many occasions in past centuries—to a sermon of Christian love and charity. The keynote was of course philo-Semitism: We Christians should treat you so well that you won't want to run off somewhere else! You are too valuable to lose! You can function perfectly well in the Diaspora! Look at the Golden Age of Spain! Why do you want to set up a Levantine state, another Lebanon? What a pity that all the Oriental Jewish communities have now been lost!

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I was not left speechless, but I knew—and was later assured—that my response fell on deaf ears. Then the conversation shifted to a discussion of the general atmosphere of the department and I remarked that I did not enjoy the strain of its constant tension. My interlocutor looked at me and replied: "But isn't that what being a Jew is all about?"

Isn't that what being a Jew is all about? So we have been told. So was Trypho the Jew told many hundreds of years ago:

> Indeed the custom of circumcising the flesh . . . was given to you as a distinguishing mark, to set you off from other nations and from us Christians. The purpose of this was that you and only you might suffer the afflictions that are now justly yours; that only your land be desolate, and your cities ruined by fire; that the fruits of your land be eaten by strangers before your very eyes; that not one of you be permitted to enter your city of Jerusalem. Your circumcision of the flesh is the only mark by which you can certainly be distinguished from other men. Therefore, the above-mentioned tribulations were justly imposed upon you for you have murdered the Just One, and His prophets before Him; now you spurn those who hope in Him, and in Him who sent Him, namely, Almighty God, the Creator of of all things. . . .

Yes, so we have been told. But now—for afflictions, read tension. For distinguishing marks, read: "You don't look Jewish." For desolation, read: "You have no history." And for exile, read exile. To be sure, the 20th-century Jew has an advantage which his forefathers did not: he knows how to exploit technology to the fullest. He can use plastic surgery to remove his horns and Right Guard to mask his *foetor judaicus.* He can go to Berlitz and learn to speak like an Anglo-Saxon. And Alka-Seltzer, labeled in Hebrew script, is sold all over the State of Israel to relieve his divinely ordained tension.

ROME. January 26, 1904. Theodor Herzl writes in his diary:

> I saw the Pope yesterday.
>
> I presented my request briefly, but he answered: "We cannot look with favor upon this movement. We cannot prevent the Jews from going to Jerusalem—but we can never favor it."
>
> "But, Holy Father, the Jews are having a terrible time. I do not know whether your Holiness is acquainted with the whole scope of this melancholy situation. We need a country for these persecuted people."
>
> "Must it be Gerusalemme?"
>
> "We are not asking for Jerusalem, but for Palestine, only the profane part of the country."

Herzel's desacralization of the sacred was not as some Christians might envision the Jewish state: further evidence of Jewish obstinacy, doomed—for as long as it might last—to a medicore levantinism. Rather, it was a notice that after having been forced to participate in a two-thousand-year-old drama, the Jew was ready for his stage directions to say "Exit." His role-playing in someone else's passion play is over. Yet for some Jews, new-found independence has not been enough.. They want the state to be accepted, recognized, acknowledged—not only politically but theologically; and when it is not, they feel frustration, disappointment, and despair. This pattern repeated itself only recently in response to the Vatican's failure to come to grips with the state of Israel in its latest guidelines on relations with the Jews. Significantly, Israeli Jews—and especially native-born Israelis—are least concerned. What matters to them is what the U.S. State Department thinks and not what U.S. churches think. But the Diaspora Jew, far less secure, is far more sensitive. For him, perhaps, the restoration is no less a mystery than for the Christian; and perhaps in explaining it to the Christian, he is really trying to explain it to himself. He does not yet realize that the posture of a supplicant is no longer appropriate to a sovereign nation.

To such Jews, and to their Christian partners in dialogue, one may address the words of the distinguished Catholic philosopher, Jacques Maritain:

> It is a strange paradox to see disputed with the Israelis the sole territory to which, considering the entire spectacle of human history, it is absolutely, *divinely* certain that a people has incontestably a right. . . .
>
> In speaking thus I [am] not making of the State of Israel a state by divine right. The State of Israel is only a state like the others. But the return of a portion of the Jewish people and its regroupment in the Holy Land (of which the existence of this state is a sign and the guarantee)—this is the reaccomplishment, under our eyes, of the divine promise which is without repentance. . . . And I do not doubt that the event, however enigmatic it may be for the Jews as for the Christians, carries in it the mark of the faithful love and of the pity of God toward the people which is ever His. It appears to me, consequently, that once the Jewish people has put its feet again upon the land which God gave to it, no one will be able anymore to wrest it from it; and that to wish the disappearance of the State of Israel is to wish to reject into nothingness this return which finally was accorded to the Jewish people, and which permits it to have a shelter of its own in the world; in other words, it is—in another manner, but as grave, than that of ordinary anti-Semitism—to wish that misfortune hound again this people, and that once more it be the victim of iniquitous aggression. *"Anti-Israelism" is no better than anti-Semitism.*

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Visiting the Hirshhorn

Sonya Rudikoff

MODERN art is now officially in residence in the nation's capital: the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden has opened at last, in Gordon Bunshaft's round structure on the Mall in Washington. At one end is the Capitol on its hill, at the other is the Washington Monument. The red-brick Smithsonian buildings adjoin the newest member of their group, across the way are the National Gallery and the National Archives, nearby are the Freer Gallery and the marble surfaces of the Air and Space Museum still under construction. The neighborhood is all official Washington. Nobody is stopping by while out for a stroll, or on the way to shopping or school; there is no intimacy about these streets, there are no schools, stores, houses, or anything else except large buildings of imperial or bureaucratic purposes. Nobody lives near here, and visitors wanting lunch must find a cafeteria in one of the other Smithsonian buildings, or the National Gallery, or up on the Hill in the old Senate Office Building. Souvenirs are the only things to buy.

The museum came into being because Joseph Hirshhorn gave the nation his enormous and magnificent collection of modern art in 1966, with $1 million toward the construction of a building for it, and President Johnson set in motion the procedures necessary for the nation to accept the gift. There were delays, increased construction costs, additional gifts by Mr. Hirshhorn; there were Congressional committee hearings, groundbreaking ceremonies in 1969, more delays, until the Smithsonian took title to the collection in April 1974, and the museum opened in October.

The round building, 82 feet high, and 231 feet in diameter, stands on four huge pillars in a courtyard surrounded by an eight-foot wall, on a site of 3.1 acres. A sculpture garden of 1.3 acres is next to it, separated by a road. Inevitably, controversy attended all phases of the museum's realization, as it has its donor, and opinions proliferate on the collection itself, on the building's design, on the circumstances of the gift, and the financing of the building. Most of all, the structure has become controversial: the doughnut, the bunker, the windowless bulk, the concrete cylinder, in Ada Louise Huxtable's phrase, the "maimed monument on a maimed Mall"—it has drawn mockery or ire, not so much from visitors as from reporters and critics as they inspect and evaluate.

Yet neither the collection nor the museum is easy to assess. To begin with, the collection is not a thoroughly comprehensive survey of modern art from the 19th century on, but is rather specialized, with a preponderance of European sculpture and American painting. Unlike the founding collections of other major museums, which were built around the gifts of several different collections, this one was all chosen and purchased by a single collector. Hirshhorn's taste changed during his forty years of collecting but, as his friend and adviser, Abram Lerner (who is now director of the museum) underlines, his taste was very much his own.

In addition, while paintings and sculpture from the Hirshhorn collection were to be seen during the 50's and 60's in Canadian cities, in Detroit, Houston, Louisville, Minneapolis, Boston, Brooklyn, and New York, even today only a small portion of this vast treasure has been exhibited; the opening exhibition, for example, contains only eight or nine hundred samplings out of a total of six thousand art objects.

As many have observed, what seems clear on the basis of these small glimpses of the entire collection—apart from its generally high quality—is that the sculpture is more remarkable than the pictures. In the new museum, it is to be seen in the adjacent sculpture garden; in the large courtyard surrounding the museum, inside the eight-foot wall; in the lower exhibition galleries, grouped together; or in the inner gallery rings which are glass-walled, sunlit, and devoted entirely to sculpture, as the outer spaces are mainly devoted to pictures. In the opening exhibition, arranged more or less chronologically, there are many treasures clustered together—Carpeaux, Dalou, Gerôme, in close proximity to Brancusi and de la Fresnaye. Downstairs, there are incredible discoveries to be made at every step: some Eakins reliefs, for example (for which Eakins required his model to take spinning lessons so she would

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pose more authoritatively); Medardo Rosso; a small Henri Laurens reclining woman; a small Giacometti man of 1929 of unusual linear grid-like drawing; two Nadelman figures, *Host* and *Hostess*, of painted wood, almost folk-art figures, varying the cool classicism of his busts and nudes; another Giacometti, a mushroom-shaped *Standing Man*, of polychromed plaster. At every turn, there is something you haven't seen for a long time or have never seen.

Upstairs, the riches of the sculpture collection become really astounding: the group of Daumier heads, bronze caricatures of courtiers and other social types, and the small figures, each series remarkably interesting; and the Degas bronzes, of dancers, of women drying themselves or arranging their hair or putting on their stockings. There are marvelous Matisse sculptures: the five heads of 1910-13, increasing in abstraction, the small nudes, the Rodinesque *Serf* of 1900. And Rodin himself is to be seen outside in the monumental *Burghers of Calais*, the *Monument to Balzac*, and other heads and portraits. And there are superb sculptures by Nadelman, Lachaise, Noguchi, Maillol, Bourdelle, Archipenko, Despiau, and a group by Picasso, including the important Cubist *Head of a Woman* of 1919. Many works by Barlach, Kollwitz, Bill, Henry Moore, David Smith, boxes by Joseph Cornell, heads by Gonzalez, de la Fresnaye, some wonderful heads and figures of Duchamp-Villon, and a most interesting figure of a wrestler by Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, that doomed young figure of London's pre-World War I Bohemia.

Of special interest are some bronzes by Arthur B. Davies, the American artist of the 20's, and the *Medals for Dishonor* executed by David Smith early in World War II. Works by Lipchitz, Calder, Gabo, Pevsner, Reuben Nakian, Louise Nevelson, Ipoustéguy, Manzù, Marini, Barbara Hepworth, Reg Butler, Stanckiewisz, Germaine Richier, and Hajdu suggest the range of the sculpture. And more contemporary examples include Soto, Ferren, Schöffer, Dubuffet, Kenneth Snelson, Pomodoro, de Lap, Forakis, Beverly Pepper, Chryssa, Donald Judd, Anthony Caro, Paolozzi, Witkin, some plaster bus riders of George Segal in real bus seats, and five of David Smith's *Voltri* series of 1962. Many of the larger pieces, such as the Calder, a Reuben Nakian, the Rodin *Burghers*, are in the sculpture garden or around in the courtyards and plaza. The smaller things are grouped in the sunlit inner rings which museum personnel call the "ambulatories."

If the paintings shown in the museum's inaugural exhibition seem less astonishing or stupendous in their range and quality than the sculpture, those displayed are nevertheless a very rich and valuable fragment of what will undoubtedly prove to be a most important collection. It must be noted that the pictures are largely American, from the late 19th century to the present, and—striking in a museum of *modern* art—there is only the sparest inclusion of certain movements in modern art which have been of crucial importance—that is, Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Fauvism, Expressionism. Whether, when Hirshhorn began to collect (in the 30's), good examples of these were not available, or available only at prohibitive prices and indifferent quality, or this work did not express his taste in art so well as modern sculpture, the collection clearly detours around these significant movements: there is no room of cubist still life, no walls of Picasso, Braque, Gris, early Léger, no rooms of Cézanne, no Seurat, Utrillo, no Monet, no Matisse pictures, no succession of Miró or Klee or the German painters, none of what the ordinary museumgoer expects to see.

There are, to be sure, some American impressionists, such as J. Alden Weir and Childe Hassam; and there are Sargent, Mary Cassatt, Blakelock, Inness, Bierstedt, Winslow Homer, Ernest Lawson, John Sloan, as well as Maurice Prendergast, Morgan Russell, Stanton MacDonald-Wright. There is Eilshemius (a great favorite of Hirshhorn's) in profusion, and Marsden Hartley and Marin and Robert Henri and Everett Shinn. But if cubist figure compositions by Max Weber and Henry Fitch Taylor remind the visitor too cruelly of what is missing, there are the incomparable Eakins portraits which are perhaps rivaled only by the group at the Philadelphia Museum of Art, and which—especially the ones of Robert Ogden, of Mrs. Eakins, and of the girl in the big hat—are of commanding quality, equal to anything that might be missing from the collection. The same cannot be said of the American painting of the 20's and 30's on exhibit, with the exception of works by Gorky, Dove, Torres-Garcia, Milton Avery, Arthur B. Carles, and Patrick Henry Bruce.

American painting of the late 40's and the 50's—that union of Surrealism, Social Realism, and Cubism which produced Abstract Expressionism and its cognate movements—is represented in the Hirshhorn Museum by numerous works of Pollock, Gorky, de Kooning, Kline, Gottlieb, Stamos, Tobey, Glarner, Rothko, Clyfford Still, Barnett Newman, Ad Reinhardt, Sam Francis. Related subsequent pictorial interests are shown in the work of Jasper Johns, Frank Stella, Kenneth Noland, Morris Louis, and the group associated with Pop Art—Rosenquist, Wesselman, Dine, Lichtenstein, Rauschenberg. Also included are the optical shocks of Vasarely, Kelly, Poons, and Zox; the joke pictures of Rivers, Red Grooms, Raysse; the horror pictures of Francis Bacon; and two superb works by Stuart Davis, of the 50's.

Throughout the rooms, there are innumerable examples of idiosyncratic painters whose work is not easily classified, such as Jan Müller, in a haunting double tryptych of 1956, *St. George* and *Walpurgis Night*; and Josef Albers, a grandfather of modern art who has endured long enough to

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become a pillar of Minimalist art; and Hans Hofmann, another ancestor of the contemporary movements who lived to see himself again proclaimed avant-garde in his seventies. And, brooding over all the painting galleries, commanding a room and a wall which surely will defy curatorial plans, no matter how flexible the partitions, is an immense picture by Ad Reinhardt, a pink, red, and rust expanse of thinly applied paint, *No. 90, 1952*, eleven by twenty feet.

ADMISSION to the Hirshhorn Museum is free, but money is never out of mind in a stroll through the galleries or garden. Generosity on such a scale, with such a personal emphasis, has not been so widespread in recent years. Even the invaluable and substantial contributions of the Ford, Rockefeller, Guggenheim, and other foundations to public life and welfare have reinforced the anonymous corporate bureaucratic administration of social beneficence, and of course increasingly the federal, state, and local governments have been forced to act as benefactors of first and last resort.

Whether it was the professionalization of social work which destroyed private charity, whether the spread of psychology through the general culture overpowered the authority of *noblesse oblige* and unmasked it as guilt, whether the tax structure has encouraged private indulgence more than public benefaction, the fact is that acts of great public generosity on the part of individuals occur less frequently, less identifiably, than in the past. Poor children at the turn of the century drank milk in the summer because Nathan Straus had established a milk fund, discovered books in libraries started by Andrew Carnegie, and went to settlement houses visited by real rich people. Nowadays, of course, there are more of the poor, and it has been argued that private charity can no longer meet their needs. What is often forgotten is that there are also more of the rich nowadays too, and more objects, activities, and agencies competing for their resources, and a climate of opinion which has sanctioned the public acknowledgment and pursuit of expensive pleasures for an ever increasing number of people. In such a context, the individual act of generosity to the nation assumes a different importance. The great Hirshhorn wealth could have been expended differently, could have remained unknown beyond his own enjoyment of it, and the inescapable taxation of it. That this did not happen is immediately worthy of notice and approval, and of respect.

But money is never out of mind in a visit to the Hirshhorn Museum not only because of the size of his gift; it is also because Hirshhorn's own story is a story of money, a chapter in the history of the American Dream. That the streets were paved not with gold but with uranium, and that it was in Canada where he found it, are perhaps details in a saga which had national overtones. Hirshhorn himself seems to enjoy playing his part, even hamming it up deliberately, but never failing to speak of himself as an immigrant, and of the sainted mother who introduced him to art by means of insurance calendars decorated with reproductions. At the ground-breaking, and at the opening of the new museum, Hirshhorn spoke of his pride in belonging to the family of Americans. The boy from the little Latvian village, the twelfth of thirteen children of the poor widow who took her brood by train and steerage to Brooklyn, there to work six days a week, twelve hours a day, in a pocketbook factory for $12 a week—this boy is not unfamiliar to us, he comes out of all the stories of immigrant heroism and has a perennial fascination.

In the Hirshhorn version, the boy on a school trip in downtown Manhattan saw the hand signals then used for trading in the Curb Market, and headed back to Wall Street as an office boy and educated himself in the stock market, made his first fortune by the time he was eighteen, lost it soon after, made another in the 20's, and incredibly got out with $4 million before the Crash. The legend then takes him to Canada, where he began to invest and speculate in gold. In the 40's, sophisticated now about geology as well as investments, Hirshhorn became interested in taconite, thorium, and uranium, and began to finance drilling and mining in neglected Canadian properties. By his remarkable organizational skill, conviction, and the use of his capital, Hirshhorn accomplished his great uranium strike of 1953, called one of the most fabulous claims in Canadian history. The bankers and investors of Toronto's Bay Street had been cool, but the British owners of the legendary Rio Tinto Company Ltd. could recognize a hero and were disposed to enter into the long negotiations which resulted in Hirshhorn's consolidation of his far-flung properties in Rio Tinto Mining Company of Canada Ltd., with 55 per cent of the stock owned by Hirshhorn.

All that ambition, all that skill and cunning, all that sense for speculative investment has not been without its transcendent spirit: Hirshhorn has expressed disdain for the obvious self-indulgence and conspicuous consumption of the rich and powerful. He has been moved by a vision of sorts, not merely the accumulation of wealth and power, but a desire to erase the taste of poverty for himself and others, a wish to create, and build, and make a difference in the world. The Hirshhorn Museum is in part a realization of those wishes, that vision.

Yet some of the reportorial comment on the museum and its collection has carried a curious undertone. Reams of newsprint have documented the story of the 5′4″ uranium king, the child of the pavements, the rapacious wisecracking collector, scooping up roomfuls of pictures as though there were no taste or sensibility involved, as

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though it were all indiscriminate and merely acquisitive. And even though the entire collection, like Hirshhorn's uranium holdings, still conceals most of its riches—as it certainly did in 1966 when the gift was initially made—countless observers have been moved to comment and characterize and compare invidiously, as if the purchases in the 30's of Social Realists and Depression artists represented too gross an error for the later acquisitions to offset, or as if the enthusiasm for Eilshemius were somehow less forgivable than the enthusiasm for Francis Bacon. There is a whiff here of anti-Semitism—as there perhaps also is in the repeated pointing to the fact that this latest museum, unlike the Metropolitan and the National Gallery and the Museum of Modern Art, bears the name of its donor who differed from the Mellons and Morgans and Rockefellers in refusing to have his identity submerged. A fact of far greater importance to the future of the Hirshhorn Museum which is rarely mentioned is that this same donor has also taken the unusual step of abdicating control over the collection, stipulating that any part of it may be sold in order to purchase works deemed necessary to expand its scope.

WHETHER or not Gordon Bunshaft was Hirshhorn's choice as architect for the museum, it is an interesting conjunction of histories that brought them both into this project: both Jewish, born ten years apart, Bunshaft the child of Russian immigrants, Hirshhorn a child immigrant himself from Latvia, neither one sheltered by "the inherited glory of the rich." Bunshaft, in his way, has been almost as notorious as Hirshhorn, and his famous buildings of the 50's are comparable to Hirshhorn's mining exploits: Lever House, the first glass and steel postwar skyscraper, with its green glass, its piers and plaza and horizontal recessed levels, in 1952; the Manufacturers Hanover Trust (1954) which could have gone up fifty stories but instead remained a large glass cube; the 500 Park Avenue building (1960); and then the immense Chase Manhattan building of 1961. Bunshaft's role as a design partner in the vast empire of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, the major "establishment" architectural firm, his notoriety in the profession as a glossy successful traditional designer, and a harsh, exacting, even vindictive master and elder —all this does not match Hirshhorn in any parallel or exact resemblance, but there are suggestions of analogy between architect and donor, such as the way they both generate controversy. Hirshhorn's story has just a touch of the irregular, in a slight currency problem after World World II, in unproven allegations about stock manipulation; Bunshaft's role in the building of the Hirshhorn Museum has a more questionable aspect because Bunshaft was a member of the Fine Arts Commission which passes on the architectural quality of structures in the official part of Washington, and he does not seem to have disqualified himself or withheld approval so rigorously as he did when the designs of younger competitors for other buildings were reviewed by the commission.

It would not be surprising if Bunshaft regarded this assignment as a great challenge to his own or Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill's skills, and also as an opportunity to place his own kind of contemporary building on a significant site in the national capital, in the very center of the national imagery, between the Capitol and the Washington Monument. Few architects could resist such an imaginative call, and he has responded in an unusual but not entirely unpredictable way. To present a building which would stand in the midst of those acres of government marble and concrete, near the neo-classical presences of the Freer and the National Gallery, and adjacent to the red-brick Victorian Gothic of the old Smithsonian, with the imposing dome in the distance, and the knowledge of a Breuer building nearby, what was more appropriate than a very traditional kind of building encased in a seemingly radical monumental design? The round building is unforgettable, it stands apart from all the masonry in the area, it is now and forever that round building on the Mall. This round structure raised on its four massive pillars—so that its circularity cannot be missed, even from far away, say, up on top of the Washington Monument!—is distinctive and, *pace* Ada Louise Huxtable, it does not really maim the Mall, it sits there very well, even echoing the circularity of the Capitol looming ahead. It makes the kind of statement Bunshaft obviously thought should be made in Washington.

The conventional critical assessment of the structure has it, however, that "the doughnut, the bunker, the gun turret, is out of place in the Mall, is stupid, ugly, brutal," and so on, but "the space in the Museum is marvelous, the pictures and sculpture can be seen to good effect, the building works well even if the design is not entirely pleasing." The fact is that exactly the opposite is true: the "eccentric" circular design (it is technically eccentric too, by four feet) is really perfectly acceptable as a sculptural object, and bears little resemblance to a doughnut or bunker —that's just cocktail-party talk—and in any case is only the external form of the building's design, not the design itself. The real design—that is, the structure of space to accommodate the building's purpose—is actually rather poor, and not at all well engineered, it raises all sorts of questions, and may not be really satisfactory at all. The primary users of the building have not been considered and it is their mute protest which few of the commentators seem to have noticed. The primary users are not the donor, nor the architect, nor even the director and his curatorial and maintenance staffs (whose needs have in fact been

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well served) but the visitors to the museum, whose interests and needs and comfort have not really been accommodated, and those other users, those silent users, the works of art, whose requirements cannot be easily ascertained by questionnaire or interview.

The space at the Hirshhorn Museum has been universally commended, and of course the galleries are large and well-lit and high. There are flexible partitions, and despite the circular outer wall, the visitor is not troubled inside by that frame. The floors of the picture galleries are carpeted, the areas are spacious. The space, however, favors the large pictures: the smaller works simply do not look well in these spaces, as if the architect were thinking primarily of Sam Francis and Ellsworth Kelly and Clyfford Still and Larry Rivers, not of Stuart Davis, Dove, Hartley, Martin, Eilshemius, Eakins. There is a feeling that each picture must fend for itself and too bad about the ones that can't command an entire wall, as the huge Sam Francis does.

Critical reviews of the Hirshhorn's opening exhibition tended to slight the early painting in favor of the more recent massive walls of color, and it is true that American painting before World War II was less magisterial in the history of art than it has since become. There is reason to wonder, however, whether the building's design does not contribute powerfully to that impression, and whether the less-than-major effect of a marvelous painter such as Dove is not aggravated and underlined by the setting in which it is presented here. Nothing reveals the changed nature of contemporary art so much as this—the cultural collusion, almost, of museums and galleries designed expressly to display the immense pictures which can be created only for such spaces. This is an art to be supported by prosperity, by large expenditures of public and private funds, and housed in large public buildings. And yet one wonders about the fate of some of these immense pictures and sculptures in their immense congenial spaces: will they one day look like the enormous battle scenes of the past, mastodons of culture, preserved in provincial town halls and museums in the meaningless space sacrificed for them?

The collection was formed out of one man's overflowing desire to surround himself with works of art, and, until the idea of the museum developed, these works were to be found in the various Hirshhorn residences, in offices of the foundation, in warehouses; pictures above fireplaces, in bedrooms, stacked in hallways; sculpture on desks and window ledges, on lawns, in gardens. Here in the vast chambers of Bunshaft's well-lit, air-conditioned, high-ceilinged continuous space, there has been no consideration given to possible needs of the collection other than space —the need of several pictures and sculptures to be in a room, to be framed by furniture, to be viewed across a room, in a sitting position, to be near a chair, a couch, to have candles in a sconce on each side, to be above a table, to be near curtains or heavy drapes.* All domestication of these interiors has been renounced, if it was ever considered, and throughout most of the picture galleries there is hardly a chair or bench on which to sit. (All the available seating is to be found only in the inner ring, among the sculptures and among small plants.) This failure of the building to accommodate, to show any cultural reverberation, to make allowance for the differing expressions of various works of art, can be remedied by the curatorial staff, or by the maintenance men perhaps, but the initial statement remains.

ONE of the problems in talking about buildings is that once the building is ready to be *talked* about, there is nothing to be *done* about it. Commissions and clients approve designs and plans, and even revisions during the construction stage, but later, when the vistor goes to the museum, that whole process is completed. A building is not like a picture or a sculptural study, or a drawing, or even a construction: it cannot be wiped out with chamois or turpentine, repainted, taken apart, crumpled into the wastebasket. What then can be done about it, about those parts that can't be remedied even by the most imaginative custodial staff?

That eight-foot high wall all around the property is ugly, with its slight slant, and its cheap-looking aggregate surface, but something was needed to enclose the outer courtyard space and it is not really unacceptable, nor is the interior court, although wasting nearly three thousand square feet on a huge, flat bronze fountain that looks blank unless the water is on does seem a most unfortunate design choice. But what of the more serious and even less remediable features, such as the continuous circular space which cannot easily be entered except in the prescribed manner? The outer picture gallery ring communicates with the inner sculpture ring by a number of open passages between the two, but there is no way to get to any of the spaces enclosed within either ring unless you go through the entire circular space of one floor. There is no plan available to visitors to help them find particular rooms or periods or pictures, and in fact the present exhibition makes impossible that kind of limited purposeful museum visit to see specific works because examples are scattered throughout the museum. On the other hand, the museum is not small enough to permit total immersion if the visitor has a specific interest to pursue and limited time; and no amount of carpeted floor is proof against "museum feet." The severely controlled access to galleries and ambulatories thus

* Photographs of Gertrude Stein's rooms, and Leo Stein's, and of the Schukhin and Morosov palaces in Moscow, with their Matissess, Picassos, and other avant-garde works, suggest that the role of the physical surroundings in the formation of a taste for new art is not at all negligible.

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determines the way the works of art are to be viewed, and, given the fundamental design of the building, this is one of the things that cannot be remedied.

Indeed, the matter of access to the works of art becomes, in this museum, curiously problematic. To begin with, entering on the street level, the visitor must use one of the two available doors, although four are visible. Once inside the revolving door, the visitor is practically swept into the escalators and forced to go either up or down. The entrance lobby is bare and glass-walled, with an information desk, a staff elevator, a large sculpture, and a number of guards. Red velvet ropes indicate the direction for visitors to follow, and there is no place to sit, no provision for waiting, for deciding which galleries to visit, for looking around the lobby or meeting someone, or even examining the sculpture or looking outside at the fountain. The massive bank of escalators is the sculpture here, noisily enveloping and manipulating all visitors unless they forcibly extract themselves from its grasp. Downstairs are the museum shop, the checkroom, the washrooms, the drinking fountains, the telephones, the places to sit. This too is an uncongenial space, and there is a sense of confusion, even clutter.

THE design of the sculpture garden offers more sense of the other possible uses of the space than does the museum itself. Most critics have been harsh with the sculpture garden, calling it into painful comparison with the sculpture garden of the Museum of Modern Art, or other such spaces, and it is true that the garden at the Hirshhorn Museum seems both incomplete and inarticulate. The initial idea was to use part of the Mall, but there were objections. Now it is a sunken garden, varying from six to fourteen feet below the Mall, and reached either above ground or by means of a sort of subway passage. Sculpture is also disposed around the museum in the courtyard, under the four immense piers holding up the circle, and, in the areas close to the eight-foot wall. Large works by Pomodoro, Pepper, Witkin, Caro, Ipoustéguy, Calder, Smith, Nakian, Manzù, Marini, Moore, Matisse, Snelson, and other modern sculptors are set among the Rodins, Maillols, Bourdelles, and Matisses. The first impression of all of this is not a happy one: these incredible works of art, of bronze, stone, and steel, set out and exposed to the elements, placed in spacious isolation from one another, all seem a little small, a little meager, when viewed from the road, as if these significant sculptural efforts were somehow not very important or interesting. The whole tone is unfurnished, literally as if someone had just moved. Around the museum itself no tendrils of ivy, or leaves of pachysandra, or wisps of greenery humanize the harsh wall and help settle the sculptures. In the garden, there are shrubs, it is true, and a few seats, and a bit of hedge, but the effect is all wrong, there are not enough large trees, and not enough vertical mass to counteract the powerful consequences of its being a sunken garden.

In fact, why *is* it a sunken garden? To insure that nothing matches the sculptural and monumental power of the building itself? No other reason seems adequate, certainly no claim that could be advanced for the sake of the sculptures, which do not thrive as they are now situated. There is a further question about the placing of all the sculptures, qualified, perhaps, by the sense that this is ostensibly a temporary exhibition. Apparently, much thought was given to the matter of placing all the works of art, and mock-ups were employed to test out various arrangements; even large styrofoam models of the sculptures were used to test the placement in garden and courtyard, before the monstrously heavy things were swung into place. The logic of the final arrangement defies scrutiny, however; larger works, such as Calder's *Two Discs*, are put near the building, and a large Nakian is crowded near the pillars, while out in the garden itself much smaller works are left to command indeterminate spaces without any help from the garden itself.

Photographs in the handsome catalogue show many of these sculptures in their earlier setting, in Hirshhorn's own garden in Greenwich, Connecticut, and it is fascinating to see how much they needed their surroundings, how much they may have lost by their translation to this public space—not lost irretrievably, of course, because the perception of loss suggests a possible remedy. Like the pictures, the sculptures need a context. The massive *Burghers of Calais* stood at the entrance to the Greenwich house, David Smith's *Agricola I* (1951-52) stood against trees, a Calder mobile hung from a ceiling against dark carved wood molding and bamboo blinds, a beautiful Maillol was framed in evergreens and a slate walk below, even sculptures by Snelson, di Suvero, Moore, Giacometti were *somewhere*, not just in space, and had the chance to play against a wall, a corner of slate pavement, a vista, a lawn, a distant view of hills. It is worth wondering, did Bunshaft, or the members of his design "team," see the works of art in the warehouse only or in the Greenwich setting as well? And why no fountains in the garden? And no flower beds, despite hints at a formal kind of space, and at the same time no spreading untrimmed shrubbery to suggest "the natural garden"? The space is not imaginatively broken up, as in a thoughtfully designed real garden, yet it is not all open and continuous. Considering Washington's spring, summer, and fall temperatures, some shade would have been useful, and simply for spatial reasons some greater bulk and height of evergreens would have been more congenial to the purposes of the garden. All the half-hearted little rubber plants and the like scattered throughout the sculpture ambula-

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tories inside could have been exchanged for a few spruce, a few Austrian or Scotch pine, or a few London plane trees, a large sycamore! Why was no landscape architect charged with responsibility for this space? Surely, one of the major areas for exhibition of some of the museum's most important works of art should not be an afterthought, an unfinished and unarticulated space, inadequately furnished, and unequal to its purpose?

Nevertheless the garden still beckons, offering possibilities and interest: the pebbled ground surfaces can be varied more easily than the marble floors of the museum's indoor sculpture ambulatories, and landscape material is easier to install, less costly to change than masonry and steel. With the current shrinkage of funds for cultural purposes and the general retrenchment in federal expenditures, there is of course some question about the possible funding of much new design for the garden. Perhaps just moving the sculptures around a bit would help.

As FOR the building itself, if stone walls do not a prison make, neither do concrete walls. The ingenuity and resourcefulness, the imagination and skill of the curators now and in the future will surely adapt the museum to its structure, and make the physical environment accommodate the purposes of the museum, as has already happend at the Guggenheim Museum in New York. If Palladio has designed a temple for it or Le Nôtre a palace or Le Corbusier a concrete slate or Louis Kahn a shell with exposed steel beams, heating ducts, and hot water pipes, the task would not have been more difficult or different. Indeed, most of the world's museums have been located in old palaces or abandoned temples, or in churches or other structures no longer needed for their original purposes. It is a question, really, whether we don't always retrieve what we need from the warehouse of forms and institutions that society accumulates for us. Thus, even if other forms could have been contemplated for this museum, instead of the structure that has been offered, the building as conceived is already built and exists among us, like a person. Nothing may be done any longer about its past history or heritage, so the interest now shifts to its usage, its development, and its inevitable transformations.

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Shtetl and Revolution

Robert Alter

PARIS in 1923 hardly seems a likely place for the gestation of a novel written in Hebrew that would offer a searching panoramic vision of the *shtetl*'s disintegration in the historical maelstrom of the Russian Revolution. The last volumes of Proust were still coming out; Gide was working on *The Counterfeiters*; Surrealism was about to be born out of the aftermath of Dada; and at that time and place, a twenty-five-year-old Ukrainian Jew, who having fled Russia two years earlier had arrived in Paris by way of Constantinople, began to ponder the fate of Jewry and Judaism in the age of revolution, using a mode of fiction that harked back to Dostoevsky and to the cognate traditions of social realism of the 19th-century Yiddish and Hebrew novel.

Haim Hazaz had nearly half a century of activity as a novelist still ahead of him, and after his emigration to Palestine in 1931, his work, with varying artistic success, would eventually reach out to encompass other continents, other cultural spheres, other communities of Jews. The traumatic events, however, that he had witnessed in Russia in the fateful winter of 1917-18 were to remain at the heart of his imaginative world, for he would continue to brood over the Jewish hunger for redemption and the modern attempts to realize redemption through politics. In 1923, the Revolution was still being almost universally celebrated by the intellectual avant-garde in the West. Hazaz as a Hebrew writer was, one might say, acutely advantaged in being able to see not only the vastness of the Revolution's messianic hopes but also its murderously destructive possibilities. If the Revolution, catalyzed and to an appreciable degree implemented by Jews, meant the end of the Jewish people, it might also mean the end of humanity as we had been accustomed to think of it. Over the years, as historical experience confirmed the rightness of this grim perception, Hazaz returned to the fictional material he had conceived in that distant Paris, working and reworking it.

The kernel of his novel, *Gates of Bronze*,* first appeared in print in 1924 in the periodical, *Ha-Tekufa*, as a series of fictional vignettes entitled "Revolutionary Chapters." In 1956 Hazaz radically revised and expanded these chapters into a short novel. In 1968, four years before his death, he published a new version of the novel, almost twice as long, with certain significant additions to the historical picture presented in the earlier material. As the book grew in length, Hazaz's conception of how he must handle his subject became firmer, moving away from effects of decorative elaboration through imagery and flaunted grotesquerie in the first version (qualities he would remain addicted to in other works) to a spare, concentrated representation of the conflicts among classes, generations, and ideologies in the second version, finally rounded out with greater novelistic specification of scene and subsidiary characters in the final version. Specific episodes and characters, however, remain substantially unchanged through all three treatments of the subject; and there is one scene, I would like to suggest, retained from the 1924 story, that is the vital central point from which this whole Hebrew imagination of the Revolution radiates.

A small knot of young comrades in the Ukrainian village of Mokry-Kut has just emerged from a political meeting held in the heady period of fervid debate and confusion of tongues that marked the first winter of the Revolution. At the meeting, there has been a collision between Communist and anarchist views of the revolutionary situation. As these Jewish revolutionaries make their way through a midnight blizzard, the town itself seems to disappear in the storm. Then a spectral voice reaches them from behind the clouds of wind-whipped snow. It is, we will learn in a moment, the drunken chanting of Heshel Pribisker, pathetic, uprooted *hasid*, a religious instructor by profession with no children to teach any more, who has left his own wife and children and now dangles in desire for one of the young Communist girls while the iron wheels of revolutionary change move rapidly down upon him. At first, however, Heshel's voice alone is detectable, as though this sorry representative of the twilight of traditional Judaism were a mere sounding-box for visionary words first intoned 2,500 years earlier. The words chanted by the stranded *hasid* through the all-enveloping storm are those of the prophet

* An English translation by S. Gershon Levi is about to be issued by the Jewish Publication Society, 398 pp., $7.95. The present essay will serve as the introduction.—ED.

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Ezekiel: "One third of you shall die of the pestilence . . . and shall perish of hunger in your midst, and a third shall fall by the sword round about, and a third will I scatter to every wind, and the sword shall pursue them."

Hazaz, let me hasten to say, was by no means a symbolic writer, and the midnight encounter between Heshel Pribisker and the young comrades is in context entirely continuous with the verisimilar representation of historically plausible figures and actions out of which the whole novel is shaped. The very choice, however, of the Hebrew language to enact the clash between two generations of Jews in the throes of the Revolution produces certain symbolic overtones, the words themselves sometimes leading us to see the paltry events of a few months in this forsaken *shtetl* though the magnifying prism of ancient visionary perspectives. It is precisely this peculiar feature that gives Hazaz's account of the crisis of Jewish values in the Revolution unique worth as historical testimony.

Hebrew literature on European soil had rarely been very subtle in the nuanced discrimination of character and motive, largely because it had no vocabulary for such fine discrimination and perhaps also because there was little in the culture from which it derived that might have trained writers to Jamesian or Flaubertian niceties of perception. (Hazaz is no exception to this general rule.) By way of compensation, Hebrew, because its own adaptation to secular literary ends sharply reflected the contradictory struggle with modernity of Jews steeped in tradition, provided an ideal instrument for probing the pathologies and potentials of historical Judaism in the modern era, and also for measuring the modern world against the values of historical Judaism. The effectiveness of this recurrent literary focus on a critical stage of historical transition was enhanced, for Yiddish as well as for Hebrew writers, by an accident of sociology—the fact that the Jewry of Russia and Poland typically (though by no means exclusively) lived in *shtetlach*, provincial townlets of predominantly Jewish population. The *shtetl* was for the Hebrew and Yiddish writer more or less what the ship was for Melville—a readymade microcosm, a social unit of limited scope, with established hierarchies and conventions, within which opposing views and conditions could be set in coherent relation as part of a cohesive fictional structure. Thus, the imponderable forces of modernity could become fictionally manageable in the microcosmic conflict between the study-house hangers-on and a local *maskil*, or proponent of Enlightenment, in the grudging decision of a pious householder to bypass the matchmaker and allow his daughter to choose her own husband, and so forth. This concentration on the microcosm of the *shtetl* leads Hebrew and Yiddish writers in precisely the opposite direction from the European novel, which is impelled by the titanic aspiration to embrace, encompass, dominate in language the vast inchoate reality of the modern metropolis, from Balzac's Paris and Dickens's London to Joyce's Dublin and Biely's St. Petersburg. The two novelistic traditions are, one might say, ways of scrutinizing the dynamics of history from the two opposite ends of the telescope.

Historical change is generally a corrosive presence, inexorably encroaching on the enclaves of piety, in the late 19th-century Hebrew and Yiddish fiction about the *shtetl*. In the revolutionary moment in which the action of Hazaz's novel occurs, such change becomes literally explosive: the first illumination of the *shtetl* in the book is from the flames of the aristocratic manors put to the torch by Sorokeh, the Jewish anarchist. *Gates of Bronze* explores the tensions and discrepancies between two competing views of the Revolution, one messianic and the other apocalyptic, both rooted in the language and concepts of Jewish tradition. The most dramatic expression of the messianic construction is voiced by Sorokeh at a new year's party held by the young revolutionaries to inaugurate 1918. As the midnight hour strikes, Sorokeh announces that "At . . . this very moment, the whole world is crossing a frontier, traversing a line that divides all of human history into two. . . . The sun of capitalism has set —a new world has come into being—a world of social justice, of freedom and happiness, a world celebrating the grandeur of man." Sorokeh's image of history cut through by a critical dividing-line at the point where he stands, with "everything that has gone before, the entire past for two thousand years, four thousand years . . . on one side," is central to the novel and to Hazaz's general perception of the modern predicament. What is at issue is whether the other side of the line hides the *atkhalta degeula*, the dawning redemption, as Sorokeh imagines, or universal doom, as the Ezekelian vision of Heshel Pribisker darkly intimates.

Lionel Trilling once suggested, with an allusion to Dostoevsky, that the future of the novel, because the old conflicts between social classes had become blunted and blurred, might lie in the study of conflicting ideologies. *Gates of Bronze* is a rather pure example of this sort of ideological novel. Hazaz in fact sharpens the focus on ideological conflict by devoting so much of the novel's bulk to dialogue, with a bare minimum (particularly in view of his narrative procedures elsewhere) of authorial obtrusion around and between the long exchanges among the characters. What makes this book especially distinctive, however, as an ideological novel is the way in which the ideologies articulated by the characters repeatedly impose themselves as theologies in political guise. The choice of Sorokeh, the utopian anarchist, as the central character is

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wonderfully effective in precisely this connection because Sorokeh in himself is a "one-man party," a busy intersection of different ideologies with their sundry theological freight. It would have been temptingly easy for Hazaz, a Hebraist and a Zionist, to have introduced a clear spokesman for his own commitments in the novel, a Zionist Positive Hero anchored in the Hebrew heritage who could reprove the waywardness of the young Jewish Communists. Something of this is in fact done through Sorokeh, but in a historically complex, psychologically convincing way, because Sorokeh embodies so many of the baffling contradictions and ambiguities of trying to persist as a Jew on the other side of that great dividing-line of history.

The young Communists who quickly become the administrators of the local revolutionary government have only a tenuous connection with their Jewish antecedents, while their professed ties with the Russian people are even more dubious, as Hazaz made clear in the final version of the novel by confronting the Jewish comrades with anti-Semitic Russian peasants (there are scarcely any Gentiles to be seen in the two previous versions). Sorokeh, by contrast, recapitulates the various stages of ideological modernization undergone by Russian Jewry without really abandoning the earlier stages as he goes on to later ones. He is, then, the son of a yeshiva director, the grandson of an illustrious talmudist. Trained from an early age in rabbinical lore, he had lost the old faith, seized upon the new secular Hebrew literature, afterward Russian literature, then the Social Revolutionary party, as modern instruments of salvation. But when, on the verge of World War I, the Social Revolutionaries renounced terror as a weapon of revolution, Sorokeh turned anarchist. Psychologically, he is a new kind of Jew, measuring the length and breadth of the *shtetl* with a machine-gun tucked under his arm, answering a demand from the local revolutionary committee chairman to show his arms permit by coolly drawing his pistol and pointing it with a smile at the head of the Bolshevik authority.

And yet, we are reminded that his revolutionary fervor is continuous with the mystical fervor of his pious forebears; he quotes Yehuda Halevi as passionately as he does Kropotkin; and the interludes to his dreams of sweeping the world with a cleansing fire of destruction are the idyllic fantasies he entertains of going back to a sun-drenched bucolic haven in the Land of Israel. Sorokeh's fitful imaginings were the only voice of Zionism in the two earlier versions of the novel. In the book's last revision and expansion, however, there is actually a Zionist movement in Mokry-Kut, the *Tzeirei Tziyon*, and its presence gives greater substance and balance to the conflict of ideologies among the young generation of Russian Jews. Nevertheless, Hazaz remains true to the soundness of his first intuition in keeping Sorokeh with his confusions at the center of vision, so that in this historical maze of contradictory longings Zionism is plausibly an alluring—perhaps quixotic—possibility, not a pat solution.

Sorokeh the anarchist is driven on an unchartable zigzag course by passionate impulse; his Communist rivals follow a straight line of murderous abstraction. In the foreground of the novel, we see the purity of Sorokeh's motives; in the background, we get an occasional glimpse of the awful consequences of his utopian activism—in the rape and destruction unleashed upon the countryside by the anarchist bands he has helped to organize. As a voice in the ideological debate, what sets him apart from the Jewish Bolsheviks most decisively is that his feelings are still palpably in touch with the living Jewish people caught between the millstones of the Revolution. The older generation of that people is almost entirely a gang of bourgeois counterrevolutionaries, running-dogs of capitalism—which is to say, they are more or less the *shtetl* Jews of Mendele and Sholem Aleichem, only a little more prosperous, not *schnorrers*, petty conmen, and ne'er-do-wells but small shopkeepers, grain merchants, economic middlemen of varying sorts. They still have the same verbal mannerisms, the same comic nicknames, the same daily regimen of pious practices as the Jews of Mendele and Sholem Aleichem, but now they flounder in a bog of desperation, for everything on which they lived is being destroyed, with their own children zealously executing the iron purpose of the new regime. Incomprehension is their primary response to the revolutionary moment, and it is in its way a historically illuminating incomprehension. They simply cannot understand why their shops should be closed, their stock confiscated, why their homes should be invaded for a general search on the holy Sabbath itself, why some among them should be summarily arrested, beaten, even shot.

THE Hebrew words they use in the novel to express their bewilderment impart to it a special historical resonance. In point of fact, such Jews would of course have been speaking Yiddish to one another. Hebrew literature in Europe, following the masterful example of Mendele, made the most of a supreme gesture of stylization, putting Hebrew in the mouths of speakers of Yiddish, exploiting the older language's rich texture of literary associations while trying to simulate in Hebrew the nuanced liveliness of the actual vernacular. Hazaz's novel is a culminating instance of this peculiar literary tradition, which means that even though the book was completed by a writer who had been living for decades in the new Hebrew-speaking cultural milieu, it is by no means modern Hebrew that the characters use with one another but the language of the Mishnah, the Midrash, the medieval exegetes, and the Bible, as it would be embedded in a Yiddish consciousness.

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This exchange between two study-house faithfuls at morning prayers is typical: "'They just don't want us to live,' said Yankel Potchar hoarsely. 'I've heard that their *rebbe,* Karl Marx, was himself an apostate and a Jew-hater, and said all kinds of terrible things about Jews, as renegades always have. They say he left the Bolsheviks a torah called *Kapital,* where he preaches hatred for mankind, and permits stealing and bloodshed.'" The translation clearly suggests the unbridgeable chasm between the mental world of, say, Rashi's commentary and Left Hegelianism, though certain important overtones are necessarily lost in the English. "Apostate and Jew-hater" is *meshummad v'sonei yisrael* in the original, two Hebrew terms naturalized in Yiddish usage, habitually invoked in both languages with a kind of spitting emphasis of contempt that could only be guessed at by speakers of a genteel language like English. The conversational "said all kinds of terrible things . . ." is in the Hebrew *amar dilatoria kasha 'al yisrael*—roughly, "viciously maligned the people Israel"—a turn of old-fashioned literary phrase that, with the key Latin loanword, *dilatoria,* calls to mind early rabbinic contexts and thus suggests that Karl Marx is only the most recent version of an archetypal line of plotters against Jewry going back to Hellenistic times. Yankel Potchar's Hebrew formulation of revolutionary Marxism is obviously a terrible simplification, but it is a simplification that firmly catches a brutal historical truth which somehow continued to slip through the fine mesh of immeasurably more sophisticated intellectual vocabularies even during the Great Terror, the Doctors' Trials, and more recent barbarities.

The response in context to Yankel's observation then moves the argument from rabbinic lore and law to the Bible and its exegesis: "'Ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat the fruit thereof,' quoted Reb Avrohom-Abba, holding his beard and swaying mournfully. 'Scripture is talking about our children. We toil to bring them up, and they turn around and choke us.'" In the Hebrew here, every single phrase, except of course for the biblical quotation, is in perfect Midrashic idiom: the mentality nurtured by a long tradition of exegesis naturally applies biblical texts to the present predicament, though there is sour irony in that mental operation, in the use of that vocabulary, since the present predicament threatens both to extirpate the tradition and to hound to death its upholders.

Sorokeh, as the chief focusing device of the novel's historical vision, provides a lucid perspective on these Jews of the old world under the shadow of extinction precisely because his feelings about them oscillate between critical distance and intimate identification. Broadly, his sense of solidarity with the Jews is expressed in dialogue, in his debates with the other revolutionaries, while the angry criticism is generally reserved for his interior monologues, his debates with himself. This socialist-anarchist has no use for the Jews in their stance as "otherworldly spectators of history," alienated from nature, enmired in petty trade, adept in a thousand varieties of verbal ingenuity but impotent in the realm of practical action. His indictment is one that had been familiar in Hebrew literature since the days of the Haskala; it shares the vehemence of those early Hebrew-Enlightenment critiques, but the vehemence is now qualified with compassion. The obvious and sufficient reason for that change is the fact that in the historical moment of 1918 these idlers and obscurantists of the *shtetl* culture are catastrophically threatened by forces whose ruthlessness is infinitely more pernicious than their own shambling impracticalities. Indeed, Sorokeh is able to perceive in the Jewish fathers a kind of quixotic integrity that seems almost noble in comparison with the motives of their revolutionary sons and daughters. If the traditionalists with their long-deferred messianic hopes have an imperfect knowledge of their complicity in history, the revolutionists, giving their own lust for power the name of humanitarian idealism, exhibit an even more disastrous lack of self-knowledge.

I HAVE been speaking of *Gates of Bronze* as an instructive historical testimony, but its assault on the contradictions of Jewish revolutionary universalism also makes it a compelling monitory text still relevant in the last decades of the 20th century. The ideological debate between universalism and particularism is at the root of all modern Jewish history, and it is a debate that has had literally deadly consequences. Because this debate involves a collision between general ideas of history and concrete, individual human predicaments, perhaps the most effective formulation it could receive is in fiction, where fully imagined personages can struggle with ideas against a background of highly specified human situations. In the novel, Sorokeh himself has universalist aspirations, feels torn between them and his persistent Jewish loyalties, but he serves primarily to confront the young Jewish Communists with an inexorable historical fact: that national consciousness remains a stubbornly potent element in all human identity, including that of self-professing universalists; and therefore the Revolution, in which the Jews imagine they enjoy an equal role, is as Russian as the spires of Moscow, or the knout.

"In the end reality will catch up with you," Sorokeh tells the Bolsheviks, "you'll have to pay for your illusions. The bill will be paid by the Jew each of you carries hidden within himself. These *goyim* will take it out on him with axe and pitchfork, as they have from time immemorial!" These words were first devised for the 1956 version of the novel; in the 1968 revision, Hazaz

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underscored this general emphasis by having a Russian peasant later in the book fire into the Revkom office, killing a Jew, with the cry, "Down with the commune of the *Zhids*! Long live the rule of the Soviets!" The basic insight, however, was already present in Hazaz's first conception of the novel a scant half-dozen years after the Revolution, and subsequent history has proven to be a series of terrible footnotes to this observation, from the countless Jewish universalists who died as Jews in the gas-chambers and before the firing squads, to the hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews in the 1960's and 70's desperate to leave the country at any cost because there is no place for them in Soviet society.

Both Sorokeh's special interest as a psychological type and his peculiar value as a voice of ideological critique derive from his cool confidence in the rightness of his own perceptions. This confidence is unshaken even when his perceptions lead him to be stigmatized with the labels that modern Jews fear above all else: chauvinist, nationalist, reactionary. He is, in other words, impervious to that force of moral blackmail which in our century has so often cowed intellectuals into positions of base political conformism, and he is able to bring to bear a fine lucidity in the debate with the partyline Marxists.

One exchange between Sorokeh and Leahtche Hurvitz, the rather conventional Jewish girl turned Bolshevik who is the erotic center of the novel, brings us to the heart of his quarrel with the universalists. The dictatorship of the proletariat, he has been arguing from his twin vantage-point as anarchist and self-respecting Jew, is a dictatorship like any other, and its moral character is especially transparent in the way it has set about crushing the pathetic, befuddled Jews of the *shtetl*. " 'These poor people have to pay for the sins of the bourgeoisie! Tell me, what hope is there for these poor lost Jews, what have they got to look forward to?' " Elsewhere, Leahtche Hurvitz, like the other Communists, is willing to contend that the Revolution is beyond all considerations of morality, that if it requires colossal injustice, its redemptive power lies precisely in thus trampling upon the jaded values of the dead past. (The claim sounds like a late echo of Sabbatean theology.) In this particular discussion, Sorokeh's polemic insistence on the suffering of the Jews, always an irritant to leftists, triggers a classic leftist response: " 'I'm not a nationalist,' she shook her head solemnly. 'I'm for humanity as a whole.' " This grand declaration induces a peal of laughter in Sorokeh, then a dismissal of her words as foolish cant. Leahtche, much offended, reaffirms her position: " 'I don't care what you say . . . but I'm not a nationalist. I'll go further, I'm an anti-nationalist. I'm a Communist.' 'What a Jewish answer!' Sorokeh laughed again. 'No *goy* would say, I'm not a Russian, I'm not a Ukrainian. Only Jews talk like that.' "

Certain words and ideas find uncanny echoes in unexpected places, perhaps because of their inevitability as historical perceptions. Cynthia Ozick, in a grimly powerful essay on the Jews, the world, and past and future Holocausts, evokes a ghastly vision of the universalist victims of the Nazis, refusing to be categorized as Jews, their "charred bones . . . cry[ing] out from the gut of the ovens, 'You cannot do this to me! *I am a member of all humanity*!' " To this Cynthia Ozick adds, "Only Jews carry on this way," and then a devastating epigrammatic summary: "Universalism is the ultimate Jewish parochialism."*

What a novel like *Gates of Bronze* might well do is lead us to reconsider the meaning of parochialism. If to be parochial is to be hedged in by the mental assumptions of your own limited parish, whether geographical, cultural, or ethnic, that in turn implies some grotesque, perhaps calamitous disparity between the terms through which you conceive the world and the way it really is out there, in the historical moment which is yours to confront. The study-house Jews of Hazaz's novel are obvious and familiar parochials, almost comically so when they talk of the Bolsheviks' *rebbe* Marx and his torah, or when they imagine writing a letter to their Jewish brother, Lev Trotsky, to redress the injustices done them. Their Communist sons and daughters are far more self-deceived in their parochialism, but they, too, apply to the alien world a grid of assumptions unwittingly taken from their own group's experience and needs, and so in certain crucial respects they are even more incapable than their elders of seeing what is actually going on in the movement of history around them. Sorokeh angrily accuses them of being all too eager to make themselves the lackeys and mindless functionaries of a revolution that is not ultimately theirs. As a point of historical fact, when the nativist managers of the Revolution no longer needed such a class of "universalist"—that is, non-Russian—zealots to do their administrative dirty work, that class was ruthlessly eliminated. The iron boot of Cynthia Ozick's epigram fits these young Jews of 1918 with painful precision.

THE issue of revising notions about parochialism is raised not only within the novel itself but also by the anomalous facts of its composition in Hebrew. Hazaz's commitment in the Paris of 1923, after his flight from multilingual Russia, to go on fashioning an imaginative world in Hebrew—an eminently "parochial" language and at the time hardly a spoken one—must surely seem a peculiar choice to conventional ways of thinking. (It might be worth recalling what an illustrious line of East European expatriates—playwrights, poets, critics—has come to Paris in this

* "All the World Wants the Jews Dead," *Esquire*, November 1974.

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century and adopted French as its means of expression.) When "Revolutionary Chapters" first appeared, Hazaz could have hoped at best for a couple of thousand readers—a few brave coteries of Hebraists in Paris, Berlin, Vilna, New York, and the new, small centers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Even by 1968, the likely readership for a Hebrew novel would not have increased by more than a few thousand. Yet after half a century, this fiction first conceived in an almost lost language for the perusal of the not-so-happy few possesses a cogent timeliness, and from our own vantage-point seems to render the fateful historical juncture which is its subject with a persuasive fullness of vision. The same could hardly be said of the now quaint realms of effusions by "progressive" intellectuals in the sundry European languages during the 20's and 30's written to celebrate the achievements of the Revolution.

Hazaz, as I have tried to suggest, needed Hebrew in order to define his Jewish material with some profundity of historical dimension, in order to take its measure through and against the accreted meanings of its own distinctive terms; and, of course, he needed his Jewish material in order to describe the full impact of the Revolution at the point he knew most intimately, could probe deeply. Historically and imaginatively, there is a way of seeing out and around by first seeing within very keenly. The availability in English of *Gates of Bronze* offers American readers a valuable opportunity to observe the operation of that paradox in fiction, for it is a novel which, by making scrupulous use of its inherited cultural and verbal materials, vividly shows how a supposed backwater of history could be a point where the most portentous historical currents converge.

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Theater

The English Invasion

Jack Richardson

EACH year the American theater season becomes less and less a result of native effort and more and more indebted to English ingenuity. Indeed, if our theater were more vital to the country's economy, embargoes and tariffs would have by now been instituted to slow down the flow of London imports, or if what took place on our stages were a matter of national pride, politicians would deem it unpatriotic to spend native time and money on an English farce when Neil Simon was producing ample opportunities for homespun American laughter. But as the theater means very little, either to the pocket or spirit of the majority of Americans, no protests are made or sanctions threatened, and it is left to the meanest of moral and political forces, the theater critic, to decide if such a one-way flow of trade is good or bad for the country.

Since every question of national importance permits extreme positions, it might be best to state right now that, about English theatrical goods glutting the Broadway marketplace, I am something of a centrist. I am no Anglophile who thinks that the spirit of Shakespeare infuses his country's present generation with natural genius for all the forms of drama, and that the English therefore, by right of birth, possess theatrical powers which we, out of a petty need for political freedom, lost some two hundred years ago. However, neither can I count myself among those who see in the present wave of English popularity nothing except an example of provincial gullibility, a snobbish readiness to accept superficial polish and glitter in place of the perhaps rougher but more substantial products of our own theatrical soil.

Not being a critical jingoist or a cultural expatriate, I find much to admire and much to deprecate in the examples of English theater that are starting to overwhelm us, and while I have no desire to constrain their right of entry, I do think it necessary to temper some of my colleagues' enthusiasm about this polite invasion.

To be hospitable, I shall begin positively and admit that we are at present no match for the English at theatrical virtuosity. The results of the great debate of the 40's and 50's between the American Method and the English Craft are now evident: we have produced a generation of competent television and movie performers; England, on the other hand, now has dozens of stage actors capable of interpreting the theater's great roles, past and present, and a seemingly endless supply of yeoman performers who can add skillful authority to the minor details and moments of a play. It is this front-line excellence that has allowed so many directorial strategies to be successful, and permitted John Dexter, Peter Brook, Frank Dunlop, and many more to experiment with ensemble playing in a way denied their American colleagues. One need only recall such unified theatrical efforts as *Marat/Sade, Chips with Everything, Midsummer Night's Dream,* and, most recently, *Scapino,* in order to realize that, so far as total performance goes, the high moments of the last decade have been due to the training and technique inherent in the English tradition of company players. We have, of course, had our own bright moments too, but they have been furtive and isolated, the result of a particular talent or set of circumstances that could not be perpetuated or adapted to different and varied enterprises. Our theater has remained, in Matthew Arnold's sense of the word, provincial; that is, it has maintained a good opinion of itself by virtue of its idiosyncrasies, its very personal bursts of excellence. But these qualities have provided no broad foundations on which to build standards of theatrical judgment, no principles by which the art of performance can be, as far as possible and to as many as possible, taught as a technique.

The Method was, of course, meant to do this, to supply actors with a common language of instruction. However, the result was generally opposite to the intention. Instead of broadening the individual talent in order that it might encompass wider and wider areas of life, it more often that not contracted life to a size suitable to the talent. This meant that roles were often played within the boundaries of a performer's personal psychology, a process which can make for an odd moment or two of exciting coincidence but which is both restrictive and unfruitful when the question is that of forging a serviceable and generous acting technique. I have no wish to examine critically the specific differences between the theatrical pedagogy of England and that of America. It is enough for this argument to state that while England in the last decade has produced a National Theater, a Royal Shakespeare Company, and a New Vic, we have produced the well-meaning floundering of Lincoln Center, the sad lunacy of the Living Theater, and the brief but harrowing seasons of the Actors' Studio's attempt to practice what it preached.

Now it is, of course, true that the English productions that find their way here generally represent the best of what the London stage is up to, for although our producers have a hard time putting together a play from scratch, they have a good enough eye for the finished product. I would never say

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that all, or even a majority, of the efforts that fill up a season of theater on the other side of the Atlantic possess as high a degree of general excellence as do those that make a profitable crossing. Anyone who has lived in London and has regularly attended its theater will always carry with him the fetid memories of mannered productions, of stifling self-indulgence, of gimmickry, contrivance, and embarrassing attempts at democratic entertainments for the working class. Nevertheless, it remains true that their best is better than our best, and that they have a second level of theatrical ability which we almost lack entirely.

So MUCH for tribute. Now I must point out that this professional excellence does tend to mask a basic lack of emotional and intellectual depth in the original works to which it gives theatrical embodiment. The techniques of acting and production have become so refined and adaptable that the English playwright is often credited, by the general audience and undiscriminating critic, with a dramatic coherence and power he in truth does not possess. The vacuity of Pinter, for example, or the disconnected outbursts of an Osborne play—how many times have these creative weaknesses, weaknesses by no means unique in England to these writers, been made to seem virtues by the skillful way in which they are masked by stage effects and an ensemble *tour de force*? Often it has seemed to me that the virtuosity of English performance is not only a substitute for, but an actual discouragement of, complexity in the text, for where is the need, or indeed the room, for literary depth when the simple or inchoate concept can be fleshed out and made to appear penetrating and complete by actors whose skill at playing an ill-defined *something* is so interesting in itself that to request a good play to go along with it seems peevish?

Now it must be understood that I'm not accusing English actors of anything except being what they should be: namely, a positive addition to a play's inception, an element not simply of transmission but of improvement. What I object to is that too often they improve so much around the hollow center of a play that audiences and critics end up mistaking technique for substance and, instead of chiding those companies of directors and actors for frittering away their talents on trifles, they consider plays and players all of a piece and call him a dramatist who has really written nothing more than a few disjointed sketches or a bit of incoherent fustian. Since I believe in the primary importance of the playwright in the theater, I would prefer not to see him allowed to get away with a two-act banality simply because it wears its theatrical finery well. This brings me to *Equus*, a play by Peter Shaffer, which last year was put on by the National Theater of Great Britain and which is currently the success of Broadway. Now Shaffer is a playwright of very modest talents that, when put to a use commensurate with their scope, can produce a thin but pleasant amusement like *Black Comedy* or a competent family melodrama like *Five Finger Exercise*. However, when he attempted a heavier task in *The Royal Hunt of the Sun*, he turned the conquest of Peru into a public-school history pageant and made a conflict of cultures an exercise in English badinage. In *Equus* he has scaled down his scene of action but not his ambitions, for although the play is about a young man's undergoing the agony of mental therapy, much more is at stake in this drama than the rehabilitation of an individual psyche. The whole question of cultural vitality, of the Apollonian and Dionysian tension in civilization, is Shaffer's theme. How this grand subject rises out of such humble origins requires, I'm afraid, a good deal of plot synopsis.

A young boy named Alan has been arrested, and found guilty of the bizarre and vicious crime of willfully blinding several horses belonging to a stable in which he worked. Although this is, indeed, a heinous act in a country with the equestrian traditions of England, the court agrees to place him in a psychiatric clinic instead of jail, and the play begins with his doctor, Martin Dysart, a wryly

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

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Despair? There is much that is sad in the pages of Mr. Hart's compilation, but never any element of defeatism; rather, the fervour and vivacity, and will-to-live of the sturdy middle class society that gives Israel its strength. This book is invaluable for anybody in Israel or abroad who wants to understand what makes Israelis tick. ***Philip Gillon, Jerusalem Post Magazine***

Well written. Makes exciting and inspiring reading.
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bitter fellow burdened by a bad marriage and a growing doubt about the worth of his profession, who begins narrating Alan's clinical history for us.

Gradually, during the course of Alan's treatment, it transpires that he had come to think of horses in a singular way. To him they were manifestations of deity, embodiments of strength and submission which in his mind replaced the framed image of Christ that his father, a modern-day Benthamite, had removed from his room on the grounds that it was too sanguinary a picture for a healthy boy to look at before going to sleep at night. Deprived of this spiritual image, Alan, who'd had as a child a traumatic experience involving a horse, gradually substituted Equus, the horse-god, for Christ, and began praying each night in front of the picture of a stallion's head.

Such creative theology has, of course, its difficulties in our pragmatic age, and Alan, who has gradually increased the area and intensity of his worship, so that it includes naked midnight rides on the back of his favorite stable horse, has neither church nor friend from whom he can learn the proper hippotheistic dogma. Soon sexuality begins to creep into his liturgy, and he must make the inevitable choice between his god and the more ordinary pleasures of the flesh. When, one night in the stable, he fails to respond in a manly way to a willing young lady, he feels that his impotence is a punishment for his betrayal of Equus. In panic, he begs the horse's forgiveness, and when he receives no articulate absolution, he is driven out of terror to blind all the animals in the stable.

Now as Doctor Dysart draws this information out of Alan, he comes to discover, *mirabile dictu,* that he envies his patient's faith, not particularly in horses but in something that requires a greater spiritual energy than modern society generally permits its citizens. Trapped as he is in a sterile marriage and profession, he dreams of the world of ancient Greece, the Greece not of Plato and Pericles, of course, but the Greece of bacchic mysteries, pagan sensuality, and anthropomorphic landscapes. Since he will never attain his dream, he is reluctant to "cure" the patient who has. Only after much rhetoric on the boredom and hollowness of our age does he finally decide that he must remove Alan's divine passion and reduce him to a state acceptable to those around him, a state, as Shaffer puts it, in which the genitals all turn to plastic.

I HAVE outlined this plot in some detail because it seems to me to be a perfect case-study in the mediocrity of insight necessary nowadays for a play to enjoy a popular reputation for profundity. From the schematic psychology to the simpleminded cultural criticisms, there is nothing in this play that either informs us what life is or what it ought to be. It is all contrivance, all middle-class whines and whimpers that generally belong to the fantasies of afternoon television. One sits through *Equus* and wonders how it could be possible that so much effort was spent trying to make this poor example of a young boy's derangement into a symbol of human vitality. The dark, irrational exhilarations of human life are made by Shaffer to seem so neat and precise a part of our psychology that *Equus* ends by making pure reason appear the real human adventure; and if one should embark on it during one of the play's many *longueurs* it comes to mind that the good doctor, and all those critics who agree with him, would not see Alan as such a romantic figure if he'd found his notion of deity in titmice or in a piece of very rare roast beef. The thesis that madness, if not outrightly divine, is at best preferable to the 20th century's ruthless and uninspired sanity, is in this play, as it is in so much fashionable philosophizing, totally dependent on a pleasant, aesthetically rational form of derangement for the credibility of its argument. Great foam-covered stallions in the moonlight are fine, but for titmice cults and roast-beef sects there is no public.

And yet, as a critic of the theater, I have to say that the presentation of this nonsense has a galling merit to it. The performance by Anthony Hopkins as the divided doctor turns very ordinary English into a forceful, atonal aria —words sputter out of him as though he meant to drop them as permanent markings to point the way of his personal agony and to warn others not to follow the vain route of intelligence he has taken. Peter Firth plays the possessed young Alan with a mixture of coarseness and sensitivity that makes the pain of madness seem indeed almost a noble gift. Throughout the course of the play his face remains fixed in an expression of horror, as though he were wearing one of the Mycenaean masks his doctor dreams about, and yet through this single facial attitude he manages to transmit a range and intensity of feeling that forces one almost to believe in the character he portrays. What is essentially a duet between these two actors, John Dexter, the director, has somehow orchestrated so that it becomes rich, resonant theatrical music. Yes, one must admire the presentation, but again I question the use to which the English are putting their abundant talent, and in my next article I will discuss further this tendency on their part to use plays that need the performers' technique and embellishment in order to mean anything at all.

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Books in Review

A Modest Proposal

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST? REFLECTIONS ON JUSTICE AND NATIONHOOD. By NOAM CHOMSKY. *Pantheon. 200 pp. $7.95.*

Reviewed by EDWARD GROSSMAN

THE grievance of the Arabs and others against the Jews organized into a nation-state in Israel has replaced the war in Vietnam as the foreign trouble agitating ordinary Americans. A book in connection with this subject by Noam Chomsky will not be read by masses of people, yet his thoughts can be expected to seep through to a good-sized public, for the Vietnam decade has made more Americans than before open to the ideas of intellectuals with views that are perceived or advertised as fresh or dissenting from the conventional wisdom or really more realistic than the generals', the politicians', and the diplomats'.

In the writings that gained him a larger audience than he could ever have had as an honored academician in a rather esoteric field (linguistics), Chomsky described the Vietnam war as a criminal attack by the U.S. on a small, inoffensive people, for the purpose of destroying a national liberation movement by genocide, in order to protect an imperialistic stake in Asia and promote business stateside. This was not an inadvertent war, he insisted with generous amounts of documentation, but the logical, necessary expression of American foreign policy. Chomsky tried to shake the slumbering conscience of his readers to indignation leading to forceful protest, and in a measure he succeeded, especially in the universities. There he continues to enjoy unusual respect. Some of this must have been excited by the stream of wrathful sarcasm he directed at intellectuals who worked for the government or military, or apologized for policy, or even, while criticizing it, stopped short of damning it absolutely—thereby betraying their trust.

For Chomsky, the U.S. and the Saigon regimes against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese was a struggle between the Forces of Darkness and the Children of Light. His imagery was never so theological (Daniel Berrigan, his friend, comrade, and hero, was, and remains, more partial to that usage), yet it is fair to say that in his own style Chomsky drew the picture in black and white. He was a polemicist, without apology.

WHEN it comes to the Jews and Arabs, although the scrap of land they both want is in a part of the world where Chomsky again finds American imperialism menacing and stifling national liberation movements, he promises to shun polemic. If there is one thing Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs don't need, it is more polemic supposedly on their behalf by foreign partisans. Since the Israelis and the Palestinians both have justice on their side, according to Chomsky and the predominant conventional wisdom, as well as symmetrical or congruent crimes committed against each other on their consciences, and since their present course seems headed to "Semitic suicide," what is called for is quiet, though no less urgent, mediation between them. As an interested foreigner who happens to have a perspective on their problem, this is what Chomsky says he wishes to provide. If the implicit demand of all his writings and utterances on Vietnam was "U.S. GET OUT," here he says he will have no demands to make or confident prescriptions to advance.

And in fact, with many small and one extended and crucial lapse, Chomsky's tone is more tentative than what is familiar to readers of his Vietnam works: it is tentative, that is, by comparison. The lapses are not accidental or out of character. They come when he is pushing beliefs he admits holding: namely, that discourse in the U.S. regarding Israel is narrow-minded, emotional, "hysterical," to the actual detriment of the Israelis, and that many of the worst troubles that the Jews in Israel and the Palestinians in their dispersion have suffered in the last twenty-seven years follow from the mistake they made in giving up the idea of a "binational" state. Chomsky will contribute by trying to raise the discussion to a more intelligent, constructive, educational level; he will also keep the idea of binationalism alive, for although he doubts it is about to be embraced, it may offer the best hope for peace. His book, a collection of essays and speeches written and delivered on various occasions over a period from 1969 to after the Yom Kippur War, is held together loosely by this tone of concern and the more familiar passages of polemic that break through like motifs.

"There can be few things more sad," Chomsky told a gathering of Arab, Israeli, and American students at MIT in 1969, "than the sight of young people who are, perhaps, fated to kill each other." This speech appears as one of the chapters of the book, covering a lot of ground in roughly the same style as other chapters. Chomsky, sick at the spectacle of Arabs and Jews bedeviling each other, says he approaches "these questions with no particular expert knowledge or even intimate contact. . . . Nor do I have any specific policy recommendations." Yet during some obligatory remarks about his personal background, he reveals that he "grew up with a deep interest in the revival of Hebrew culture associated wih the settlement of Palestine," lived briefly and happily on a kibbutz, and "thought very seriously about returning permanently." Furthermore, he maintains "close connections" with friends who "now live in kibbutzim

EDWARD GROSSMAN, *who writes widely on social and cultural issues, divides his time between Israel and the United States.*

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and elsewhere in Israel." In other words, he is not a stranger to the case, and from his numerous quotations from the current Hebrew press it is clear he keeps up-to-date.

Chomsky also thinks it is proper to inform his audience that from his youth, whatever he saw as attractive politically in the Jewish revival in Palestine was "some form of libertarian socialism," epitomized in the kibbutz and opposed to the development of a nation-state. In 1947 the partition of Palestine seemed "at best a dubious move, and perhaps a catastrophic error." His view has not changed. "I think that a socialist binationalist position was correct then, and remains so today." He allows that this view is challengeable on grounds of factual evidence and principle; therefore he will proceed "quite tentatively."

This said, he gives a comprehensive account of the misgivings that not only Israeli intellectuals and Arabists like Amos Oz and Shimon Shamir, but politicians like Arieh Eliav and Pinchas Sapir, were voicing soon after the Six-Day War about the effects of the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on the Jewish character of their country and the democratic quality of its institutions, including the army. By any definition, these are Zionists Chomsky cites, who would not freely give up the substance of Jewish state-sovereignty before the millennium. So far as Chomsky with his avowed slant against all state sovereignty, and perhaps especially Jewish sovereignty, is concerned, the seeds of the problems these Zionists face were planted when Jews created a state against the will of a resident population. The emergence of Fatah and other Palestinian armed groups that he notes, though perhaps only a nuisance militarily so far, signals to Chomsky that the dispossessed, the imposed-upon, have formed "a liberation movement modeling itself on others that have proven successful." He does not expect that Israeli retaliation will accomplish anything but spur the cycle of violence. Though this type of war may somewhat demoralize Israeli soldiers, Chomsky puts his Arab listeners on their guard against the belief or hope that the situation is analogous to Vietnam or Algeria. "There is no possibility that the Jewish population of Israel will give up its cultural autonomy, or freely leave, or abandon a high degree of self-government."

That is an example of Chomsky being realistic with those who wish the Jews could be scared off or ground down, like the French *colons*. There are other examples sprinkled through the book. They always leave Chomsky the possibility of advancing, with whatever protestations of tentativeness and however dim a prospect of achievement, his own solution. He conspicuously refrains from warning that the Jews will not surrender statehood. His prescription, then, is for "a binationalist state that preserves some degree of communal autonomy" for both peoples in it. Accurately he recalls that this was the hope, and to some extent the vague program, of a section of the Zionist movement, until the Holocaust made it seem "irrelevant." Hitler "jarred the Zionist movement into a new and somewhat different course, which might still be modified." As "the Nazi massacre" recedes into history, an alternative to a Jewish state becomes plausible again, he says.

Chomsky is never very specific about most of the details but he is clear enough on one thing. The lopsided Law of Return, allowing any Jew in the world to come and claim citizenship while denying that special privilege to others, will have to be amended or repealed: it is a fruit of the Holocaust and most offensive in the eyes of the Palestinians with whom the Israelis will have to live as equals in a setup that is not quite one nation, and not quite two. Despite his certainty that so-called "pragmatists" and "realists" (in Chomskian language these appellations are heavy with negative value) will do their best to prevent Palestinians and Israelis from getting together, Chomsky permits himself "some slight degree of optimism" when he reads "such statements as this by a spokesman for one of the Palestinian Arab organizations":

> It is not enough simply to wear khaki and shoot to have a revo-

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GIANNI STATERA

Gianni Statera views the European student movements of the late 1960's within their historical and sociological context and proposes that they were unique phenomena in history—short-lived, explosive outbreaks affecting politics, society, and culture. He examines the campus movements in such modern industrial societies as France and Italy and concludes that their ultimate destruction was inherent in the Utopian ideology which carried them forward. "...The most comprehensive work yet written on the protest movement which swept through European universities in the late 60's."—Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvard University
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lution, and the Palestinan youth are not giving their lives just to restore the oppressive rule of landlords and big businessmen.

The self-described Marxist faction of the PLO whose spokesman evoked Chomsky's optimism in 1969 with these words had already been responsible for premeditated massacres of civilian bystanders in Europe and Israel, operations which were multiplied in the intervening years. For a long time, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has not been considered except with revulsion by any of the Israelis unhappy with their governments' policies and unsure about the course of Zionism. Whether Chomsky should be taxed with crimes committed and gloried in by those in whose pronouncements he found hope of peace, reconciliation, and close coexistence is not directly to the point. What is more important is that Chomsky lends his prestige to calling into question the right of Israel to continue to exist as a state.

THAT is the strongest impression a reader will come away with who is not too knowledgeable or interested in going over the old controversies, emergencies, and makeshift arrangements of Zionism since Herzl. Chomsky may exaggerate, for the sake of presenting a symmetrical picture, the willingness of Palestinian Arabs at any time to parley with Jews. He may attribute too much freedom of choice to Jews and Arabs both, slighting when it suits him the role of big powers that compete to bring the Middle East into their spheres. But for the non-specialist—it should be assumed most Americans fall in this category—historical and geopolitical considerations will not loom as important as Chomsky's objection to the very existence of a Jewish state today or tomorrow, at war or at peace. This objection is couched in terms of an absolute moral judgment that is made as if logically deduced and empirically proved. "In a Jewish state, '*klein aber mein*,' there can be no full recognition of basic human rights," he asserts in his Introduction. "Such limitations are inherent in the concept of a Jewish state that also contains non-Jewish citizens." Again, in a talk at Holy Cross College: "If a state is Jewish in certain respects, then in these respects it is not democratic. That much is obvious." Chomsky becomes assertive, cavalier with proofs and definitions, if not yet polemical, whenever he confronts the fact, ugly to him, that Israel is a national community where Jews are the majority. To declare a state undemocratic by nature, not circumstance, is fairly to damn it; to do so in regard to Israel is to put a question mark over its right to exist, for Israel is unversally judged by different standards from those applied to other nations.

From what vantage point does Chomsky require more of Israel than he would of other nations at war, say North Vietnam? His autobiography suggests that the bur-

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den of exceptional vocation assigned the Jews in Palestine by Ahad Ha'am, Buber, and Magnes (not to mention Ben-Gurion) may be weighing on his mind. But he does not write, or prescribe, as a Zionist, even as a throwback to those who held out for a solution other than partition as long as they could. It is not simply by his changeable tone that he is far removed from Buber's steady, sweet pacifism—Chomsky's world-view is charged politically. However special the Arab-Jewish conflict, it cannot escape his formulas. These have been associated in the West with Communists of Jewish extraction sooner or later frozen out by Communist states. "[The invocation of] national interests," Chomsky quotes Rosa Luxemburg in support of his charge against Jewish nationality, "can only serve as a means of deception, of betraying the working masses of people to their deadly enemy, imperialism." This is a slogan, but it fits Chomsky's "tentative" way of thinking well enough. When he proposes that the Jews in Israel give up a substantial part of their sovereignty, Chomsky does it in the context of his world-view. A federation or something of Jews and Arabs at this late date when the whole world is organized for better and worse into nation-states would be the prototype for what the whole world should become.

Rhetorical style aside, the difference between this and the messianic or prophetic vision is that Chomsky, otherwise sufficiently vague, is ready to blink at means of hastening the millennium that are neither vague nor peaceful. For him to write, "the Palestinians resort to terrorism as a last resort, to impress their existence on popular consciousness" is to offer extenuating circumstances; to grant the PLO probationary status among national-liberation movements is to go a great deal further, because "national liberation" (illogically for one who detests nationalism) is a code-phrase loaded with positive value.

Some of Chomsky's American readers will warm to the PLO if it is related to the Vietcong. Chomsky is at pains to draw distinctions between his "binationalism" and the PLO's "democratic, secular state." The more he insists on these distinctions, the foggier they seem. There is remarkable similarity between his picture of what things would be like should binationalism come to pass, and the hortatory passages of Yasir Arafat's "olive branch" speech to the UN. "It seems to me," Chomsky says,

> not impossible that after the experience of building and living in new Montenegros and Lithuanias, Jews and Arabs may turn to a better way, one which has always been a possibility. It will be based on the fundamental principle, already cited, "that whatever the number of the two peoples may be, no people shall dominate the other or be subject to the government of the other." Each people will have the right to participate in self-governing

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national institutions. Any individual will be free to live where he wants, to be free from religious control, to define himself as a Jew, an Arab, or something else, and to live accordingly. People will be united by bonds other than their identification as Jews or Arabs (or lack of any such identification). This society, in the former Palestine, should permit all Palestinians the right to return, along with Jews who wish to find their place in this national homeland. All oppressive or discriminatory structures should be dismantled, and discriminatory practices should be condemned rather than reinforced. The society will not be a Jewish state or an Arab state, but rather a democratic multinational society.

Presumably Chomsky wishes to be taken seriously. If so, his version chills much like Arafat's. It puts things back to square one, the Balfour Declaration. The discriminatory Law of Return scrapped, entry of Jews into the "homeland" (evocative euphemism or evasion!) predictably becomes the cause of civil war, as it was from 1917 to 1948. Anyone familiar with the history of the Mandate remembers this; anyone acquainted, as Chomsky must be, with the views of Arabs across the political spectrum today knows that the right to make immigration policy within the boundaries of their state is the ordinary sovereign exercise the Jewish community in Israel is expected to be stripped of first. Immigration, Arabs say and perhaps believe, makes the Jewish state much more "expansionist." "No serious person will succumb to romantic illusions . . ." Chomsky says elsewhere. The politician Arthur Balfour had the excuse of romance, ignorance, and cynicism that Chomsky, an intellectual re-promulgating the Declaration in revised form half a century later, surely would not care to claim.

It is no wonder that among Israeli "doves," Chomsky's proposal is considered irrelevant, at best. The only prospect that permits them still to hope for peace—an effective partition of the old Mandate into Jewish and Palestinian states with recognized international bound-

Dialogue on World Oil

Edward J. Mitchell, editor
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

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aries—fills him with distaste and ennui. But at a distance, how many Americans will eventually come around to the notion that these troublesome people, cousins after all, with justice apportioned equally on both sides, should arrange or be encouraged to arrange to live with one another as the German-speaking and French-speaking Swiss do, for lack of a better example on earth? Today most Americans would instinctively call that unrealistic and unhelpful—look at Cyprus. Yet if the fighting goes on indefinitely, becoming even more dangerous and costly, there is no assurance that such views will not make headway. Though few Americans believe with Chomsky that American power is the scourge of mankind, after Vietnam and the books on Vietnam not so many are confident in denying it. Similarly, public opinion might eventually get battered about and fed up sufficiently so that the idea that the Jews should give up their state piecemeal for possible peace and quiet would no longer outrage common sense. It would then become easier to look away.

This will require agitation. If some of the leading figures of the Vietnam "Peace Movement" (Chomsky's terminology) who have not forsaken politics have their way, the divided remnants might try to regroup over the issue of Israel, or "Peace in the Middle East." Chomsky tentatively points the direction in the one chapter of his book where he dispenses with the forms of caution and qualification, to defend Father Daniel Berrigan against critics. Chomsky wants to show how "hysterical" reaction is when Israel is discussed in the U.S. in language he says Israelis use daily in Israel. Berrigan's well-known "I am a Jew" speech to Arabs during the Yom Kippur War is the example he selects of such a discussion, that he wishes there could be more of, for the good of Israel. In other chapters, Chomsky pretty much puts the historical facts and current events in the light that makes his "binationalism" appear like the best, or only, hope that remains, but he does not flagrantly misrepresent or otherwise violate his intellectual's responsibility to a standard of truthfulness. He does it defending Berrigan.

According to Chomsky, Berrigan evenhandedly admonished Jews and Arabs. "He condemned both sides in harsh terms. He refused to 'take sides' and urged non-violence." This quite shamelessly misrepresents the gist, content, and tone of Berrigan's performance. Berrigan explicitly said at the beginning that he would concentrate his remarks on the Jewish state because he owed Jews "a debt of love" by reason of their example as martyrs in Europe and war resisters in America. He was as good as his word; his speech was heavily weighted. After slapping the Arab regimes for "their contempt for their own poor" and "willingness to oil the war machinery of the superpowers," Berrigan excoriated Israel at length in language that became notorious, an embarrassment to many of his former admirers: ". . . criminal Jewish community. . . . The coinage of Israel is stamped with the imperialist faces whose favor she has courted; the creation of an elite of millionaires, generals, and entrepreneurs . . . the classic refugee people is now creating huge numbers of refugees . . . [with] a biblical justification for crimes against humanity. . . . [Israel is] an Orwellian nightmare."

Not the faintest hint from Chomsky that Berrigan said such things, as if to give an accurate report of his utterances would make it impossible to argue that American Jews tend to be emotional about Israel. Nor does Chomsky show any awareness that for a priest to use such purple language on such a subject is remarkable. But this is Chomsky's way finally. He is an absolutist in polemic, willful, more loyal than scrupulous, apparently unable to imagine faulting those who acted out in civil disobedience his writings in the 60's. "No one can doubt," he wrote in a previous book, "that they [the Berrigan brothers] are heroic individuals."

To whose benefit could it be, and what kind of a contribution is

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it, to pretend so vociferously that heroes never make fools of themselves, or worse?

Founding Father

WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE MAN. By JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER. LITTLE, BROWN. *423 pp. $12.50.*

Reviewed by JAMES R. ADAMS

THIS admirable biography is condensed from James Thomas Flexner's earlier four-volume work, which began to appear in 1965 and was finished two years ago. Actually, the present work is more a summation than a condensation, since it has been largely rewritten and occasionally reorganized. The narrative proceeds at a breathtaking clip, passing over Washington's first forty-three years in seventy pages and devoting only a hundred more to the entire Revolution. These limits of space force Flexner to omit some of the delightful detail of his earlier books. For instance, we miss the *Rules of Civility*, copied out by the young George: "In the presence of others, sing not to yourself with a humming noise nor drum with your fingers or feet"; "Kill no vermin, as fleas, lice, ticks, etc. in the sight of others"; "Cleanse not your teeth with the tablecloth"; and so on. Some illuminating chapters of the earlier work, like the study of Washington's art collection, are missing altogether. Flexner, who is also a distinguished historian of American art, may have thought this chapter a self-indulgence, but the discussion of Washington's taste for wild American landscapes shows better than anything else in the book the extent to which our first President was shaped by the American frontier. And once or twice one has the feeling that the rewritten, condensed passages overstate points that were presented with more scholarly nuance in the original. What remains, however, is still the best part of the work. In

JAMES R. ADAMS, *a member of the editorial staff of the* Wall Street Journal, *is a student of Middle East affairs and of the American Revolution.*

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this one volume, we have an uncluttered and coherent account of Washington's development.

In his discussion of the American Revolution, Flexner returns several times to the theme of Washington's inexperience in military matters, until one wonders whether he might not be exaggerating the point simply to guard against the charge of hero-worship. In one sense, of course, the charge of inexperience is undeniably true. In 1753, at the age of twenty-one, Washington had led a suprise attack on a party of French and Indians that sparked the Seven Years' War and earned him an ignominious reputation in the eyes of everyone but his colonial .contemporaries. Later, as a volunteer adviser to General Braddock, he distinguished himself for bravery in the midst of a bloody ambush of British forces by the French and Indians—the worst disaster in Anglo-American history. This, together with a two-year stint as Colonel of the Virginia Regiment, was the extent of Washington's military training when he was called upon to be commander-in chief of a New England insurrection in 1775. Flexner makes it plain that Washington was not feigning modesty when he told the Continental Congress, "I beg it may be remembered, by every gentleman in this room, that I, this day, declare with the utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with."

Yet military greatness depends on far more than technical experience. There were times when the revolutionary army was kept together, it seemed, only by Washington's force of will. And if Washington lacked an extensive grasp of 18th-century military science, he more than made up for it by his remarkable strategic insight, which took full advantage of American terrain. When Washington evacuated Long Island and New York and began his withdrawal across New Jersey in late 1776, he may have been following the dictates of a prudence learned from brooding over his impetuous behavior twenty years earlier. But he was also providing a masterful demonstration of a strategic retreat into a protected hinterland, a doctrine later codified by Clausewitz (and more recently plagiarized by Mao Tse-tung).

In the Christmas battle of Trenton, Washington showed what an irregular force could do to an overextended occupying army. His troops could move more quickly and infiltrate behind the lines of the less mobile enemy. Attacking supply lines, showing up where least expected, receiving aid from local farmers who had previously feigned loyalty to the occupying army, his revolutionaries recovered two-thirds of their four-month-long retreat in the space of two weeks. Such warfare has a very contemporary sound, yet it all took place two centuries ago on the plains of New Jersey.

One can easily overdo this line of argument, however. The Trenton campaign was Washington's high point as a strategist. Other battles were won by subordinates or, in the case of Yorktown, by French "military advisers." Yet it is to Washington in the field that we must look for some sense of the personality that historians have had so much trouble in bringing to life. One commonly hears Washington described as cold or remote. Certainly to his men, he was an imposing figure, dignified, self-restrained, and physically impressive. (Flexner emphasizes that Washington, standing 6'2", was an athletic giant.) But he was also affable, bantering, and particularly lively in the officers' mess.

Although Washington is properly remembered for his moderation and clemency toward the Tories in his jurisdiction, he was not a man to cross. When General Charles Lee, a former rival for the Continental command, failed to press an attack at the Battle of Monmouth, Washington flew into a rage of legendary proportions. (Flexner observes, "Every type of American has wished to make Washington an exemplar of his favorite activity, and thus it has been often repeated that on this occasion Washington established a record for eloquent profane swearing.") If Washington occasionally lost control of his furious temper, he was also, in very unusual circumstances, capable of holding a sustained grudge. Early in 1778, at the time of Valley Forge, several officers and

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

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politicians tried to force Washington to resign, alleging his incompetence. A public outcry squelched the attempt (later called the "Conway Cabal" after one leader). But Washington would not let the matter rest, and encouraged his aides to seek out duels with his enemies.

Rather than emphasizing these human qualities, the grade-school version of Washington prefers to stress his virtue, devotion to duty, personal integrity, and the like. These qualities he possessed, and they deserve emulation. But grade schools do as much damage to history as Sunday schools do to religion. By hammering names, dates, and a few eroded clichés into their students at an early age, they succeed mainly in imparting a permanent distaste for the subject.

IF SUCH mental barriers prevent a close look at Washington's personality, an entirely separate sort of myopia has left his role in political history seriously out of focus. During the first third of this century, historians of the early republic seem to have been preoccupied with finding parallels to the class conflicts of the Progressive era and the New Deal. Their work concentrated on the feud between the "Hamiltonians" and the "Jeffersonians," and they were on the whole biased in favor of Jefferson. This emphasis has resulted in a distorted picture of Washington's administration.

Flexner succeeds in restoring the proper balance. He remembers, as the Hamilton-Jefferson school forgets, that during Washington's Presidency Washington was the President. Washington made the final decisions, and he acted on his own principles. During the controversies raised by French-British fighting, for example, he was much less favorably disposed to the British than was Hamilton, and much more skeptical of the French Revolution than was Jefferson. Washington tried to keep the two men in his cabinet to get the benefit of both viewpoints; each party to the feud tried to turn Washington against the other, or at least to neutralize his opponent's influence, but the antagonists shrink in stature when measured against Washington's concern for the public good.

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

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

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In Flexner's perspective, Hamilton no longer appears as the *eminence grise* of the administration. Although Hamilton did draft many of Washington's statements, even after he had left the cabinet, Flexner maintains that he wrote only what Washington wanted him to, knowing from experience that the President would delete anything he disagreed with. On several important matters, Washington rejected Hamilton's advice and accepted Jefferson's. In Flexner's presentation, Hamilton is diminished to a brilliant subaltern, who derived his political prestige from Washington. In short, although Washington needed Hamilton, Hamilton needed Washington more.

But Flexner is on the whole sympathetic to Hamilton, who will be the subject of his next biography. It is Jefferson who receives the full brunt of his disapproval. As a cabinet officer, Jefferson was a statesman; as a party leader, he was an inspiring radical propagandist. But the attempt to combine the two roles, when his faction was opposed to the government he served, involved a certain degree of duplicity. During the debate on the Neutrality Proclamation, says Flexner, Jefferson helped to draft a policy which he simultaneously denounced in confidential letters to his friends Madison and Monroe. In the "Citizen Genet" affair, Secretary of State Jefferson at first encouraged the emissary from revolutionary France but then backed off when Genet embarked on a disastrous attempt to appeal to the American people over Washington's head. Genet, at least, knew enough of the situation to claim afterward that Jefferson had doublecrossed him.

Washington has sometimes been portrayed as an agent of the moneyed class, an anti-democrat, even a proto-monarch. Much of this misunderstanding is a result of Jefferson's attempt to confuse the record. Even more, however, has come from the stubborn refusal of the 20th century to understand the political vocabulary of the 18th. In one of the more enlightening passages of the book, Flexner explains why Washington, in the immediate aftermath of the Whiskey Rebellion, attacked the Democratic

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Societies, a proto-political party encouraged by Jefferson. His oblique reference in his Sixth Annual Address to Congress to "certain self-created societies" was interpreted by Jefferson as "an attack on the freedom of discussion, the freedom of writing, printing, and publishing." But Washington really intended, notes Flexner, to warn against factions which organized themselves outside of constitutional institutions, and threatened to pervert the relation of a constituency to its representative, bending and exploiting local grievances for the national purposes of a group of men standing outside the government. Washington was convinced that the Whiskey Rebellion had resulted from such agitation.

Attitudes have changed since Washington's time, thanks largely to the work of Jefferson, but the former's basic position still has some validity. The influence of national parties over Congressional constituencies is limited; reformers who try to extend that influence are more out of touch with the nature of our institutions than they care to admit.

EVEN more difficult for our impatient age to grasp is the supremely 18th-century virtue of prudence. The paramount exercise of this virtue in Washington's life came in his treatment of slavery. In a chapter which is probably the book's most important contribution to scholarship on Washington, Flexner illustrates Washington's steadily growing aversion to the institution. As a revolutionary leader, Washington knew that slavery would be fundamentally incompatible with American liberty. This conviction grew stronger after the war and was a major factor in Washington's rejection of Jefferson's slave-based agrarianism. But Washington was unable to oppose the institution on an effective scale. After the Revolution, he offered to lend his prestige to any politically viable emancipation movement in Virginia, but none developed. At the same time, the larger issue of national unity took precedence in his mind, in the form of the movement toward a Constitutional Convention. The success of this movement depended on Washington's prestige. If Washington had squandered his reputation on a quixotic campaign against slavery, argues Flexner, "he would undoubtedly have failed to achieve the end of slavery, and he would certainly have made impossible the role he played in the Constitutional Convention and the Presidency."

This argument has something of an old-fashioned ring to it, which some might not like to hear. In a sense, the whole tone of this work is old-fashioned—Flexner does not hesitate to praise Washington, for example, for his "political virtue." The course of modern scholarship has erected all sorts of prejudices against thinking in such terms. Yet the words are undeniably just. Flexner has rendered an invaluable service by restoring to us a mature and intelligent portrait of Washington, the republican hero. One hopes we are still capable of appreciating the example.

View from the Ward

W-3. By BETTE HOWLAND. *Viking. 206 pp. $7.95.*

Reviewed by JOHANNA KAPLAN

THERE have been so many books about suicide attempts and nervous breakdowns—either novels, usually thinly fictionalized, or direct autobiographical accounts—that they could be said to comprise a sort of morbid literary sub-genre. As with the recent plethora of books by parents of dead or dying children, attempted suicide is apparently an experience that fairly compels one to write it all down. But write *what* down exactly? And to what purpose? For the writers, it is perhaps partly an attempt to make

JOHANNA KAPLAN *is the author of the forthcoming* Other People's Lives and Other Stories *(Knopf).*

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sense out of a harrowing time in their lives when they had in fact left their senses, and often these books have the quality of an act undertaken as exorcism, as insurance that it will not happen again. For readers—and books, especially novels in this category, are often very popular—the motives are at least as complicated: they are offered at safe and easy remove a vicarious entry into a world that is half-dreaded and half-wished-for. For them, the peculiar and insidious allure is twofold: many of these books or poems, by virtue of their *being* books and therefore by novelists or poets, suggest, if inadvertently (and sometimes it is not inadvertent at all), that acute, extreme mental distress is somehow a higher state, a condition akin to or necessary for artistic creation. Indeed it is often suggested that this mental state is art's substitute or equivalent, and as such does away with the need for the drudging proof of actual work. This particular romantic misconception is most commonly found among adolescents, but adolescence, it seems, has a way of lingering on. (It was Camus who said, "Suicide is prepared within the silence of the heart, as is a great work of art.")

The second fallacy that many books in this genre propound, again perhaps unwittingly, is even more seductive. That is the notion that surrender to the helplessness of illness can bring, if not salvation, then at least comfort—a kind of perversely luxurious freedom or abdication from not just the necessarily painful and difficult dilemmas of human life, but from its actual shaping and direction. If I can't cope, then someone else will do it for me, *they'll* take care of me. Since the "they" involved is invariably a psychiatrist, such a subtly advocated easy slide into total powerlessness imputes a nearly magical efficacy to psychiatry that psychiatrists themselves would probably be the first to disavow. Even in books that do not enshrine suffering (*I Never Promised You a Rose Garden*) or are harshly critical of specific psychiatric practices (the various shock treatments in *The Bell Jar* and *Faces in the Water*), individual passivity and helplessness as a route to rescue at the hands of a remarkably omnipotent Other are in some ways encouraged or glamorized. A notable exception to this representation of psychiatric hospitals is Ken Kesey's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, but this novel's objective is specific and polemical to an entirely different end: the authoritarian, brutal mental hospital is viewed as a paradigm of authoritarian, passion-crushing bourgeois "Amerika."

W-3, Bette Howland's account of her attempted suicide and attendant brief psychiatric hospitalization, is not burdened with any of the familiar ideological baggage of most books of its genre. It does not purport to be muckraking in what might be called the first-generation tradition (Mary Jane Ward's *The Snakepit*, Jane Hillyer's *Reluctantly Told*), nor does it belong with those books of subsequent generations whose presenting voice is a dazed, flickering whisper creeping in and out of a sensitive, poetic haze—a haze which in practice, as Mrs. Howland points out, is increasingly due to the overwhelming reliance on psychotropic drugs. This book's singularity and strength derive not only from the writing itself, which is powerful, lively, and instantly evocative, but above all from Bette Howland's unusual angle of vision: she writes as if she were a participant-observer, a novelist-anthropologist in a strange, often perplexing new place. This ability to distance herself from her own immediate suffering has yielded a remarkable result: it has enabled her to present a picture of life in a psychiatric ward that is humanly moving and politically astute. She understands and explains the social structure and power configurations of hospital life in a way that neither professionals nor patients commonly come to grips with, and that is rarely written about—only Erving Goffman's *Asylums* comes to mind as an example.

Even before she was moved to the psychiatric unit (she had taken

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

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an overdose of sleeping pills and so for a while was just not physically well enough—"ready" was the word used by the psychiatrist who came to interview her), Mrs. Howland began to be aware of the peculiar underlife of the hospital: the thin, uniformed black cleaning women listlessly pushing their mops, the white-coated, yawning medical students, the night nurses dully talking: all those people whose working lives are spent in a hospital and whose relation to the individual drama and pathos of illness and suffering is often only incidental. There is a clear sense of a hospital as simply another place of work:

> For the sick in their beds were invisible. They were there only by implication. They must have existed, if only for the sake of this other life, full of importance —the bustling arms, starched coats; the carts, mops, ringings, beepings; the brisk comings-and-goings of white-stockinged nurses.

Once her physical condition improved, Mrs. Howland was transferred to W-3, the psychiatric ward, and found herself, willy-nilly, a member of a therapeutic community. It was a membership she had not sought and whose implications she did not immediately understand. Other patients, experienced in the ways of psychiatric wards, did understand it: "Iris was not taken in by all this community stuff. . . . She had been around long enough to know that her survival in a mental ward depended on her status with the doctors. *They* were the ones who doled out the pills, the Passes, and finally the discharges." Frequently piously assured by the staff that there were no rules, or rather, that the only existing rules were the ones the patients themselves agreed upon, Mrs. Howland found that to the contrary W-3 was all rules—even if they did not work or were sometimes unspoken. Patients quickly grasped what kinds of behavior, jargonized language included, were expected of them, deemed healthy, and they acted in accordance with the theoretical assumptions that the staff hoped were true. In their various states of druggy confusion and general disarray, they attended a dizzying number of fancily titled meet-

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Foreword by Elisabeth Kubler-Ross

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

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ings: Community Rounds, Team Meetings, Patients Council; they had Halloween parties, went bowling, worked on projects in occupational therapy. "Hooking rugs was all the rage on the ward," Mrs. Howland reports, but it was only the nurses who hooked their rugs with real enthusiasm. The patients were never allowed to close their doors, they always had to be out "participating, colliding, with life—life which was to be found somewhere out there, and not in ourselves." Even at night, privacy was nonexistent.

NOWHERE does Mrs. Howland suggest that the doctors or nurses were brutal or even lacking in sympathy with their patients. What she saw was sham, confusion, and what she calls "petty deceits." The professionals on W-3 were bent on seeing their theories succeed, the patients were their proving grounds, and because it was a teaching hospital, most of the professionals were brand new at what they were doing. They were in the process of learning, they did not stay long; their stumbling and faltering was obvious and the more sophisticated patients were able to gauge the status and experience of their doctors by their mannerisms and the size of their offices. Ultimately, Mrs. Howland came to the conclusion that "the patients existed for the sake of the hospital, not the other way around."

Although this is a confessional book of sorts, Mrs. Howland remains remarkably reticent about herself and her own inner life. That's her prerogative, of course, but it leaves the reader feeling oddly cheated. She presents the superficial facts of her life and of her acute distress, but if this experience yielded her any redemptive knowledge or new self-understanding, she has simply left it out. She concludes finally that her hospitalization served its purpose because it freed her of "[her] own personality, [her] own particular history." If actually achieved, this would be a highly dubious, not to say dangerous, goal. But Bette Howland is at her best when her keenly observing eye is turned outward. Watching, always watching, she misses nothing, grasps everything, and puts it all together with an originality and cogency that are rare and memorable.

Goodbye to the Mob

BLACK MAFIA: ETHNIC SUCCESSION IN ORGANIZED CRIME. By FRANCIS A. J. IANNI. *Simon & Schuster. 831 pp. $8.95.*

Reviewed by B. BRUCE-BRIGGS

PROFESSOR IANNI'S thesis is that control of organized crime is slipping from the increasingly bourgeois and respectable Italian-Americans and is being taken over by Cuban, Puerto Rican, and black gangsters. If true, this would be in some respects a positive development. At present, most big Northern cities are afflicted by *dis*organized crime. Free-lance criminals make business and residential activities difficult, expensive, and dangerous in large areas. *Organized* crime, on the other hand, performs useful illegal services to society as a whole and provides income and employment opportunities for depressed minority groups. It is generally agreed that the safest places in our cities are those controlled by the Mafia. A black-and-brown Mafia would bring order to crime, institutionalize services, make the streets safer, and levy less than the existing laissez-faire system.

But Ianni's display of evidence does not support his thesis. With the exception of a single organization in "Patterson" (all individual names in the book are fictional; one must assume the places are too), the criminals described here are unimpressive—a pimp, a fence-loan shark, a narcotics dealer, a Brooklyn boys' gang that grew up into better things, a numbers banker, a hot car-parts dealer—just an assortment of small-time hoods and punks, not to be compared with the sophisticated organizations detailed in Ralph Salerno and John S. Tompkins's thoughtful and comprehensive *The Crime Confederation.*

The types of operations Ianni deals with have always existed in urban poverty areas and have been

B. BRUCE-BRIGGS *is writing a book on the future of cities which Basic Books will publish later this year.*

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manned by the local people. To be sure, there has been some specialization—at the turn of the century Jews and Armenians were favored fences, and even Ianni's "minority" criminals seem to prefer Jewish shysters for their legal services. But the everyday crime in slums has been handled by locals, whether they were of old American stock, Scots-Irish, Irish, German, Slavic, Jewish, or Italian.

Ethnic succession in crime is a myth. During Prohibition, criminals came out of all the slums to serve the demand of urban dwellers for illegal liquor. The winners of the vigorous competition for markets were a loosely allied confederation of gangs dominated by (but not restricted to) Italians in line positions and Jews in the staff. With the profits, organization, respectability, and political contacts acquired during Prohibition, the syndicates were able to convert to labor relations, insurance, narcotics, gambling, and many legal businesses. But respectability and political contacts have gradually been eroded. Almost all the great leaders who put together the organization are dead; Meyer Lansky, the *eminence grise* of the Mob, is one of the few remaining survivors of that heroic era. What with federal income tax and wiretapping, it would probably be impossible to rejuvenate organized crime on the national and regional levels.

What Ianni chronicles, then, is a regression to the *status quo ante* Prohibition—small localized gangs with little cohesion or political clout. Indeed, present-day ethnic factors may preclude, rather than foster, the establishment of organized crime in the "ghetto." According to Ianni, it is Cubans who most closely adhere to the old Italian model, but the Cuban diaspora is economically so succeeful that its criminal phase will scarcely last a generation. Black criminals have the fierce individualism, sense of personal honor, and taste for violence of their Southern homeland, but they lack the family ties and organizational heritage necessary to put together stable syndicates. (Ianni's speculations that black criminals might turn politically militant is not consistent with the record of urban criminals anywhere or with the behavior, as distinguished from the rhetoric fed to white sociologists, of black criminals.) Puerto Ricans offer a mixed example—some are adhering to black models, but the more successful seem to be assimilating to the Italians as they move up.

As illustrated by Ianni's fine discourse on gypsy-cab operations in New York City (an illegal business employing tens of thousands and serving hundreds of thousands, made necessary by licensing procedures "in the public interest"), the expansion of government regulation creates additional needs and opportunities for organized crime. It is possible, however, that American society has evolved to the point where we no longer require lower-class criminals at all. The marijuana business, certainly,

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

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suggests that the middle classes are quite capable of staffing their own illegal services. Professor Ianni's thesis of ethnic succession, then, in addition to describing a process that has never really taken place, may be addressed to a way of life that is altogether en route to disappearance.

Power and Anxiety

JEWS AND AMERICAN POLITICS. By STEPHEN D. ISAACS. *Doubleday. 302 pp. $8.95.*

AMERICAN JEWS: COMMUNITY IN CRISIS. By GERALD S. STROBER. *Doubleday. 297 pp. $7.95.*

Reviewed by DAVID SINGER

THE general thesis of Stephen Isaacs's *Jews and American Politics,* which is based on interviews with politically active Jews in government, the media, and Jewish organizations, is easily stated: Jews play a "unique role" in American political life in that they "command influence far out of scale to their tiny proportion of the population." This influence extends to virtually all aspects of the political process, and is a result of Jewish "hyperactivity" in the political arena. Isaacs's Jewish-power thesis is set forth and elaborated in a series of short chapters dealing with such matters as the sources of Jewish political activity, the role of Jewish officeholders, staffers, media experts, and fund raisers, the nature of the "Jewish vote," the black-Jewish confrontation, and the new Jewish "conservatism." In his concluding chapter, "Jewish Power: Taking a Stand as Jews," Isaacs applauds the "open exercise of Jewish influence" in American political life, and the fact that Jews are "expressing themselves openly, enthusiastically, and brashly" on matters of concern to the Jewish community.

Jews and American Politics provides useful information on a number of subjects. It also contains some interesting vignettes (Senator George McGovern hobnobbing with "big-money" Jewish industrialists; Governor Marvin Mandel striving to prove that a Jew can be a "regular guy") and a generous sprinkling of gossip. But Isaacs's central thesis about Jewish power remains completely unproved. This is not a matter of insufficient evidence, but, more significantly, of a basic failure to supply necessary definitions and to draw necessary distinctions.

One would think, for example, that any discussion of Jewish power would have to begin by differentiating among the various groups of Jews in the United States—rich-poor; radical-liberal-conservative; Orthodox-Conservative-Reform-unaffiliated; etc.—and by indicating the separate political agendas of each. But Isaacs does no such thing. Instead, he lumps all Jews together, giving as his reason the fact that politicians "treat them as a bloc in their planning of strategy, campaign literature, speeches, pleas for contributions, polls, and judgments." It is this "bloc" approach to American Jewry that leads Isaacs to come up with such meaningless observations as: "Thus are the likes of an Abbie Hoffman and a Ben Wattenberg or a Daniel Ellsberg and a Meshulam Riklis united in peoplehood." This leaves completely unexplained Hoffman's and Ellsberg's New Leftism, as against Wattenberg's support of Senator Henry Jackson, and Riklis's militant Zionism. The one advantage to treating all Jews as a single entity is that it enables Isaacs to compile lengthy lists purporting to demonstrate "Jewish" power. To cite one example:

> It is no accident ... that the most respected political reporter of the day, David S. Broder, is Jewish; or that the best known media expert, David Garth, is too; or that the top political filmmaker, Charles Guggenheim, is. Or that of the three principal national public opinion surveyors, two (Louis Harris and Daniel Yankelovich) are Jewish.
>
> The most successful popular political historian, Theodore White, is Jewish too. As is the leading authority on campaign

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DAVID SINGER *has contributed essays on Jewish affairs to* COMMENTARY, Judaism, Midstream, *and other periodicals.*

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financing, Herbert E. Alexander . . . and the preeminent producer of political radio commercials, Tony Schwartz, and the best-known political satirist, Art Buchwald.

The most prominent activists of the radical Left when it was in its peak—Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman—were Jews. As are many of the most prominent political fund raisers like the Republicans' Max Fisher and the Democrats' Arthur Krim. As are many of the leading political speech writers, like the Republicans' William Safire and the Democrats' Richard Goodwin and Adam Walinsky. And so, too, is the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Robert Strauss.

What does such a compilation prove? It certainly demonstrates that a striking number of individuals of Jewish origin play an important role in the American political arena. It indicates absolutely nothing, however, about their shared commitment to a political agenda that can in any way be described as Jewish.

IF "Jewish" remains an empty abstraction throughout *Jews and American Politics,* so does "power." In a political context, power must mean the capacity to shape and control events, and Isaacs offers scarcely any evidence at all that American Jews are able to do this. Because Jews are heavily concentrated in a small number of key states—New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Florida, and California—and vote in greater numbers than do members of other groups, the Jewish community receives a great deal of attention during election years. Attention, however, is one thing, power quite another. Thus, in his chapter, "Years of Turbulence," which deals with such aspects of the black-Jewish confrontation as the New York City school strike, the Forest Hills housing imbroglio, and the affirmative-action/quota issue, Isaacs fails to cite a single instance in which Jewish community interests clearly prevailed. As for foreign affairs, Isaacs himself concedes that American Jews can influence United States policy on Israel and Soviet Jewry only insofar as Jewish sentiment generally coincides with what is otherwise perceived as the American national interest.

Finally, Isaacs fails to provide a serious analysis of the sources of Jewish political activity. Because he treats American Jewry as a monolithic entity, he places himself in the unenviable position of having to offer a unitary explanation of the political motivation of Jewish liberals, radicals, and conservatives. Isaacs's initial inclination is to argue that there is an inherited "knot of fear" in the recesses of the Jewish psyche, and that Jews flock to the political arena in order to avoid "becoming lamp shades. . . ." This formulation, aside from being extremely nebulous (and vulgar), works against Isaacs's own view of a self-assured American Jewish community. In the end, therefore, he falls back on the cliché that Jewish political activity is rooted in the Jewish religious tradition. A sample of his "insights" in this connection:

> The [New Deal] may have seemed somewhat radical in America, but it was not so radical according to precepts of Jewish communality and to the Talmudic recognition that property is fundamentally a social object. . . .
>
> If anything [Arthur] Waskow [the New Leftist] is directly within the rabbinic tradition, searching and wrestling as rabbis always did for some meaning to the past that will guide the present and future. . . .
>
> An interesting facet of the growing "conservatism" among some Jews is that their politics are coming into line with their religion. Judaism is, basically, a conservative religion.

Need more be said about all this, other than that a theory which explains everything, explains nothing?

THERE is no doubt that Gerald Strober, in *American Jews: Community in Crisis,* comes much closer than does Isaacs to describing the actual situation. That situation, in Strober's alarmed view, is compounded of a multiplicity of unsolved problems (each of which he examines at length):

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> In a genuine sense, the Jewish community is under siege, disturbed from without by the threat to Israel's existence, the energy crisis, and the success of Arab political tactics and propaganda, as well as by the enmity and hostility of many of the same groups it once worked with in coalition [blacks, mainline Protestants, etc.]; and troubled from within by the continuing ambiguity of its relationship with Israel, and a major series of crises involving identity, the disaffection of youth, the status of religion, and the diminishing effectiveness of the communal organizations.

Because of its external problems, Strober argues, American Jewry is "hard pressed to maintain its position as an equal partner in the American pluralistic setting," while its internal difficulties prevent it from "adopting the disciplined position required to cope with the grave threat to continuity and survival."

The chief villains of *American Jews* are all those at home and abroad who are seeking to undermine Jewish security in America: the Arabs, the Russians, the State Department, the New Leftists, the black militants, the National Council of Churches, the Wasp establishment. These "enemies," whether acting individually or in tandem, are creating havoc for American Jewry by destroying the status quo in which Jews enjoyed relative stability and power. Among the new and entirely negative elements in the American Jewish situation, according to Strober, are:

> The Christian establishment's antagonism to Israel, the spread of anti-Jewish attitudes from extremists to rank-and-file elements of the black community, the trend toward quotas and away from the principle of merit in employment and educational opportunities, the diminution of Jewish poitical clout, the renaissance of ethnic identification among groups traditionally hostile to Jewish experience [and] the joining together of a great industrial force with the Arab lobby. . . .

As if this were not bad enough, Strober sees the distinct possibility of the emergence of a solid "Wasp-white, ethnic-black, anti-Jewish coalition" that will be openly anti-Semitic.

While Strober lashes out at a large number of non-Jewish targets, he is also highly critical of the leadership of the American Jewish community, centered in the major Jewish defense agencies, which he contends has failed the broad masses of American Jews in two fundamental ways. First, it has not made a serious effort to deal with the manifold problems associated with the "Jewish identity crisis"—the generally poor quality of Jewish education, the vacuity of much of synagogue life, the alienation of Jewish youth, the rising rate of intermarriage, etc. As a result, the Jewish community finds itself in an internally weak state at the very time that it is being severely challenged from the outside. Second, and especially significant according to Strober, the "establishment" leadership has steadfastly refused to abandon its universalist outlook, even though that outlook has been totally discredited:

> Tragically for the issue of Jewish survival in America, the capacity of the Jewish establishment for self-delusion is almost limitless. For years this establishment has operated on the principle that the fate of the American Jewish community is inextricably tied to the status of all other minority groups within the society. Thus, during the 1960's the national agencies and their local branches and counterparts increasingly assigned high priority to programs directed at the amelioration of the negative conditions of blacks and other non-Jewish minorities. These programs often continued in operation even after the intended beneficiaries expressed anti-Jewish tendencies. The liberal-humanist-universalist ethic of the Jewish establishment rendered it incapable of dealing with these manifestations of hostility and resulted in a general attempt to sweep black and other forms of anti-Semitism under the rug.

What the contemporary Jewish situation calls for, Strober argues, is a "thoroughgoing and all-inclusive concentration and preoccupation with *Jewish* concerns and issues."

Strober presents a convincing picture of a Jewish community increasingly isolated and threatened. This does not mean, however, as Strober believes it does, that American Jewry is totally lacking in resources with which to defend its interests. There are distinct limits to Jewish political power, but the fact remains that it exists, and that Jews therefore bring some leverage to the political arena. Indeed, Strober himself cites instances in relation to Israel, Soviet Jewry, and the urban crisis in which the Jewish community has been able to have a positive impact on the course of events. Moreover, since the masses of American Jews, as Strober recognizes, are definitely moving in a particularist direction, the future is likely to witness heightened Jewish political activism and militancy. Finally, American Jewry can draw upon the reservoir of Christian good will which, though diminished, is still an operative factor in Jewish-Christian relations.

As for Strober's criticisms of the American Jewish leadership, they must be seen as the product of polemical excess. Strober sets himself up as the champion of Jewish self-interest, and attacks the Jewish defense agencies for their universalist outlook. What he fails to take sufficient account of, however, is the conviction of these agencies that a concern for non-Jews is a basic ingredient of Jewish self-interest. Since Strober would agree that Jews have a definite stake in the general welfare of society, in reality the differences between him and the "establishment" leadership are differences of degree rather than of kind. And even here the area of disagreement is not as large as he asserts, since the Jewish defense agencies are themselves becoming more particularistic in their concerns, as is indicated by the various attempts in recent years to come to grips with the "Jewish identity crisis" and to promote Jewish study and practice. In the end, Strober's work has the unfortunate effect of making an admittedly bleak situation appear worse than it actually is.

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

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